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Summary 
 
Genetically modified cotton was first time introduced during 1996 in USA and Australia. 
Since then, many cotton producing countries have commercialized the production of Bt 
cotton. Pakistan is the fourth largest cotton producing country in the world after China, 
USA and India. Cotton and cotton products contribute about 3.2 % to GDP and 60-65% 
to foreign exchange earnings of the country. Cotton production supports millions of 
farm families in Pakistan. Recently Bt cotton varieties are grown by farmers in Pakistan 
and adoption rate is quite high as more than 75% area is under Bt cotton varieties. The 
present study is the first Bt cotton adoption and impact evaluation study in Pakistan. 
Moreover, important focus is on the influence of land rights on the farmers‟ decision to 
invest in land improvement measures and efficiency level. Due to highly skewed land 
distribution pattern in Pakistan, one third of the farmers are tenant farmers. Tenant 
farmers have few land rights and very less resources. Therefore, in the present study 
land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement measures and 
efficiency levels is estimated. Literature on farmers‟ market participation is mostly 
missing in the past, particularly in Pakistan, and only few studies have analyzed 
farmers‟ market participation. Farmers‟ market participation is affected by household 
resources and credit constraints. Three important aspects of cotton production and 
marketing are focused in this dissertation i.e. adoption and impact of Bt cotton, land 
rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement measures and 
efficiency level, and cotton farmers, access to markets. These three important aspects 
has been mostly ignored in the past. 
 
For the study, cross sectional data set of 325 cotton farmers has been collected in 
2007 from seven highest cotton producing districts in the Punjab province of Pakistan. 
These seven districts together produce nearly 50% cotton of Pakistan. The study 
estimates the adoption and impact of Bt cotton on household welfare by employing the 
propensity score matching approach. Propensity score matching is non-parametric 
method. Hence, no functional form assumptions are needed. Propensity score creates 
the condition of a randomized experiment by constructing the control group. Land 
rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement measures is 
estimated by employing the multivariate Tobit model, while cotton producers‟ technical, 
allocative and economic efficiencies are estimated by employing translog profit and 
cost frontier models. The propensity score matching approach is employed to examine 
the direct effects of investment in the productivity enhancing measures on farm 
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productivity and efficiency. For the cotton marketing analysis, a number of different 
models are employed, to investigate the farmers‟ market participation and its impact on 
net returns. Probit model is employed for farmers‟ market participation and results have 
been instrumented for credit (advance money) taken from local trader (commission 
agent). The Tobit and censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) models were 
employed for distance travelled to sell cotton, while Heckman selection estimator was 
employed for quantity of cotton sold in the market. The propensity score matching 
estimator was employed for estimating cotton net returns.  
 
The results regarding adoption and impact of genetically modified cotton indicates that 
Bt cotton adoption has positive and significant impact on cotton yields and household 
income while negative and significant impact on pesticide demand and poverty status 
of the household. In detail, the results indicate that adopters of Bt cotton technology are 
getting 50-60 kg per acre higher yields, while the average household incomes are 
higher by rupees 16500-17000. The demand for pesticide is lower among adopter 
households in the range of 0.62-0.68 litres per acre. The probability of adopters being 
poor is found to be lower by about 13.5-14.3%, relative to non-adopters. The farming 
categories (small, medium and large) results indicate that new technology has a 
beneficial impact among small, medium as well as large scale farming households. 
Particularly Bt cotton can help to reduce poverty among small scale farmers. The  
finding are very much in line with the previous studies on Bt cotton adoption and impact 
evaluation in different countries like China, India and Argentina. 
 
The results of land rights influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement 
measures and efficiency level indicate that farmers with secure land rights invest more 
in land improvement measures i.e. farm yard manure, mineral fertilizer and leguminous 
crops. The estimates reveal that owner-cultivated lands exhibit the highest levels of 
technical, allocative and economic efficiency. Specifically, the allocative efficiency for 
owner-cultivated, fixed-renters and sharecroppers are 92, 85 and 82%, while the 
corresponding figures for technical efficiency are 86, 80 and 77%, respectively. 
Similarly, the economic efficiency of owner-cultivated, fixed renters and sharecroppers 
are 78, 68 and 62%, respectively. The results indicates that owners are technically, 
allocativelly and economically more efficient as compared to sharecropper and fixed 
renters. The fixed renters are technically, allocativelly and economically more efficient 
as compared to sharecroppers. 
 
 v 
The results of farmers‟ market participation indicate that farmers‟ market participation is 
influenced by the farmers‟ resources and households‟ wealth. Compared to resource 
poor farmers, large farmers have easier access to markets. Wealthier households can 
travel longer distances for cotton selling and are also in a position to sell larger 
volumes of cotton in the market. The net returns are positive and significant for the 
farmers selling at market compared to the farmers selling at farm gate.  
 
The present study provides important policy implications, since the adoption of the Bt 
cotton technology has a significantly positive impact on cotton yields, household 
income and poverty reduction, and a negative impact on the use of pesticides. 
Especially, targeting the small-scale farmers with new agricultural technology can help 
improving their farm productivity, household income and reduce poverty among these 
households. Policies in this direction include increasing cotton farmers‟ access to 
information to reduce uncertainty about new technologies and formal credit for them to 
overcome liquidity constraints. Additionally, improving their human capital in the form of 
education and providing them with better infrastructure, as well as advanced extension 
services, can help in adoption of Bt cotton technology. Since owners are technically, 
allocativelly and economically more efficient as compared to tenants, hence tenants 
should be provided land rights through land reforms. This will encourage the small- 
scale farmers to invest in land improvement measures and hence higher levels of 
technical, allocative and economic efficiency can be achieved, which will be helpful in 
increasing the cotton productivity at national level. Cotton marketing results indicate 
that currently the wealthy households have easy access to markets. Farmers with 
market participation are getting higher net returns compared to farmers selling at the 
farm gate. Small-scale farmers can be linked to markets by investing in human capital, 
improving the village infrastructure and making the formal credit programme easy for 
small-scale farmers. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Im Jahr 1996 wurde in den USA und Australien zum ersten Mal gentechnisch 
veränderte Baumwolle eingesetzt. Seitdem haben viele Baumwolle produzierende 
Länder die Produktion von Bt-Baumwolle kommerzialisiert. Pakistan ist nach China, 
den USA und Indien der viertgrößte Baumwollproduzent der Welt und Baumwolle und 
Baumwollprodukte machen 3,2% des BIP und 60% bis 65% der Deviseneinnahmen 
des Landes aus. Die Baumwollproduktion unterstützt Millionen Familienbetriebe. 
Neuerdings werden verschiedene Bt-Baumwollsorten von Landwirten in Pakistan 
angebaut und die Einführungsrate ist sehr hoch, wobei mittlerweile mehr als 75% des 
Landes mit verschiedenen Bt-Baumwollsorten bewirtschaftet werden. Die vorliegende 
Studie ist die erste Studie, die sich mit der Annahme der Bt-Baumwolle und der 
Auswirkungsbewertung in Pakistan befasst. Darüber hinaus liegt der Schwerpunkt 
auch auf dem Einfluss von Bodenrechten auf die Entscheidung der Landwirte, in 
Bodenverbesserungsmaßnahmen und den Wirkungsgrad zu investieren. Aufgrund der 
stark verzerrten Bodenverteilungsstruktur in Pakistan sind ein Drittel der Landwirte 
Pächter. Pächter haben nur wenige Bodenrechte und sehr wenige Ressourcen. Aus 
diesem Grund wird der Einfluss der Bodenrechte auf die Entscheidung der Landwirte, 
in Bodenverbesserungsmaßnahmen und den Wirkungsgrad zu investieren, in dieser 
Studie untersucht. 
Es gibt bisher kaum Literatur bezüglich der Marktteilnahme der Landwirte in Pakistan 
und insgesamt haben nur wenige Studien die Marktteilnahme der Landwirte 
untersucht. Die Marktteilnahme der Landwirte wird durch die Haushaltsressourcen und 
Krediteinschränkungen beeinflusst. Drei wichtige Aspekte der Baumwollproduktion 
werden beleuchtet, nämlich die Annahme der Bt-Baumwolle und deren Auswirkungen, 
der Einfluss der Bodenrechte auf die Entscheidung der Landwirte, in 
Bodenverbesserungsmaßnahmen und den Wirkungsgrad zu investieren, und der 
Zugang zu Märkten für die Baumwollproduzenten. Diese drei Aspekte wurden in der 
Vergangenheit kaum berücksichtigt. 
Für diese Studie wurde im Jahr 2007 in den 7 produktionsstärksten Bezirken der 
pakistanischen Provinz Punjab ein Querschnittsdatensatz mit 325 
Baumwollproduzenten erhoben. Diese 7 Bezirke zusammen genommen produzieren 
knapp 50% der gesamten Baumwolle in Pakistan. Mit Hilfe der Propensity Score 
Matching-Methode werden in dieser Studie die Annahme der Bt-Baumwollproduktion 
und die Auswirkungen der Produktion auf die Wohlfahrt der Haushalte untersucht. 
Propensity Score Matching ist eine nichtparametrische Methode und benötigt daher 
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keine Annahme zur funktionalen Form. Das Verfahren schafft die Bedingungen eines 
randomisierten Experiments, indem eine Kontrollgruppe gebildet wird. Der Einfluss der 
Bodenrechte auf die Investitionsentscheidung der Landwirte wird mit Hilfe eines 
multivariaten Tobit-Modells geschätzt, während die technischen, allokativen und 
wirtschaftlichen Leistungen der Baumwollproduzenten mittels Translog-Gewinn- und 
Kostengrenzmodellen untersucht werden. Das Propensity Score Matching-Verfahren 
wird verwendet, um die direkten Auswirkungen der Investitionen in 
Produktivitätssteigerungsmaßnahmen auf die landwirtschaftliche Produktivität und 
Leistung zu beleuchten. Zum Zwecke der Analyse des Baumwollmarketing finden 
verschiedene Modelle Anwendung, um die Marktteilnahme der Landwirte und deren 
Einfluss auf den Nettoertrag zu untersuchen. Für die Marktteilnahme der Landwirte 
wird ein Probit-Modell angewandt und die Ergebnisse werden als Kredit (Vorschuss) 
vom Händler (Kommissionär) instrumentiert. Die Tobit- und CLAD-Modelle werden für 
die zurückgelegte Entfernung zum Baumwollverkauf angewandt, während der 
Heckman-Selektionsschätzer für die auf dem Markt verkaufte Menge an Baumwolle 
verwendet wird. Die Propensity Score Matching-Methode wird für die Analyse der 
Nettoerträge der Baumwolle herangezogen. 
Die Ergebnisse bezüglich Annahme und Auswirkung der gentechnisch veränderten 
Baumwolle deuten darauf hin, dass Bt-Baumwolle signifikant positive Auswirkungen 
auf die Baumwollerträge und das Haushaltseinkommen hat und dazu signifikant 
negative Auswirkungen auf den Pestizidverbrauch und die Armutssituation des 
Haushaltes. Genauer gesagt erzielen Landwirte, die die Bt-Baumwolltechnologie 
annehmen, um 50 bis 60 Kilogramm pro Morgen höhere Erträge und das 
durchschnittliche Einkommen der Haushalte ist um 16.500 bis 17.000 Rupien höher. 
Der Pestizidverbrauch der annehmenden Haushalte ist um 0,62 bis 0,68 Liter pro 
Morgen niedriger und die Wahrscheinlichkeit der annehmenden Haushalte, arm zu 
sein, ist im Vergleich zu nicht annehmenden Haushalten um etwa 13,5% bis 14,3% 
niedriger. Die Ergebnisse für die verschiedenen Betriebsgrößen zeigen, dass die neue 
Technologie sowohl auf Klein-, Mittel- und Großbetriebe günstige Auswirkungen hat, 
wobei Bt-Baumwolle besonders in Kleinbetrieben dazu beiträgt, die Armut zu 
reduzieren. Diese Ergebnisse stimmen mit den bisherigen Studien überein, die 
ebenfalls die Annahme von Bt-Baumwolle und die Auswirkungsbewertung in 
verschiedenen Ländern wie China, Indien oder Argentinien untersucht haben. 
Die Ergebnisse bezüglich des Einflusses der Bodenrechte auf die Entscheidung der 
Landwirte, in Bodenverbesserungsmaßnahmen und den Wirkungsgrad zu investieren, 
weisen darauf hin, dass Landwirte mit sicheren Bodenrechten stärker in 
Bodenverbesserungsmaßnahmen, wie z.B. Stalldung, Mineraldünger und 
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Hülsenfrüchte, investieren. Die Werte belegen, dass vom Besitzer bestelltes Land die 
höchsten technischen, allokativen und wirtschaftlichen Leistungserträge aufweist. 
Genauer gesagt betragen die allokativen Wirkungsgrade der vom Besitzer bestellten 
Böden, der Böden von Pächtern mit fester Miete und von Farmpächtern 92%, 85% und 
82% und die entsprechenden Zahlen für den technischen Wirkungsgrad sind 86%, 
80% beziehungsweise 77%. Die wirtschaftlichen Wirkungsgrade für die von Besitzer 
bestellten Böden, die Böden von Pächtern mit fester Miete und von Farmpächtern 
betragen 78%, 68% beziehungsweise 62%. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass 
Besitzer technisch, allokativ und wirtschaftlich gesehen effizienter sind, als Pächter mit 
fester Miete oder Farmpächter, wobei Pächter mit fester Miete wiederum effizienter 
sind, als Farmpächter. 
Die Ergebnisse für die Marktteilnahme der Landwirte zeigen, dass die Marktteilnahme 
durch die Ressourcen des Landwirts und das Vermögen des Haushaltes beeinflusst 
wird. Ressourcenstarke Landwirte haben im Vergleich zu ressourcenschwächeren 
Landwirten einen leichteren Marktzugang, da reichere Haushalte für den 
Baumwollverkauf weitere Strecken zurück legen können und sie sind darüber hinaus 
fähig, größere Mengen an Baumwolle zu verkaufen. Die Nettoerträge sind signifikant 
positiv für Landwirte, die ihre Baumwolle auf dem Markt verkaufen im Vergleich zu 
Landwirten, die ihre Baumwolle ab Hof verkaufen. 
Die vorliegende Studie hat bedeutende Auswirkungen auf die Politik, da die Annahme 
von Bt-Baumwolle einen signifikant positiven Einfluss auf die Baumwollerträge, das 
Haushaltseinkommen und die Armutsreduktion, sowie einen signifikant negativen 
Einfluss auf die Pestizidnachfrage hat. Besonders die Förderung neuer 
Agrartechnologie in Kleinbetrieben kann ihre Produktivität und ihr Einkommen erhöhen 
und die Armut dieser Haushalte reduzieren. Maßnahmen in diese Richtung beinhalten 
die Verbesserung des Zugangs der Baumwollproduzenten zu Information, um die 
Unsicherheit gegenüber neuen Technologien zu verringern, und zu Krediten, um 
Liquidiätseinschränkungen zu überwinden. Darüber hinaus sollten die Bildung und die 
Infrastruktur der Baumwollproduzenten verbessert und verbesserte Beratungsdienste 
angeboten werden, um sie bei der Annahme der Bt-Baumwolltechnologie zu 
unterstützen. Da Besitzer technisch, allokativ und wirtschaftlich effizienter sind als 
Pächter, sollten Pächter durch Bodenreformen mit mehr Bodenrechten ausgestattet 
werden. Dies wird Kleinbetriebe ermutigen, in Bodenverbesserungsmaßnahmen zu 
investieren, um höhere technische, allokative und wirtschaftliche Wirkungsgrade zu 
erreichen, wodurch die Baumwollproduktivität auf nationaler Ebene gesteigert werden 
kann. Die Ergebnisse für das Baumwollmarketing weisen darauf hin, dass 
wohlhabendere Haushalte momentan leichteren Zugang zu Märkten haben. Am Markt 
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Teil nehmende Landwirte haben höhere Nettoerträge im Vergleich zu Landwirten, die 
ihre Baumwolle ab Hof verkaufen. Kleinbauern können mit dem Markt verbunden 
werden, indem in Humankapital investiert, die dörfliche Infrastruktur verbessert und 
Kreditprogramme für Kleinbauern vereinfacht werden. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1. Problem Setting and Motivation 
 
Cotton occupies the main position in Pakistan‟s economy, since two thirds of the 
country export earnings are from cotton and cotton products. In Pakistan, more than   
67% of the population lives in rural areas, which are directly or indirectly dependent on 
agricultural activities for their livelihood. Cotton production supports millions of farm 
families in Pakistan. Genetically modified cotton was first introduced in 1996 in USA 
and Australia, since then many countries have commercialized the cultivation of Bt 
cotton such as China, India, USA, Argentina, Australia, South Africa, Mexico, Columbia 
and Indonesia. As a result, the area devoted to Bt cotton has increased from 1.9 million 
acres in 1996 to more than 25 million acres in 2008. Although a large number of 
studies have been carried out in cotton producing countries regarding the adoption and 
impact of Bt cotton technology, past studies have mostly focused on cotton yields and 
pesticide demand (see e. g. Crost et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2002; Qaim and 
Zilberman, 2003). The most important aspect that is missing in the past literature is the 
Bt cotton impact on household poverty. The second important aspect that is missing in 
the literature is that only a couple of studies have taken into account the selectivity bias 
problem and no study has employed the propensity score matching approach in the 
past, which is quite new in the growing literature. In Pakistan, Bt cotton has only 
recently been introduced. The present study is one of very few studies that explicitly 
analyzed household poverty effects of genetically modified crops and the first impact 
assessment of Bt cotton in Pakistan. 
 
Past literature on land rights has focused different countries and their influence on 
investment in land improvement measures. In Pakistan, only a couple of studies has 
been carried out regarding land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land 
improvement measures but no study has related the improvement in soil capital to the 
household efficiency level. Due to highly skewed land ownership, one third of the 
farmers are tenant farmers in Pakistan. Tenant farmers receive less institutional 
support and have fewer resources. Due to higher tenancy rates in Pakistan, the cotton 
yield per hectare is low and is only 781 kg, while in other cotton producing countries it 
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is much higher, e.g. Israel 1,818 kg, Australia 1,802 kg, Syria 1,571 kg, Mexico     
1,312 kg, Turkey 1,289 kg, Greece 1081 kg, USA 951 kg and Egypt 939 kg 
(International Cotton Advisory Committee, 2003). In Pakistan, the per hectare 
productivity of cotton is low and the cost of production is high. As a result, cotton is also 
facing the danger of replacement by competing crops like sugarcane and rice (Pakistan 
Times, 2006). In the present study, land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest 
in land improvement measures and its impact on technical, allocative and economic 
efficiency levels of cotton farmers is estimated, which received little attention in the 
past. 
 
There was not much attention in the past on cotton farmers‟ market participation. 
Generally, a little literature exists on farmers‟ market participation in developing 
countries, specifically in Pakistan. In Pakistan, cotton farmers‟ market participation 
besides other factors is influenced by the high transaction costs and liquidity 
constraints. Since cotton is a high input demanding crop, small and medium scale 
farmers face liquidity constraints. In Pakistan, formal credit sources has mostly failed to 
meet the demand of the cotton farmers, so farmers mostly turn to informal credit 
sources, i.e. local traders (commission agent), who interlock the supply of credit with 
the provision of output. In the present study, cotton farmers‟ market participation and 
determinants of decision making are studied by employing different sample selection 
models. The current study is focusing on three important aspects of cotton production 
and marketing in Pakistan, i.e. adoption and impact of genetically modified cotton 
technology, land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement 
measures and cotton farmers‟ access to markets. These three aspects have received 
less attention in the past, particularly in the context of production and marketing of 
cotton in Pakistan. 
 
2. Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
Objectives 
 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to study the production and marketing 
system of cotton in Pakistan. The specific objectives of the study are 
1. To estimate the impact of Bt cotton adoption on cotton yields, household income, 
pesticide demand and poverty status among cotton farmers in Pakistan. 
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2. To compare the Bt cotton adoption and impact evaluation among different farming 
categories i.e. small, medium and large scale farmers. 
3. To estimate the land rights influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land 
improvement measures and technical, allocative and economic efficiency levels. 
4. To study the impact of transaction costs and liquidity constraints on cotton farmers‟ 
market participation. 
5. Based on the findings, to suggest policy recommendations to improve the cotton 
production and marketing in Pakistan. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The following hypotheses will be tested in the study. 
1. Genetically modified cotton adoption has a positive impact on the livelihood of cotton 
farmers and the overall household welfare.  
2. Genetically modified cotton adoption has a positive and significant impact among all 
farming categories, i.e. small, medium and large scale farmers and particularly among 
small scale farmers. 
3. Land rights have a positive impact on farmers‟ decision to invest in land 
improvement measures; owners having secured land rights invest more in land 
improvement measures (farm yard manure, mineral fertilizer and leguminous crops)  
compared to tenants ( both sharecroppers and fixed renters). 
4. Farmers having secured land rights are technically, allocatively and economically 
more efficient compared to farmers having no secured land rights, i.e. owners have 
higher efficiency levels in comparison to tenants (fixed renters and sharecroppers). 
5. Cotton farmers‟ market participation is influenced by the high transaction costs and 
liquidity constraints. The farmers having more resources have easy access to markets 
compared to resource poor farmers. 
 
3. Significance of Study 
 
The present study is important for all the stakeholders involved in the production and 
marketing of cotton, as it addresses three important aspects of cotton production and 
marketing in Pakistan simultaneously, i.e. the adoption and impact of the Bt cotton 
technology; land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement 
measures and efficiency level and factors influencing cotton farmers‟ market 
participation. The current study is the first Bt cotton adoption and impact evaluation 
study in Pakistan. Bt cotton has only recently been introduced in Pakistan and currently 
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more than 60% of the cotton farmers are planting Bt cotton varieties, covering more 
than 75% of the cotton producing area, hence the estimation of the impact of the new 
technology was important. The current study is also in line with the efforts of the 
government of Pakistan. Since the government has recently introduced a plan titled 
“Cotton vision 2015 targets” after taking into account the future prospects for a 
sustained growth in the cotton sector and the possible improvements in the quality of 
raw cotton. The targets of the plan include considerable increase in cotton yield per 
hectare, mill consumption of cotton to 20.1 million bales, exportable cotton surplus to 
0.6 million bales and improved yarn recovery rate to 92% from current average of 84%. 
The plan has been designed to achieve higher production of clean cotton to obtain 
advantages of assured supply of cleaner, uniform, graded and contamination free 
cotton to the domestic textile industry. It may also be helpful to get a higher recovery 
rate, hence more yarn would improve the reputation of Pakistan‟s cotton and its 
products in the world market and substantial foreign exchange would be earned 
through better unit values.  
 
Only a couple of studies in Pakistan have focused on the land rights‟ influence on 
farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement measures. But no study has related the 
influence of land rights and investment in land improvement measures to the 
household‟s efficiency level. The current study is focusing on this important aspect, 
since one third of the farmers are tenant farmers in Pakistan having fewer land rights 
and less resources. Besides estimating the land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision 
to invest in land improvement measures, the investment in land improvement 
measures is related to farmers‟ technical, allocative and economic efficiency levels, 
which is mostly not addressed in the previous literature.  
 
The literature on farmers‟ market participation has received little attention in the past in 
developing countries (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005). Specifically in Pakistan, there exists 
little literature on cotton farmers‟ access to the market and the determinants of the 
cotton farmers‟ market participation. 
 
4. Scope and Limitation of Study 
 
The present study is broad based, since it is focusing on three different areas 
simultaneously, i.e. the adoption and impact of Bt cotton technology; land rights 
influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement measures and efficiency 
level; impact of transaction costs and liquidity constraints on cotton farmer market 
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participation. The study findings are important for all the stakeholders involved in 
production and marketing of cotton in Pakistan, i.e. policy makers, researchers, 
extensionists and cotton farmers. Since the present study is the first Bt cotton adoption 
and impact evaluation study in Pakistan, study findings have extreme significance for 
policy makers regarding the future adoption of Bt cotton technology in Pakistan.  
 
Land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement measures and 
efficiency levels has important policy implications for policy makers. Land reforms are 
needed to be carried out in Pakistan, as this will be helpful in increasing the farmers‟ 
efficiency levels and the overall household productivity at the micro level and will be 
helpful in increasing the national productivity at the macro level.  
 
Farmers‟ access to the market will provide information about the determinants of 
farmers‟ market participation decision making especially with reference to liquidity 
constraints and transaction costs. Due to time and resource constraints, the study is 
limited to one province (Punjab) and the seven highest cotton producing districts only. 
Cross sectional data was employed in the current study; although panel data provide 
more useful information regarding efficiency measurement. 
 
5. Organization of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation is organized as follows: chapter two provides background information 
about production and marketing of cotton in Pakistan. Chapter three is a paper on 
adoption of genetically modified cotton and poverty reduction in Pakistan. Chapter four 
is a paper on land rights influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement 
measures and efficiency level. Chapter five is a paper on cotton farmers‟ access to 
markets in Pakistan. In chapter six the concluding remarks and policy 
recommendations are presented along with directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Production and Marketing of Cotton in Pakistan 
 
1.  Background 
 
1.1 Pakistan Geographic Profile 
 
The geography of Pakistan is a profound blend of landscapes varying from plains to 
deserts, forests, hills and plateaus ranging from the coastal areas of the Arabian sea in 
the South to high mountain ranges of the sub-continental North: the Himalayas, the 
Karakorams and the Hindu Kush. The vast and rich irrigated plains of the Indus basin 
covering vast tracts of the Punjab and Sindh, the deserts of Cholistan (Punjab) and 
Thar (Sindh), the inter-mountain valleys of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)1 
and the awe-inspiring rugged plateaus of Balochistan and the meeting point of the 
Himalayas, the Hindu Kush and the Karakoram in the Northern Areas (NA) are some of 
the most varied features of the country‟s landscape (ICIMOD, 1998).  
 
Geographically, Pakistan lies between 
024 and 370 N latitude and 610 and 750 E 
longitude. It is bordered by China in the North, Arabian sea in the South, Iran in the 
West, Afghanistan in the North-West and India in the East (ICIMOD, 1998). Pakistan 
consists of four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP) including Azad 
Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Northern Areas. The population is about 170 million 
and is growing at a rate of 1.8% annually. Pakistan is the sixth most populous country 
in the world (Pakistan Encyclopedia, 2009).  
 
The total geographic area of Pakistan is 79.6 million hectares. About 27% of the area is 
currently under cultivation of which about 80% is irrigated. In this regard, Pakistan has 
one of the highest proportions of irrigated cropped area in the world. The cultivable 
waste land amounts to 8.9 million hectares, and offers good possibilities for crop 
production. 
 
The climate of Pakistan varies with altitude, which in turn affects the type of vegetation. 
It has some of the world‟s highest cold areas in the Himalayas and the hottest low 
                                                 
1
 New name of NWFP is Khyber pakhtunkhaw. 
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areas in the Indus plains with many intermediate ecological zones (ICIMOD, 1998). 
Pakistan lies in the temperate zone characterized by hot summers and cold winters, 
and wide variations between extremes of temperature at given locations. The rainfall is 
seasonal and erratic; the rainfall varies between 50 mm in the South to more than 1500 
mm in the North. Pakistan has four seasons: a cool, dry winter from December through 
February; a hot, dry spring from March through April; the summer rainy season, or 
Southwest monsoon period, from June through September; and the retreating 
monsoon period of October and November. The onset and duration of these seasons 
vary somewhat according to location (Pakistan Encyclopedia, 2009). The climatic 
conditions are very suitable for economic cultivation, production and growth of all types 
of crops, fruits, nuts and vegetables that are produced and grown in any part of the 
world. 
 
1.2 Pakistan Agricultural Sector Brief 
 
Pakistan is an agricultural country, since agriculture is the backbone of Pakistan‟s 
economy. Agriculture contributes about 21.8% to the GDP and employs 44.7% of the 
workforce. More than two-third of Pakistan‟s population lives in rural areas and their 
livelihood continue to revolve around agriculture and allied activities (Economic Survey 
of Pakistan, 2008-09). In foreign trade, agriculture dominates through exports of raw 
products such as rice and cotton. Moreover, semi-processed and processed products 
such as cotton yarn, cloth, carpets and leather products, the share of primary 
commodities and processed and semi-processed products constituted almost 60% of 
the total exports. There have been some structural changes over time, but the 
contribution of agro-based products has more or less sustained its position. Agriculture 
is the hub of economic activity in Pakistan. It lays the foundation for economic 
development and growth of the economy (Government of Pakistan, 2003). The 
importance of agriculture to the economy is seen in three ways: first, it provides food to 
the consumers and fibers for domestic industry; second, it is a source of foreign 
exchange earnings; and third, it provides a market for industrial goods. 
 
The most important crops grown in Pakistan are cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, maize, 
fruits and vegetables which together account for more than 75% of the value of total 
crop output (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2005-06). According to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (2005), Pakistan is the second largest producer of chickpea, 
the fourth largest producer of apricot, cotton and sugarcane, the fifth largest producer 
of milk and onion, the sixth largest producer of date palm, the seventh largest producer 
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of mango, the ninth largest producer of wheat and the tenth largest producer of 
oranges in the world. Overall, Pakistan is ranked twentieth in the world regarding farm 
output (FAO, 2005). 
 
There are two principal crop seasons in Pakistan, namely “Kharif”, sowing season of 
which begins in April-June and harvesting during October-December; and the “Rabi” 
which begins in October-December and ends in April-May. Rice, sugarcane, cotton, 
maize, mong, mash, pigeon pea and sorghum are “Kharif” crops while wheat, gram, 
lentil (masoor), tobacco, rapeseed, barely and mustard are “Rabi” crops (Economic 
Survey of Pakistan, 2008-09).  
 
1.3 Cotton Production in Pakistan 
 
Cotton is the largest revenue earning non-food crop produced in the world. Its 
production and processing provides some or all of the cash income to over 250 million 
people worldwide, including almost 7% of the available labor force in developing 
countries. Cotton is grown in approximately 70 countries of the world, but the top 10 
cotton producing countries share 85% of the total world production. These countries 
are Australia, Brazil, China, Greece, India, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, USA and 
Uzbekistan (International Cotton Advisory Committee, 2003). The world cotton 
production is projected to decline by about 10% in 2008-09, to 108.8 million bales2, 
mainly due to the decline in world cotton areas caused by increased competition from 
alternative crops. Significant portions of cotton area were diverted to grains and oilseed 
production due to more attractive prices than cotton. The world yield is also estimated 
slightly lower mainly due to unfavorable weather. The world yield is projected down to 
763 kg per hectare from the record of 788 kg per hectare reached in 2007-08, and this 
is the second consecutive season of decline in world cotton yield (Economic Survey of 
Pakistan, 2008-09). 
 
Pakistan is the ancient home of cotton cultivation, since in Indus valley civilization 
(present day Pakistan), the cotton cultivation was first carried out (FAO, 1999). 
Currently, Pakistan is the fourth largest cotton producer worldwide, whereas regarding 
the yield per hectare Pakistan is ranked 13th in the world. Pakistan is also the third 
largest exporter of raw cotton, the fourth largest consumer of cotton, and the largest 
exporter of cotton yarn. In Pakistan about 1.3 million farmers (out of total 5 million) 
                                                 
2
 One cotton bale contains 480 pounds (218 kgs) of cotton. 
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cultivate cotton covering 3 million hectares and 15% of the cultivable area in the 
country. Cotton and cotton products contribute about 10% to GDP and 60-65% to the 
foreign exchange earnings of the country (Government of Pakistan, 2006). Taken as a 
whole, between 30-40% of the cotton ends up as domestic consumption of final 
products. The remaining is exported as raw cotton, yarn, cloth, and garments. Pakistan 
produces about 8 million cotton bales and Pakistan‟s share in the total world cotton 
production is 8%. Due to its importance cotton is also known as “white gold” 
(Pakistan.com, 2007). 
 
Cotton is the sole source of survival for millions of farm families in Pakistan because 
cotton is an important cash crop for small holders, a major source of employment for 
farmers and workers in textile industries, and also a major source of foreign exchange 
(exports of raw cotton, cotton products and byproducts). The strategic problems the 
industry is faced with at present are rising costs of inputs, declining yield (area, 
production and yield of cotton in Pakistan is given in appendix A-1) and quality due to 
weakness in varietals‟ maintenance, water logging and salinity problems in irrigated 
plantations (International Cotton Advisory Committee, 2006).  
 
Cotton production supports Pakistan‟s textile sector, comprising about 400 textile mills, 
7 million spindles, 27,000 looms in the mill sector (including 15,000 shuttle looms), over 
250,000 looms in the non-mill sector, 700 knitwear units, 4,000 garments units (with 
200,000 sewing machines), 650 dyeing and finishing units (with finishing capacity of 
1,150 million square meters per year), nearly 1,000 ginneries, 300 oil expellers, and 
15,000 to 20,000 indigenous, small scale oil expellers (kohlus). Cotton by any measure 
is Pakistan‟s most important economic sector (Banuri, 1998). The rate of economic 
growth is quite closely correlated with the fate of the cotton crop. A bigger crop means 
a larger volume of exports (both raw and processed products), subsidy to the textile 
sector, which leads to higher aggregate demand, higher employment, larger fiscal 
inflows and less pressure on the balance of payment (Banuri, 1998). The reasons for 
the decline in cotton production are the shortage of irrigation water, less use of 
fertilizer, attack of cotton leaf curl virus (CLCV), mealy bug and white fly (Economic 
Survey of Pakistan, 2008-09).  
 
1.4 Genetically Modified Cotton (Bt Cotton) Prospects 
 
Agricultural biotechnology is identified as a technology that could make a significant 
contribution to the reduction in the world hunger through increased crop yields and 
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higher incomes for farmers, particularly in developing countries. Genetically modified 
crops were first commercially introduced in USA and Australia. However, as pointed 
out by Huang et al. (2002a), the only significant way biotechnology has contributed to 
the well-being of the poor so far is through higher incomes from the production of 
genetically modified cotton. Genetically modified cotton has been commercialized in 
many cotton producing countries like China, USA, India, Argentina, Australia, South 
Africa, Mexico, Columbia and Indonesia. Because of the wide range of insects that 
attack cotton, the crop has been identified as the largest worldwide consumer of 
insecticide. Although cotton accounts for about 2.4% of total acreage cultivated 
globally, estimates suggest that it consumes over 25% of pesticides (Krattiger, 1997). 
Hence, production of the crop is often associated with negative externalities. Countries 
that have introduced Bacillus thuringiensis  (Bt) cotton have therefore derived benefits 
through increased yields and declining production costs from reduced application of 
pesticides (Thirtle et al., 2003; Shankar and Thirtle, 2005; Frisvold et al., 2006; 
Subramanian and Qaim, 2009).  
 
Although the broader impact of Bt cotton, particularly the long-term environmental 
implications of the technology, still remains controversial, the positive yield and income 
effects have contributed to the widespread diffusion of the technology over the last 
couple of years (Rao, 2007 a, b). At the global level, the area devoted to Bt cotton has 
increased from 1.9 million acres in 1996 to 25 million acres in 2008 (Clive, 2008). 
Available evidence shows that the Bt cotton-sown area in China reached 3.7 million 
hectares in 2004, which comprised more than 40% of the total Bt cotton in the world 
(Qiao et al., 2007). The proportion of Bt cotton in the total world production is currently 
about 30% and is projected to exceed the 40% mark by 2010 (Rao, 2007 a, b). 
 
In Pakistan, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MINFA) has been working on a two 
pronged strategy, i.e. developing the technology through indigenous capabilities as well 
as inviting the multi-national companies to bring in the latest cotton production and 
protection technologies to enhance the cotton production in the country. In this respect, 
a letter of intent (LoI) and memorandum of understanding (MoU) have been signed with 
the Monsanto company for introduction of latest technology (bollgard-II) in the country 
to maximize cotton production. The National Biosafety Committee (NBC) of Ministry of 
Environment has also authorized biosafety clearance to eight cotton varieties with 
bollard-1 trait (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2008-09).    
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Although the Bt cotton technology has not yet been officially commercialized in 
Pakistan, more than 60% of the cotton farmers are already planting these new hybrids, 
covering more than 75% of the cotton producing area (Pakistan Central Cotton 
Committee (2008). The seeds are mainly smuggled into Pakistan from India, and the 
farmers normally obtain them from Punjab and Sindh provinces, where cotton is largely 
cultivated (Sharma, 2009).  
 
Particularly in a developing country like Pakistan, information on the impact of adoption 
of new technologies on the welfare of farm households is quite crucial to understanding 
how policy interventions can help reducing poverty among farm households.  
 
1.5 Land Tenure and Land Reforms in Pakistan 
 
As in other parts of the developing world, access to land, as well as the security of land 
tenure contracts determines the social status and the economic well-being of the 
members of the rural society in Pakistan to a large extent (Haider and Kuhnen, 1974). 
After independence in 1947, the distribution of land ownership was highly skewed, with 
less than 1% of the farmers holding more than 25% of the total agricultural land. At the 
other extreme, about 65% of the farmers held some 15% of the farmland in holdings of 
about two hectares or less. The unequal distribution of land contributed to tenancy 
arrangements such as sharecropping and fixed-rent contracts. Evidence shows that 
more than 50% of the total farm land is cultivated by tenants having no secured or 
transfer rights (Pakistan Agriculture, 1995). In addition, one-third of the farmers are 
tenant farmers, who cultivate the land on sharecropping and fixed rent contracts 
(Jacoby and Mansuri, 2009).  
 
The unequal distribution of land in the country resulted in two main land reform 
attempts. The first attempt was made in 1959, when land reforms fixed the ceiling for 
private ownership of land at 500 acres for irrigated and 1,000 acres for un-irrigated 
land. A major problem of this reform was that ceilings were fixed in terms of individuals 
rather than families, such that families can still own a large number of acres of land. A 
second attempt was therefore made in 1972, in which the ownership ceiling was 
reduced to 150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of un-irrigated land. Although the 
reforms appeared good on paper, the implementation was quite poor. Less than 0.9 
million acres of land was acquired for redistribution, which was about one-third of the 
land resumed under the 1959 land reforms. Moreover, the ceilings remained in terms of 
individuals rather than families. Hence, a number of large land owners still managed to 
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keep their holdings within an extended joint family framework, while giving away only 
marginal and less productive lands (Rao, 2007). Land ownership in the country 
therefore remained highly concentrated. 
The major forms of land tenure arrangements in the country and particularly in the 
study area are owner-operated with full property rights, fixed-rent and sharecropping 
contracts. The owner-operated with full rights involves farmers owning and cultivating 
their own plots. Farmers cultivating these plots have transfer rights, including rights to 
sell the plots. The fixed-rent contracts involve land owners renting out land to tenants3, 
a sharecropping contract is an arrangement made between the landlord and the 
operator, such that part of the output is given to the landlord as compensation for using 
the land. The sharecropping contract appears to be less risky for the owner, since 
offering a share rental contract enables the landlord to direct the tenant‟s choice of 
project towards the kind that the landlord prefers (Basu, 1992). In some cases, the 
tenant gets one-fourth, one-sixth, or only one-eighth of the output, depending on the 
terms of agreement and contribution made in inputs. Normally, the fixed-rent contracts 
are informal and tend to vary between one and three cropping seasons, although they 
can prolong for several years, depending on the mutual understanding between the 
owner and the tenant (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2008).    
 
1.6 Cotton Marketing System in Pakistan 
 
Efficient marketing plays a crucial role in the process of economic development (Barrett 
and Emelly, 2005; Gideon et al. 2007; Kleih, 1999). In developing countries, the 
marketing system is mainly confronted with multiple problems like high transaction 
costs, poor physical and institutional infrastructure, lack of market information and 
inadequate markets (Jones, 1996). Regarding cotton marketing decision making 
(market or farm gate) in Pakistan, the household‟s financial condition plays a crucial 
role. If the farmer is financially well-off, he mostly neither needs credit from informal 
sources nor has to buy inputs on credit. But the majority of cotton producers need 
credit during cotton season to meet the high input demand of the cotton crop or to buy 
inputs on credit from a local trader (commission agent). In return, they are bound to sell 
cotton to that particular person from whom they have taken the credit4, although there 
exists the formal credit programme in the cotton growing areas of Pakistan. 
                                                 
3 The amount of rent varies depending on the soil fertility, location of land, irrigation source and 
the previous dealing etc.  
4
 The interlocking of input supply, credit and crop marketing are the common features of the 
marketing system in many developing Asian countries including Pakistan (Smith et al., 1999). 
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Unfortunately, the formal credit programme is not very effective since the procedure is 
lengthy; the mark up rate is high and also not in favour of small farmers5. Landless 
farmers are deprived of the credit facility from the formal sources due to no own land 
holding6. Because of these procedural and institutional problems the farmers turn to 
informal credit sources i.e. local traders (commission agent) since they provide ready 
credit7. Such systems are distinct from those where crop marketing, input supply and 
credit are provided by specialist providers. In developing countries there are major 
obstacles to the exclusive provision of commercial agricultural services by specialists, 
due to inherent risk, high transaction costs and weakness in the formal institutional 
environment; including both means for contract enforcement and property rights, which 
are important in relation to entitlement.  
 
Commission agents or traders usually operate year round, buying cotton in the winter 
and wheat in the summer season. They sell cotton to ginning factories, while wheat is 
either sold to the food department or delivered onto the free market which exists in 
parallel with the government procurement system. In addition, some growers‟ mostly 
larger ones sell their cotton directly to the cotton ginners (Smith et al., 1999). Ginning 
factories or ginners also provide seasonal credit, mostly to commission agent or traders 
but in some cases also to growers. The credit is usually interest-free and provided on 
the condition that the borrower supplies the ginner with a pre-agreed quantity of seed 
cotton at harvest time (Smith et al., 1999). 
 
A harmonized cotton marketing and pricing system in Pakistan has been lacking and 
both the seed cotton and lint cotton are priced mostly on the basis of subjective 
assessment, such as the variety or the station. There is no written contract for buying 
and selling operations (PCCC, 2004). The importance of farmers associations and 
cooperatives can not be ignored, but they mostly exist in small numbers and are 
handicapped by low quality due to inexperienced management, thus not contributing to 
farmers in a benefiting way (IFAD, 2007). 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 In most cases only the wealthier and more influential farmers are able to gain access to loans 
from formal sources. 
6
 The sharecropping or landless households gain even less access to formal sector credit 
(Smith et al. 1999). 
7
 Traders frequently act as moneylenders and input suppliers as well as providing crop 
marketing services (Smith et al. 1999). 
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2. Description of Study Area 
 
The present study was carried out in the Punjab province of Pakistan, which is the 
most populous province with almost 60% of the country population living there. The 
name Punjab literally translates from the Persian words Panj meaning five and Ab 
meaning water. Thus Punjab can be translated as five waters- and hence the land of 
the five rivers, referring to the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej (Pakistan 
Encyclopedia, 2009).  
 
The province is mainly a fertile region along the river valleys, while sparse deserts can 
be found near the border with Balochistan province and India. The region contains the 
Thal and Cholistan deserts. The landscape is amongst the most heavily irrigated on 
earth and canals can be found throughout the province. Weather extremes are notable 
from the hot and barren South to the cool hills of the North. The foothills of the 
Himalayas are found in the extreme North as well. 
 
Most areas in Punjab experience fairly cool winters, often accompanied by rain. By 
mid-February the temperature begins to rise; spring time weather continues until mid-
April, when the summer heat sets in. The onset of the Southwest monsoon is 
anticipated to reach Punjab by June. Despite its dry climate, extensive irrigation makes 
it a rich agricultural region. Its canal-irrigation system (established by the British) is the 
largest in the world. Wheat is the main food crop, while cotton and rice are important 
cash crops that contribute substantially to the national exchequer. Other crops include 
sugarcane, millet, corn, oilseeds, pulses, fruits and vegetables. Livestock and poultry 
production also contribute substantially to Pakistan agriculture. 
 
Punjab contributes about 68% to the annual food grain production in the country, about 
51 million acres (210,000 
2km ) are cultivated and another 9.1 million acres         
(36,600 
2km ) are lying as cultivable waste in different parts of the province. Attaining 
self-sufficiency in agriculture has shifted the focus of the strategies towards small and 
medium farming, stress on rain fed areas, farm-to-market roads, electrification for tube-
wells and control of water logging and salinity. 
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2.1 Sampling Procedure  
 
The data was collected with a survey of farmers from the Punjab province. In Pakistan, 
cotton is mainly produced in two provinces i.e. Punjab and Sindh province. More than 
80% of the cotton of Pakistan is produced in the Punjab province8. Seven highest 
cotton producing districts were selected from the province of Punjab. A stratified 
random sampling technique was employed to select the farmers in the districts of 
Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, Vehari, Khanewal, Lodhran, Multan and Rahim Yar Khan.  
 
 N
X
x
S ii            (1) 
 
In equation (1), Si represents the stratified random sampling to be drawn from each 
stratum (district i), xi represents the area under cotton in district i. X represent the total 
area under cotton in the sampling frame districts i.e. Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, 
Vehari, Khanewal, Lodhran, Multan and Rahim Yar Khan. N is the total sample size to 
be drawn from all districts i.e. 325 cotton producers.  
 
As table 1 indicates, the districts were further divided into sub-districts (tehsils) and 
villages and within villages the selection of farmers was made at random. From each 
household only one farmer was interviewed. The survey was conducted through 
questionnaire interviews, which took place between August and December 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 About 99% of the cotton production in Pakistan takes place in the Punjab and Sindh provinces. 
Farming structures for cotton production are similar in Punjab and Sindh provinces. 
Environmental and climatic conditions, particularly water constraints, in other provinces are not 
suitable for cotton production. 
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Table 1: District wise area and production of cotton and number of farmers interviewed 
from each district 
District   Area 
(in 1000 
hectares) 
Production 
(in 1000 
bales) 
Sub-
districts 
(number) 
 Villages 
(number) 
Farmers 
(number) 
Percentage 
Rahim Yar Khan 308.0 1612.9 4 22 67 20.6 
Bahawalpur 281.7 1364.6 4 18 58 17.8 
Vehari 239.6 1106.9 3 20 50 15.4 
Bahawalnagar 212.1 967.6 5 14 32 9.8 
Lodhran 206.8 1077.6 3 19 56 17.2 
Khanewal 195.4 899.7 3 16 42 12.9 
Multan 193.8 858.6 2 6 20 6.3 
Total 1636.7 7887.9 24 115 325 100 
Source: Agricultural statistics of Pakistan 2006-07 & own calculations. 
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Figure 1: Map of Pakistan 
 
Figure 2: Map of the Punjab Province. 
 
Figure 1 presents the map of Pakistan showing four provinces, i.e. Punjab, Sindh, 
NWFP, Balochistan and Northern Areas including Azad Jammu and Kashmir.  
 
Figure 2 presents the map of the Punjab province. The area surveyed for data 
collection purposes lies in the South of the Punjab province consisting of the seven 
highest cotton producing districts, i.e. Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, Vehari, Lodhran, 
Khanewal, Multan and Rahim Yar Khan.  
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2.2 Data Collection Tool 
 
A comprehensive questionnaire was prepared as data collection tool (questionnaire 
attached in appendix A). Detailed information was collected regarding village 
infrastructure, farmer‟s socioeconomic characteristics, assets of the farmer, cotton 
production practices, inputs application, varieties sown, cotton yield, cotton marketing 
information, constraints in production and marketing of cotton, questions regarding 
institutional support and access to various facilities were also included in the 
questionnaire. Before starting the formal survey, the pre-testing of the questionnaire 
was carried out and the questionnaire was modified in the light of pre-testing results.    
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Appendix 
Table A-1:  Area, production and yield of cotton in Pakistan 
Year   Area      Production     Yield 
  (000 hectares) Change (%)   (000 bales) Change (%)   (Kg/hec) Change (%) 
2003-04 2989  7.0    10048  -1.6    572  -8.0 
2004-05 3193  6.8    14265  42.0    760  32.9 
2005-06 3103  -3.0    13019  -8.7    714  -10.3 
2006-07 3075  -0.9    12856  -1.2    711  -0.4 
2007-08 3054  -0.6    11655  -9.4    649  -8.7 
2008-09 (P) 2820  -7.7    11819  1.1    713  9.9   
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2008-09. 
Note: P=Provisional (July - March).  
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Chapter 3 
 
Adoption of Genetically Modified Cotton and Poverty Reduction 
in Pakistan 
 
Abstract 
 
This article employs a propensity score-matching approach to examine the direct 
effects of adoption of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton on yields, pesticide demand, 
household income and poverty, using cross sectional data from a survey of farmers in 
the Punjab province of Pakistan. Generally, the findings reveal that adoption of the new 
technology exerts a positive and significant impact on cotton yields, household income 
and poverty reduction, and a negative effect on the use of pesticides. The positive and 
the significant impact of the technology on yields and household income is consistent 
with the potential role of new agricultural technology in directly reducing rural poverty 
through increased farm household income. 
 
Keywords: Agricultural biotechnology; Bt cotton; impact assessment; propensity score  
matching. 
 
JEL classification: I32, Q16 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Agriculture biotechnology is identified as a technology that could make a significant 
contribution to the reduction in world hunger, through increased crop yields and higher 
incomes for farmers, particularly in developing countries. However, as pointed out by 
Huang et al. (2002a), the only significant way that biotechnology has contributed to the 
well-being of the poor so far is through higher incomes from the production of 
genetically modified cotton. Because of the wide range of insects that attack cotton, the 
crop has been identified as the largest worldwide consumer of insecticide. Although 
cotton accounts for about 2.4% of total acreage cultivated globally, estimates suggest 
that it consumes over 25% of pesticides (Krattiger, 1997). Hence, production of the 
crop is often associated with negative externalities. Countries that have introduced 
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton have therefore derived benefits through increased 
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yields and declining production costs from reduced application of pesticide (Thirtle et 
al., 2003; Shankar and Thirtle, 2005; Frisvold et al. 2006; Subramanian and Qaim, 
2009). 
Although the broader impact of Bt cotton, particularly the long-term environmental 
implications of the technology still remains controversial, the positive yield and income 
effects have contributed to the widespread diffusion of the technology over the last 
couple of years (Rao, 2007 a, b). At global level, the area devoted to Bt cotton 
increased from 1.9 million acres in 1996 to 25 million acres in 2008 (Clive, 2008). 
Available evidence shows that the Bt cotton-sown area in China reached 3.7 million 
hectares in 2004, which comprised more than 40% of the total Bt cotton area in the 
world (Qiao et al., 2007). The proportion of Bt cotton in total world production is 
currently about 30% and is projected to exceed 40% by the year 2010 (Rao, 2007a, b). 
 
Although Bt cotton technology has not yet been officially commercialized in Pakistan, 
more than 60% of the cotton farmers are already planting these new hybrids (Pakistan 
Central Cotton Committee, PCCC, 2008). The seeds are mainly smuggled into 
Pakistan from India, and the farmers normally obtain them from the Punjab and Sindh 
provinces, where cotton is largely cultivated, about 75% of the land under cotton 
cultivation was devoted to Bt cotton in 2008 (Sharma, 2009). 
 
As mentioned above, most of the impact studies conducted have examined the effects 
of the technology on yields and pesticide application. In a recent study, Subramanian 
and Qaim (2009) employ a social accounting matrix to analyse the village-wide effects 
of the technology in India. In this study we contribute to the debate on the benefits of Bt 
cotton by employing a non-experimental evaluation strategy to assess the impact of the 
technology on the welfare of a sample of farm households from the Punjab province in 
Pakistan, the largest cotton-growing area in the country. The impact of technology on 
pesticide application and productivity is also examined. Specifically, a propensity score 
model is employed to control for self selection that normally arises when technology 
adoption is not randomly assigned and self-selection into adoption occurs. This study is 
one of the very few studies that explicitly analyse household poverty effects of 
genetically modified crops and to the best of our knowledge, the first impact 
assessment of Bt cotton in Pakistan (Qaim et al., 2009). 
 
Particularly in a developing country like Pakistan, information on the impact of adoption 
of new technologies on the welfare of farm households is quite crucial to understanding 
how policy interventions can help reduce poverty among farm households. Cotton is an 
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important cash crop in the country, accounting for 8.2% of the value added in 
agriculture and almost 3.2% of GDP. About two-thirds of the country‟s export earnings 
are derived from the crop, while hundreds of ginning factories and textile mills in the 
country heavily depend on the domestic cotton production (Rao, 2007 a, b). Moreover, 
a large proportion of the farming population depends on cotton production for their 
livelihoods, Bt cotton has only recently been introduced into the country, it is already 
widely, if illegally, used, and the effects can be examined. 
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the conceptual framework and 
empirical specification for the study. Section 3 provides a description of the data and 
definition of the variables. The empirical results from the analysis are presented in 
section 4, followed by concluding remarks in the final section. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework of Technology Adoption   
 
2.1. Technology Choice 
 
Let the adoption of Bt cotton technology be a dichotomous choice, where the new 
technology is adopted when the net benefits from choosing the technology is greater 
than not adopting the technology. The difference between the net benefits from 
adoption and non-adoption may be denoted as I*, such that I* > 0 indicates that the net 
benefits from adoption exceed that of non-adoption. However, I* is not observable, but 
can be expressed as a function of observable elements in the following latent variable 
model 
 
,* iii ZI     ]0[1
*  ii II       (1) 
 
where iI is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 for household i in case of adoption 
and 0 otherwise,   is a vector of parameters to be estimated, iZ  is a vector of 
household and plot-level characteristics and i is an error term assumed to be 
normally distributed. 
The probability of adoption of the new technology can be represented as 
 
),(1)Pr()0Pr()1Pr( * iiiii ZFZII       (2) 
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where F is the cumulative distribution function for i . Different models such as logit or 
probit normally result from the assumptions that are made on the functional form of F. 
As argued earlier, the adoption of Bt cotton is expected to affect the demand for inputs 
such as pesticide, as well as yields and net returns. To link the adoption decision with 
these potential outcomes of adoption, consider a risk neutral farm that maximizes net 
returns, , subject to competitive input and output markets and a single-output 
technology that is quasi-concave in the vector of variable inputs, W. This may be 
expressed as 
 
YWZWPQ  ),(max          (3) 
 
where P is the output price and Q is the expected output level; Y is a column vector of 
input prices, whereas W  is a vector of input quantities, and Z represents farm-level and 
household characteristics. The farm net returns can be expressed as a function of 
technology choice I, output price, variable inputs and household characteristics as 
follows 
 
),,,( ZPYI            (4) 
 
The application of Hotelling‟s Lemma to equation (3) yields the reduced form equations 
for input demand and output supply: 
 
W =W (I, Y, P, Z)         (5) 
 
Q=Q (I, Y, P, Z)         (6) 
 
The specifications in equations (4)-(6) show that the choice of technology, input and 
output prices, as well as farm and household characteristics tend to influence farm net 
returns, demand for inputs and level of farm output.  
 
2.2 Impact Evaluation Problem 
 
The discussion in the previous section shows that new agricultural technologies can 
help increase productivity and farm incomes, and as such, improve the welfare of farm 
households. Although several other reasons can be advanced to explain why 
agricultural technology may be crucial in improving the welfare of farm household, it is 
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difficult to simply attribute the differences in welfare between adopters and non-
adopters of the technology to adoption. In cases where experimental data are gathered 
through randomisation, information on the counterfactual situation would normally be 
provided, and as such the problem of causal inference can be resolved. However, 
when the data available are from a cross-sectional survey, as the one employed in the 
present study, no information on the counterfactual situation is obtained. An effective 
way of addressing the problem is to resort to an investigation of the direct effect of 
technology adoption by looking at the differences in outcomes among farm households 
(Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  
 
Given that the decision of households to adopt or not to adopt the new technology may 
be associated with the net benefits of adoption, the issue of self-selection is crucial. To 
show the significance of self-selection, consider a reduced-form relationship between 
the technology choice and the outcome variable such as  
 
iiii ZIR   210         (7) 
 
where iR  represents a vector of outcome variables for household i, such as demand 
for inputs, farm output, net returns and poverty status of the household. As in the 
previous section, iZ  represents household characteristics and i  an error term, with 
),0(~  Ni . The issue of selection bias arises if unobservable factors influence both 
the error term of the technology choice, i , in equation (1) and the error term of the 
outcome specification )( i , in equation (7), resulting in a correlation of two error terms. 
When the correlation between the two error terms is greater than zero, OLS regression 
techniques tend to yield biased estimates. Some authors have employed the Heckman 
two-step method or similar approaches to address selection bias. However, the two 
step procedures are completely dependent on the strong assumption that unobserved 
variables are normally distributed. Another way of controlling for selection bias is to 
employ instrumental variable approach (IV). A major limitation of the approach is that it 
normally requires at least one variable in the treatment equation to serve as an 
instrument in specifying the outcome equation. Finding such instruments remains an 
arduous task in empirical analyses. Moreover, both OLS and IV procedures tend to 
impose a linear functional form assumption, implying that the coefficients on the control 
variables are similar for adopters and non-adopters. As indicated by Jalan and 
Ravallion (2003); Mendola (2007), this assumption is not likely to hold. 
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When panel data are available, selection bias can be addressed by the difference in 
differences matching estimator. Difference-in-difference matching differs from cross-
sectional matching in that it allows for temporally invariant differences in outcomes 
between adopters and non-adopters (Smith and Todd, 2005). Crost et al. (2007) also 
employed a fixed effects approach to account for selection bias in their analysis of 
genetically modified crop productivity estimates for Indian cotton farmers.  
 
In the absence of panel data, this study employs statistical matching to address the 
problem of selection bias. This involves pairing adopters and non-adopters that are 
similar in terms of their observable characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). 
 
When outcomes are independent of assignment to treatment, conditional on pre-
treatment covariates, matching methods can yield an unbiased estimate of the 
treatment impact.  
 
2.3 Propensity Score Method 
 
It follows that the expected treatment effect for the treated population is of primary 
significance. This effect may be given as 
 
)1|()1|()1|(| 011  IREIREIEI       (8) 
 
where   is the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT), 1R denotes the value of 
the outcome for adopters of the new technology and 0R  is the value of same variable 
for non-adopters. As noted above, a major problem is that we do not 
observe )1|( 0 IRE . Although the difference ]0|()1|([ 01  IREIRE
e  can be 
estimated, it is potentially biased estimator. 
 
In the absence of experimental data, the propensity score-matching model (PSM) can 
be employed to account for this sample selection bias (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The 
PSM is defined as the conditional probability that a farmer adopts the new technology, 
given pre-adoption characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). To create the 
condition of a randomized experiment, the PSM employs the unconfoundedness 
assumption also known as conditional independence assumption (CIA), which implies 
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that once Z is controlled for, technology adoption is random and uncorrelated with the 
outcome variables9. The PSM can be expressed as, 
 
}|{}|1Pr{)( ZIEZIZp          (9) 
 
where I = {0,1} is the indicator for adoption and Z is the vector of pre-adoption 
characteristics. The conditional distribution of Z, given p (Z) is similar in both groups of 
adopters and non-adopters. 
 
Unlike the parametric methods mentioned above, propensity score matching requires 
no assumption about the functional form in specifying the relationship between 
outcomes and predictors of outcome. The drawback of the approach is the strong 
assumption, of unconfoundness. As argued by Smith and Todd (2005), there may be 
systematic differences between outcomes of adopters and non-adopters even after 
conditioning because selection is based on unmeasured characteristics. However, 
Jalan and Ravallion (2003) point out that the assumption is no more restrictive that 
those of the IV approach employed in cross-sectional data analysis. In a study by 
Michalopoulos et al. (2004) to assess which non-experimental method provides the 
most accurate estimates in the absence of random assignment, they conclude that 
propensity score methods provided a specification check that tended to eliminate 
biases that were larger than average. On the other hand, the fixed effects model did 
not consistently improve the results. 
 
2.4. Average treatment effects 
 
After estimating the propensity scores, the average treatment effect for the treated 
(ATT) can then be estimated as 
 
}0|)}(,0|{)}(,1|{{)}}(,1|{{}1|{ 010101  IZpIREZpIREEZpIRREEIRRE
           (10) 
 
Several techniques have been developed to match adopters with non-adopters of 
similar propensity scores. The most commonly used techniques include nearest 
neighbour matching (NNM), kernel-based matching (KBM), stratified matching, radius 
                                                 
9
 As pointed out by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), unconfoundedness implies that we have a sufficiently 
rich set of predictors for the adoption indicator, contained in the vector of covariates, such that adjusting 
for differences in these covariates leads to valid estimates of causal effects. 
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matching and Mahalanobis matching methods10. The NNM and KBM methods are 
employed here. 
 
The NNM involves choosing individuals from the adopters and non-adopters that are 
closest in terms of propensity scores as matching partners. Several variants of the 
NNM have been proposed in the literature, including NNM matching „with replacement‟ 
and „without replacement‟. In the former case, an untreated individual can be used 
more than once as a match, whereas in the latter case it is considered only once11. 
Matching with replacement involves a trade-off between bias and variance (Smith and 
Todd, 2005). Allowing for replacement increases the average quality of matches but 
tends to reduce the number of distinct non-adopters observations used to construct the 
counterfactual mean, thus increasing the variance. 
 
The KBM method is also a non-parametric matching method that uses the weighted 
average of the outcome variable for all individuals in the group of non adopters to 
construct the counterfactual outcome, giving more importance to those observations 
that provide a better match. This weighted average is then compared with the outcome 
for the group of adopters. The difference between the two terms provides an estimate 
of the treatment effect for the treated case. A sample average over all adopters is then 
the estimate of the sample average treatment effect for the treated group. As pointed 
out by DiNardo and Tobias (2001), the choice of the kernel function for the KBM does 
not appear to be important. However, Hujer et al. (2004) point out that a proper 
imposition of the common support condition is quite crucial in employing the KBM, as 
this helps in avoiding bad matches12. 
 
It is important to note that a major objective of propensity score estimation is to balance 
the observed distribution of covariates across the groups of adopters and non-
adopters. The balancing test is normally required after matching to ascertain whether 
the differences in the covariates in the two groups in the matched sample have been 
eliminated, in which case the matched comparison group can be considered as 
plausible counterfactual (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Although several versions of 
                                                 
10
 A comprehensive overview of the various matching algorithms is presented in Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2008). 
11
 Dehejia and Wahba (2002) show in their study that matching without replacement results in 
many bad matches in the sense that many participants get matched to non-participants with 
very different propensity scores. 
12
 Basically, this involves dropping observations from the adopter group whose p-score is higher 
than the maximum or less than the minimum score of the non-adopters (Leuven and Sianesi, 
2003). 
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balancing tests exist in the literature, the most widely used is the standardized mean 
differences between treatment and control sample suggested by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1985), who suggest that a standardized difference of greater than 20% should 
be considered as „large‟. Sianesi (2004) has also suggested a comparison of the 
pseudo-
2R  obtained from the analysis before and after matching the samples. The 
pseudo-
2R  should be lower after matching, to ensure that there are no systematic 
differences in the distribution of the covariates between the two groups. As noted by 
Rosenbaum (2002), hidden bias, and hence lack of robust estimators may still arise if 
there are unobserved variables that simultaneously affect assignment into treatment 
and the outcome variable. Rosenbaum (2002) has therefore suggested a bounding 
approach to address the problem of hidden bias in matching models. The goal of this 
approach is to determine how strongly an unmeasured variable must influence the 
selection process to undermine the implications of the matching process. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data used in the analysis were collected with a survey of 325 farmers in seven 
cotton-producing districts in the Punjab province. The Punjab province was chosen for 
the survey because almost 80% of the cotton production in the country takes place 
there13. A stratified random sampling technique was employed to select the farmers in 
the districts of Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, Vehari, Khanewal, Multan, Lodhran and 
Rahim Yar Khan. The sample ensured representation of adopters and non-adopters of 
Bt cotton, major landholdings and farm household types. The survey was conducted 
through questionnaire interviews by local enumerators who were trained prior to the 
exercise, which took place between August and December 2007. The data collected 
included information on input use, costs, yields and output prices, farm-level 
characteristics as well as socioeconomic characteristics of the households. 
 
Table 1 presents definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. The survey showed that about 62% of households adopted the new 
technology. The average age of farmers was almost 42 years, whereas the mean 
number of years of schooling was about nine years. The mean land owned by the 
household was 31 acres. The cotton area cultivated per household was about 32 
                                                 
13
 About 99% of cotton production in Pakistan takes place in the Punjab and Sindh provinces. 
Farming structures for cotton production are similar in Punjab and Sindh provinces. 
Environmental and climatic conditions, particularly water constraints, in the other provinces are 
not suitable for cotton production. 
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acres, showing that some land was rented for cotton production. Average household 
income was Rs 46,415, with 8.3% of the household falling below the purchasing power 
parity poverty line. The purchasing power parity poverty line used in the calculations is 
the US$ 1.08 per day per person suggested by the World Bank for Pakistan. Average 
yields were found to be 904 kg per hectare, showing a yield difference of about 20% to 
non-Bt cotton. It needs to be mentioned that these yields are much lower than the 
yields reported for India and China. Specifically, Crost et al. (2007) reported yields of 
about 2,065 kg/ha for India, whereas Huang et al. (2002 a, b) showed yields that 
averaged about 3,481 kg/ha for China. However, the yield levels for Pakistan appear to 
be much higher than those reported by Shankar and Thirtle (2005) for South Africa, 
where yields were around 498 kg per hectare. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable   Description      Sample Standard 
           Mean    deviation 
Dependent variable 
Bt Cotton  1 if farmer plants Bt varieties, 0 otherwise   0.62 0.49 
Cotton yields  Cotton output in kg/ha      905 0.2 
Household income Total household income (Rupees)    46,415 3,073 
Net returns  Net returns per acre from cotton production in Rupees  7,840 826 
Pesticide   Pesticide sprayed in litres during cotton season   3.79 0.08 
Poverty   Head count index is used to estimate household poverty 0.08 0.02 
 
Independent Variables 
Age   Age of the cotton farmer in number of years   42 12.4 
Education  Number of years of schooling of cotton farmer   9.0 4.3 
Household head 1 if farmer is head of household, 0 otherwise   0.62 0.02 
Household size  Number of people residing in household   9.5 5.4 
Land owned  Number of acres owned by the farmer    31.3 56.2 
Cotton area  Number of acres planted under cotton crop   31.8 49.7 
Soil fertility  1 if soil is fertile, 0 otherwise     0.44 0.03 
Tractor   1 if farmer owns a tractor, 0 otherwise    0.64 0.47 
Tube well  1 if farmer owns a tube well, 0 otherwise   0.66 0.03 
TV   1 if farmer owns a TV, 0 otherwise    0.75 0.02 
Vehicle   1 if farmer owns a vehicle, 0 otherwise    0.2 0.02 
Membership  1 if farmer holds any organization membership, 0 otherwise 0.2 0.4 
Extension contact 1 if farmer has contact with extension agent, 0 otherwise 0.81 0.4 
Credit   1 if farmer has access to credit facility, 0 otherwise  0.34 0.02 
Labour availability 1 if labour is available during cotton season, 0 otherwise 0.83 0.37 
Agri. Income source 1 if agriculture is the main income source, 0 otherwise  0.80 0.02 
Non-farm work  1 if farmer is involved in non farm work, 0 otherwise  0.20 0.40 
 
Locations and district dummies 
Bahawalpur  1 if the farmer is located in Bahawalpur district, 0 otherwise 0.17 0.37 
Bahawalnagar  1 if the farmer is located in Bahawalnagar district,0 otherwise 0.09 0.29 
Khanewal  1 if the farmer is located in Khanewal district, 0 otherwise 0.13 0.34 
Vehari   1 if the farmer is located in Vehari district, 0 otherwise  0.16 0.36 
Multan   1 if the farmer is located in Multan district, 0 otherwise  0.06 0.24 
Lodhran  1 if the farmer is located in Lodhran district, 0 otherwise  0.18 0.39 
Rahim Yar Khan 1 if the farmer is located in Rahim Y. K. district, 0 otherwise 0.19 0.39 
Source: Survey data            
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Table 2 presents differences in the characteristics of adopters and non-adopters, with 
their t-values. The t-value suggests that there are some differences between adopters 
and non-adopters with respect to farm-level and household characteristics. In 
particular, there appears to be differences in land ownership, ownership of tractors, 
tube well and vehicles, as well as membership in organizations. Thus, adopters 
generally own more land than non-adopters. There are also significant differences in 
cotton yields, household income and the poverty status. Quite interesting is the 
statistically significant difference in the application of pesticides between adopters and 
non-adopters. Although, Bt cotton provides resistance to the tobacco budworm 
(Heliothis virescens) and cotton bollworm (Helicoverpa gelotopoeon), there are other 
cotton pests in Pakistan to which the new technology does not provide resistance. 
Hence, farmers cultivating Bt cotton still need to apply some pesticides to their fields. 
The lower levels of application by adopters indicate that some level of success for the 
new technology has been achieved. There appear to be no significant difference in the 
quality of soils between adopters and non-adopters.  
 
The land-size categories of adopters and non-adopters are also presented in table 3. 
The differences suggest an apparently stable correlation between the incidence of 
adoption and land-asset ownership, indicating that most adopters are large-scale 
farmers followed by medium and small scale farmers respectively. 
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Table 2: Differences in characteristics of adopters and non-adopters (sample mean) 
Characteristic    Adopters Non-adopters Difference     t-values 
Age (years)    42.4  41.31  1.1  0.7 
Education (years)    9.2  8.5  0.7  1.0 
Household head (dummy)  0.64  0.57  0.1  1.3 
Adult males (number)   2.0  2.1  -0.1  -0.7 
Total family (number)   9.1  10.1  -1.0*  -1.7 
Land owned (acres)   36  23.4  12.6**  2.0 
Cotton area (acres)   32  22.1  9.6**  2.0 
Soil fertility (dummy)   0.5  0.4  0.1  1.4 
Cotton yields (kg/acre)  368  296  72***  2.9 
Tractor (dummy)   0.72  0.516  0.21***  3.8 
Tube well (dummy)   0.74  0.54  0.20***  3.6 
TV (dummy)    0.76  0.66  0.1*  1.8 
Vehicle (dummy)   0.2  0.13  0.1***  2.9 
Membership (dummy)   0.1  0.2  -0.1*  -1.7 
Extension contact (dummy)  0.8  0.66  0.1***  3.2 
Labour availability (dummy)  0.8  0.77  0.01**  2.2 
Agri. income source (dummy) 0.8  0.77  0.01  0.7 
Non-farm work (dummy)  0.2  0.21  -0.01  -0.3 
Household income (Rupees)  54,960  32,527  22,433*** 3.6 
Net returns (Rupees/acre)  8,627  6,484  2,142  1.2 
Pesticide spray (liters/acre)  3.5  4.12  -0.6***  -4.0 
Poverty    0.02  0.2  -0.1***  -3.1 
Credit     0.3  0.3  -0.0  -0.0 
Number of Farmers   201  124 
Note: Significance of t-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% 
level.  
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Table 3: Distribution of sample households by land holding  
 
 
     Adopters    Non adopters    Overall 
Category Land owned  Frequency  Percentage Frequency  Percentage Frequency Percentage 
  (Acres)   (Number of Farmers)   (Number of Farmers)   (Number of Farmers) 
 
 
 
Landless 0 acres  18   8.95  9   7.25  27  8.31 
 
Small  >0-5acres  22   10.94  31   25.0  53  16.30 
 
Medium >5-12.5 acres  49   24.37  43   34.67  92  28.30 
 
Large  >12.5 acres  112   55.55  41   33.10  153  47.07 
 
Total     201     124     325 
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The incidence of poverty and technology adoption is presented in table 4. The 
incidence of poverty, as well as depth and severity of poverty all appear to be lower 
among the adopters of Bt cotton. The headcount index is the percentage of the 
population living in households with income per capita below the poverty line. However, 
the headcount index ignores the amount by which the expenditures of the poor fall 
short of the poverty line. Hence, the poverty gap index which gives the mean distance 
below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line is also computed. The 
squared poverty gap index which indicates the severity of poverty is computed by 
weighting the individual poverty gaps by the gaps themselves, so as to reflect 
inequality amongst the poor. In terms of farm categories, the incidence of poverty 
revealed that about 19% of small farmers, 9% of medium farmers and 3% of large 
farmers were below the poverty line. 
 
 
Table 4: Poverty indicators among adopters and non-adopters of Bt cotton 
 
 
Indicator   Adopters  Non- adopters  Overall 
 
Head count index  0.024   0.177   0.083 
 
Poverty gap   0.015   0.122   0.055 
 
Severity of poverty  0.009   0.082   0.037 
 
Note: For the above calculations purchasing power parity (PPP) US$ 1.08 per person 
per day is used as poverty line. 
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Although the comparisons in table 2 do reveal some significant differences between 
adopters and non-adopters, mean differences do not account for the effect of other 
characteristics of farmers and cannot be taken as evidence for the specific effects of 
adoption. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) point out that to obtain the unconfounded 
effect of adoption on outcomes, only variables that influence both adoption and 
outcomes and are not affected by adoption should be used in the propensity score 
models when matching is performed14. Smith and Todd (2005) also argue that the 
choice of variables should be guided by economic theory, sound knowledge of previous 
research and the institutional setting within which treatment and outcomes are 
measured. The variables employed in this study are based on previous research on 
determinants of adoption of new varieties (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Diagne and 
Demont, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Wooldridge (2005) illustrates that including controls that are themselves affected by treatment 
generally violates the unconfoundedness assumption. 
 41 
4. Empirical Results  
 
The empirical analysis was conducted using the STATA statistical package. As 
indicated earlier, the matching process is preceded by specification of the propensity 
scores for the treatment variable. A logit model was employed to predict the probability 
of adopting the Bt cotton variety. The effect of adoption of Bt cotton on input demand, 
yields, household income and poverty was estimated with NNM and KBM. The results 
of the logit specification of the propensity score are reported in table 5.  
 
A glance at table 5 indicates that a number of the household and farm-level variables 
do influence the likelihood of adopting Bt cotton. In particular, education, access to 
credit and visits by extension officers tend to facilitate adoption of Bt cotton. The 
common support condition is imposed in the estimation by matching in the region of 
common support.  
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Table 5: Propensity score for Bt cotton adoption (logit estimates) 
Variable     Coefficient Standard error   z  
Age (years)     -0.0  0.0   -0.57 
Education (years)    0.1  0.0   0.24 
Household head (dummy)   0.7**  0.3     2.12 
Land owned (acres)    -0.0  0.0   -1.21 
Soil fertility (dummy)    0.5*  0.3   1.93 
Adult males (>16 years)   -0.0  0.1   -0.00 
Tube well (dummy)    0.5**  0.3   1.98 
Tractor (dummy)    0.7**  0.3   2.30  
TV (dummy)     0.3  0.3   0.97 
Vehicle (dummy)    0.5  0.4   1.40 
Credit (dummy)    0.2**  0.1   2.08 
Membership (dummy)   -0.4  0.4   -1.02 
Extension contact (dummy)   0.7**  0.3   2.23 
Labour availability (dummy)   0.0  0.4   0.00 
Agriculture income source (dummy)  1.7*  0.9   1.89 
Non-farm work (dummy)   1.4  0.9   1.58 
 
Districts fixed effects (district dummies) 
Bahawalpur      -1.6***  0.4   -3.55 
Bahawalnagar    0.13  0.5   0.30 
Khanewal     0.5  0.5   1.17 
Vehari      -0.2  0.4   -0.58 
Multan      2.0***  0.7   2.63 
Lodhran     0.3  0.4   0.72 
Constant     -3.2***  1.1   -2.74 
Number of observations   325 
Pseudo R square    0.19 
Note: Significance of z-statistics of mean difference is at the *10%, **5% and ***1% 
level. 
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Figure 1 presents the distribution of the propensity scores as well as the region of 
common support. The figures demonstrate the bias in the distribution of the propensity 
scores between the groups of adopters and non-adopters. They clearly reveal the 
significance of proper matching and imposition of common support condition to avoid 
bad matches. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
Figure 1: Propensity score distribution and common support for propensity score 
estimation  
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
 
 
Effect on cotton productivity 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
 
 
Effect on household income 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
 
 
Effect on pesticide demand 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
 
 
Effect on household poverty 
Note: Treated on support indicates the individuals in the adoption group who find a 
suitable match, whereas treated off support indicates the individuals in the adoption 
group who did not find a suitable match. 
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Tables 6 and 7 present the average treatment effects estimated by KBM and NNM 
methods, as well as the indicators of matching quality from the matching models. The 
matching results from both KBM and NNM approaches in table 6 generally indicate that 
adoption of Bt cotton exerts a positive and significant impact on demand for pesticides 
and the poverty level. Specifically, the KBM and NNM causal effects of adoption on 
productivity (measured in kg, at 50 and 62 kg, respectively) suggest that yields of Bt 
cotton growers are higher by about 50-62 kg / acre than non-Bt cotton growers. On the 
other hand, the KBM and NNM causal effects on demand for pesticide range between  
-0.62 and -0.68, suggesting that the demand for pesticides is lower for adopters by 
0.62-0.68 l/acres. The results here are generally in line with the findings by Qaim and 
Zilberman (2003) for different states of India, where trials showed that Bt cotton 
reduces pest damage and increases yields. 
 
The estimates from the KBM and NNM also indicate that adoption of Bt cotton exerts a 
positive and statistically significant effect on household income and welfare. The KBM 
and NNM causal effects of adoption are about Rs 16,500 and 17,000, respectively, 
implying that average household incomes of adopters are between Rs 16,500 and 
17,000 higher than non-adopters. The probability of adopters being poor was found to 
be lower by about 11-14%, relative to non-adopters.  
 
As mentioned in the discussion earlier, the main objective of propensity score 
estimation is to balance the distribution of relevant variables in the groups of adopters 
and non-adopters rather than obtaining precise prediction of selection into treatment. 
The reduction in the median absolute standardized bias between the matched and 
unmatched models is employed to examine the balancing powers of the estimations. 
As is evident in the fourth and fifth column of table 7, the results reveal that substantial 
reduction in bias was obtained through matching. The pseudo-
2R  from the propensity 
score estimation and from re-estimation of the propensity score after matching are also 
presented in the sixth and seventh columns of table 7. The p-values of the likelihood 
ratio tests before and after matching are also presented in the eighth and ninth 
columns of the table. The joint significance of the regressors is always rejected after 
matching, whereas it was never rejected at any significance level before matching, 
suggesting that there is no systematic difference in the distribution of covariates 
between adopters and non-adopters after matching. 
 
Results from the sensitivity analysis for the presence of hidden bias are also presented 
in the fourth column of table 6. Given that sensitivity analysis for insignificant effects is 
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not meaningful, Rosenbaum bounds were calculated only for treatment effects that are 
significantly different from zero (Hujer et al., 2004)15. Generally, the results compare 
favourably with findings from other studies and are insensitive to hidden bias (e.g. 
Faltermier and Abdulai, 2009). For example, for the impact of technology adoption on 
productivity, the sensitive analysis suggest that at a level of 75.1 , causal inference 
of the significant impact of adoption would have to be viewed critically. The value 
implies that if individuals that have the same Z-vector differ in their odds of adoption by 
a factor of 75%, the significance of the participation effect on income may be 
questionable. The lowest critical value of   is 1.45-1.50, whereas the largest critical 
value is 2.15-2.20. We can therefore conclude that even large amounts of unobserved 
heterogeneity would not alter the inference about the estimated effects. 
 
                                                 
15
 The lower bound scenarios underscoring the under-estimation of the treatment effect are less 
interesting and therefore omitted in our analysis. 
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Table 6: Average treatment effects and results of sensitivity analysis 
Matching algorithm Outcome  ATT  Bandwidth/Caliper  Critical level   Number Number 
            of hidden  of treated  of control 
             Bias ( )   
 
Kernel-based   Cotton yield  50***   0.60   1.70-1.75  189  119 
matching  (kg/acre)  (2.75)  
(KBM)   Household income 16,463.4***  0.60   1.45-1.50  189  119 
   (Pak Rupees)  (2.92) 
   Pesticide   -0.62***  0.60   1.85-1.90  189  119 
   (l /acre)  (-2.70)  
   Poverty  -0.143***  0.60   2.15-2.20  189  119 
      (-3.71)  
 
Nearest neighbour Cotton yield  62***   0.01   1.60-1.65  192  103  
matching  (kg/acre)  (2.43)  
(NNM)   Household income 17,061.7**  0.01   1.50-1.55  192  103  
   (Pak Rupees)  (2.39) 
   Pesticide   -0.68***  0.05   1.95-2.00  200  123 
   (l /acre)  (-2.59)  
   Poverty  -0.135**  0.03   2.10-2.15  178  108 
      (-2.10)  
      
Note: Number in parentheses are t-values. Values are significantly different from zero at ***1%, **5% and *10% level. ATT is the average 
treatment effect for the treated. In case of KBM bootstrapped statistics is 50 replications. In case of KBM bandwidth are reported, while in 
case of NNM caliper are reported. 
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Table 7: Indicators of covariate balancing, before and after matching 
Matching  Outcome  Median  Median  (Total)% Pseudo R2 Pseudo R2 p-value          p- value 
algorithm    absolute bias  absolute bias  bias  (unmatched) (matched) of LR  of LR  
     (before matching) (after matching) reduction            (unmatched)  (matched) 
      %   % 
Kernel-based Cotton yield  24.7   11.0   55.4  0.178  0.042  0.000  0.556 
matching (kg/acre) 
  Income  23.2   10.3   55.7  0.169  0.003  0.000  0.984 
  (Pak Rupees) 
  Pesticide   23.1   4.32   81.3  0.184  0.025  0.000  0.943 
  (l/acre) 
  Poverty  22.9   12.7   45.3  0.171  0.021  0.000  0.964 
 
 
Nearest  Cotton yield  14.1   8.6   39.0  0.240  0.053  0.000  0.401  
neighbor (kg/acre) 
matching Income  13.5   6.3   46.7  0.243  0.055  0.000  0.683 
  (Pak Rupees) 
  Pesticide  14.5   5.9   59.3  0.244  0.048  0.000  0.727 
  (l/acre) 
  Poverty  12.8   4.5   64.0  0.241  0.056  0.000  0.390 
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Table 8 presents results for the causal impacts of adoption of Bt cotton on productivity, 
household income and poverty status for different categories of land ownership. The 
results generally reveal that even within the different farm size groups, adoption tends 
to positively and significantly affect productivity, with the impact declining with 
increasing land ownership. The income effect of technology is the highest among the 
large farms, consistent with the earlier observation of positive relationship between 
land ownership and household income. A similar observation is reported by Mendola 
(2007) for Bangladesh. It is also significant to note that the adoption of Bt cotton exerts 
a negative and statistically significant impact on poverty among the small-scale 
farmers, but negative and insignificant effects on the medium and large farmers, 
despite the income effect being the greatest for the larger farmers. This finding 
suggests that targeting small-scale farmers with new agricultural technology can have 
welfare implications by helping such farmers out of poverty. The indicators of 
covariates balancing are presented in table 9. 
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Table 8:  Average treatment effects and results of sensitivity analysis according to farming category 
Farming  Matching algorithm  Outcome   Caliper ATT  Critical level  Number         Number  
category             of hidden  of  of    
                 bias ( )   treated  control 
Small   Nearest neighbor   Cotton yield  1.0  99*  2.05-2.10  41  39 
(0-5 acres)  matching    (kg /acre)    (1.70) 
     Household income 0.5  20184.1*** 1.20-1.25  41  39 
        (Pak Rupees)    (4.33) 
       Pesticide   0.01  -0.608* 1.60-1.65  41  39 
       (l/acre)     (-1.69) 
       Poverty  0.02  -0.445** 2.05-2.10  41  39 
            (-2.95)  
 
Medium  Nearest neighbor  Cotton yield  0.05  89.2*  1.95-2.0  49  43 
(>5-12.5 acres) matching    (kg /acre)    (1.89) 
       Household income 0.1  19506.8*** 1.95-2.00  49  43  
       (Pak Rupees)    (2.64) 
       Pesticide   0.02  -1.83**  1.45-1.50  49  43 
       (l/acre)     (-2.15) 
       Poverty  1.0  -0.083  ----   49  43 
            (-0.78) 
 
Large   Nearest neighbor  Cotton yield  0.05  80*     1.50-1.55  40  30   
(>12.5 acres)  matching    (kg/acre)    (1.72) 
       Household income 0.06  27860.2* 1.65-1.70  100  44  
       (Pak Rupees)    (1.82) 
       Pesticide   0.05  -0.55           ----   40  30 
       (l/acre)     (-1.33) 
       Poverty  0.01  -0.108           ----   100  44 
            (-1.40) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Values are significantly different from zero at ***1%, **5% and *10% level. ATT is the average 
treatment effect for the treated. 
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Table 9: Indicators of covariate balancing, before and after matching 
Farming  Outcome Caliper Median Median (Total)% Pseudo R2 Pseudo R2 p-value p-value   
Category     absolute bias absolute bias bias  (unmatched) (matched) of LR  of LR  
      (before (after  reduction     (unmatched)  (matched) 
      matching) % matching) % 
Small   Cotton yield 1.0  32.48  13.47  58.52  0.565  0.043  0.000  0.986 
  (kg/acre) 
  Income 0.5  27.58  14.73  46.59  0.330  0.029  0.000  0.900 
  (Pak Rupees) 
  Pesticide 0.01  27.44  13.51  50.76  0.332  0.060  0.000  0.383 
  (l/acre)  
  Poverty 0.02  27.58  19.25  25.88  0.330  0.112  0.000  0.922 
  
 
Medium Cotton yield 0.05  27.14  16.98  37.43  0.391  0.030  0.000  0.460 
  (kg/acre) 
  Income 0.1  25.88  17.91  30.80  0.392  0.023  0.000  0.730 
  (Rupees) 
  Pesticide 0.02  25.23  15.89  37.02  0.390  0.027  0.000  0.211 
  (l/acre) 
  Poverty 1.0  25.40  18.28  71.96  0.392  0.033  0.000  0.554  
      
 
Large  Cotton yield 0.05  22.44  14.35  36.05  0.244  0.022  0.000  0.155 
  (kg/acre) 
  Income 0.06  22.50  13.03  42.10  0.264  0.187  0.000  0.477 
  (Pak Rupees) 
  Pesticide 0.05  22.75  7.86  65.45  0.265  0.129  0.000  0.329 
  (l/acre) 
  Poverty 0.01  20.09  8.03  39.97  0.160  0.013  0.000  0.436 
Note: Nearest neighbour matching (2) results. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The direct effects of new agricultural technology on poverty reduction are the 
productivity benefits enjoyed by the farmers who actually adopt the technology. These 
benefits usually manifest themselves in the form of higher farm incomes. This study 
employed a propensity score-matching approach to examine the direct effects of 
adoption of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton on yields, pesticide demand, household 
income and poverty reduction, using cross-sectional data from a survey of farmers in 
the Punjab province of Pakistan. The analysis explicitly considers the causal 
relationship between adoption of the new technology and household welfare, thus 
addressing counterfactual questions that may be significant in predicting the impacts of 
policy changes. 
 
The empirical results from the analysis show that adoption of the new technology had 
positive and significant effects on cotton yields, household income and poverty 
reduction, and negative impact on the use of pesticides. For example, the estimates 
reveal that cotton yields are by 50 kg/acre higher for farmers who adopt Bt cotton. This 
can be considered as the opportunity cost of not adopting the new technology. The 
positive and significant impact of the technology on yields and household incomes 
reaffirms the potential role of new agricultural technology in directly reducing rural 
poverty through increased farm household incomes. The negative and significant 
impact of the technology on the demand for pesticide shows that as an inbuilt pest 
resistance mechanism. Bt cotton could result in substantial ecological benefits. The 
reduced demand for pesticides is encouraging, not only for ecological reasons, but also 
for health reasons, as they are potentially harmful for human health, particularly under 
the conditions of use in several developing countries. 
 
The estimates differentiated by land ownership indicate that the productivity gains from 
Bt cotton are higher for small farmers compared to medium and large farmers. The 
income effect of technology appears to be higher for large farmers. However, adoption 
tends to help small scale farmers out of poverty but exert no statistically significant 
impacts on medium and large farmers‟ poverty status. The policy implications of this 
finding is that targeting the small-scale farmers with the new agricultural technology 
can help improve their farm productivity, income and reduce poverty among these 
households. Promising policies in this direction include increasing their access to 
information to reduce uncertainty about new technologies and formal credit for them to 
overcome liquidity constraints. In addition, efforts to improve their human capital in the 
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form of education and providing them with better infrastructures, as well as advanced 
extension services, would go long way to help facilitate the adoption of new 
technologies.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Impact of Land Tenure on Investment and Efficiency: Evidence 
from Pakistan 
 
Abstract 
 
While recent studies appear to show a positive impact of secured land rights on land-
related investments, the relationship between land rights and farm efficiency remains 
unclear. In this paper, we explore the relationship between land rights and farmers‟ 
decisions to invest in land improvement measures, as well as its potential impacts on 
farm efficiency from a theoretical and empirical perspective. In the empirical analysis 
we use household data from the Punjab province in Pakistan. A two-stage tobit 
specification is employed to analyse the land-tenure investment relationship, while a 
stochastic profit frontier model is used to examine the impact of tenure security on farm 
efficiency. The empirical results generally show that land tenure security enhances 
investments in land-improving measures. Owner-cultivators were found to be more 
efficient than sharecroppers and fixed-renters, underlying the significance of tenure 
security in enhancing efficient allocation of resources in rural households. 
 
Key words: Land tenure arrangements, Investment, Soil capital, Efficiency, Pakistan. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The widespread support for reforming land rights in developing countries rests on the 
premise that farmlands held under secured land rights are more productive than 
farmlands held under other forms of agreements (Laffont and Matoussi, 1995; Banerjee 
et al., 2002). Tenure security encourages the farmer to undertake soil improving and 
productivity-enhancing investments, since it provides him with the confidence that he 
will remain on the land long enough to enjoy the benefits of his investment. On the 
other hand, insecure property rights in land create a disincentive to invest, since the 
uncertainty of the user‟s claim to land lessens expected future returns to investments 
(Jacoby and Mansuri, 2008). The consequence of declines in demand for investment is 
lower productivity. Land reforms that confer secured rights on farmlands should 
therefore enhance production efficiency of such lands (Gavain and Fafchamps, 1996). 
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The relevance of land tenure arrangements for investment and efficient allocation of 
resources among rural farm households in developing countries has resulted in 
significant interest in this area of research over the last three decades (e.g., Feder and 
Onchan, 1987; Banerjee et al., 2002; Jacoby et al., 2002; Deiniger and Jin, 2006; 
Jacoby and Mansuri, 2009). Although the empirical literature on this issue, particularly 
on Sub-Saharan Africa, is somehow inconclusive, the recent studies suggest that 
tenure security enhances investment in soil quality. For example, Deininger and Ali 
(2008) show that full land ownership, compared to mere land-use rights exerts a 
statistically significant and economically large effect on investment and productivity of 
land use in Uganda.  
 
Despite the large empirical literature, very little evidence exists on the effect of 
alternative tenure arrangements on efficiency. Banerjee et al. (2002) find empirical 
support for the hypothesis that secured tenure rights positively affected agricultural 
productivity in West Bengal. On the other hand, Jacoby et al. (2002) conclude from 
their study on rural China that guaranteeing land tenure in the north-eastern part of 
China would yield only minimal efficiency gains. In their recent study on Pakistan, 
Jacoby and Mansuri (2008) report a positive relationship between tenure security and 
investment. However, they could not investigate the impact of tenure security on 
efficiency due to data limitations, and therefore suggest that this issue should be 
considered as an important future research area. As argued by Gavian and Ehui 
(1999), from a policy view point, better information on the relative efficiency of farm 
lands under different tenure arrangements would provide a sound indication of the 
extent to which land tenure systems affect resource use and as such overall 
productivity of farming operations. 
 
In this paper, we provide some evidence on the relationship between tenure security 
and productivity enhancing investments as well as how tenure security impacts on farm 
efficiency in rural Pakistan. In the theoretical part of the study we employ an inter-
temporal framework to examine the link between different land tenure arrangements 
and investments as well as how these arrangements affect farm productivity. Moreover, 
this setting allows us to formulate the mutual interdependence of investment and land 
tenure arrangements in the form of a two-stage optimal control. The empirical work, 
which employs a sample of 325 cotton farmers from Punjab province in Pakistan, 
begins by analyzing the effects of different tenure regimes on investments in organic 
and mineral fertiliser, and the cultivation of leguminous crops (green manure). 
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Tenure security is measured by land ownership compared with arrangements like 
fixed-rent and sharecropping contracts. We use an empirical specification that 
accounts for potential endogeneity for tenure regimes that might occur, if farmers 
engage in productivity enhancing investments to increase security of property rights. 
The results clearly indicate that tenure security enhances investments in land 
improving measures. The second part of the analysis uses a stochastic profit frontier to 
investigate whether tenure insecurity discourages an efficient use of resources. Results 
suggest that owner-cultivators are more efficient than fixed-renters and sharecroppers, 
confirming the importance of tenure security in promoting farm efficiency in developing 
countries. 
 
1.2 Land Tenure and Land Reforms in Pakistan 
 
As in other parts of the developing world, access to land, as well as the security of land 
tenure contracts determine to a large extent the social status and economic well-being 
of the members of the rural society in Pakistan (Haider and Kuhnen, 1974). After 
independence in 1947, the distribution of land ownership was highly skewed, with less 
than 1% of the farmers holding more than 25% of the total agricultural land. At the 
other extreme, about 65% of the farmers held some 15% of the farmland in holdings of 
about two hectares or less. The unequal distribution of land contributed to tenancy 
arrangements such as sharecropping and fixed-rent contracts. Evidence shows that 
more than 50% of the total farm land is cultivated by tenants or sharecroppers 
(Pakistan Agriculture, 1995). 
 
The unequal distribution of land in the country resulted in two main land reform 
attempts. The first attempt was in 1959, when land reforms fixed the ceiling for private 
ownership of land at 500 acres for irrigated and 1,000 acres for non-irrigated land. A 
major problem of this reform was that ceilings were fixed in terms of individuals rather 
than families such that families could still own a large number of acres of land. A 
second attempt was therefore made in 1972, in which the ownership ceiling was 
reduced to 150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of non-irrigated land. Although the 
reforms appeared good on paper, the implementation was quite poor. Less than 0.9 
million acres of land were acquired for redistribution, which was about one-third of the 
land resumed under the 1959 land reforms. Moreover, the ceilings remained in terms of 
individuals rather than families. Hence, a number of large landowners still managed to 
keep their holdings within an extended joint family framework, while giving away only 
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marginal and less productive lands (Pakistan Agriculture, 2009). Land ownership in the 
country therefore remains highly concentrated. 
 
As indicated above, the major forms of land tenure arrangements in the country and 
particularly in the study area are owner-operated, fixed-rent and sharecropping 
contracts. The owner-operated involves farmers owning and cultivating their own plots. 
Farmers cultivating these plots have transfer rights, including rights to sell the plots. 
The fixed-rent contracts involves land owners renting out land to tenants and the 
sharecropping contract, is an arrangement made between the landlord and the 
operator such that part of the output is given to the landlord as compensation for using 
the land. Although the sharecropping contract compared to a fixed-rent increases the 
risk for the landowner, it enables the landlord to align the interest of the farmer with his 
interests (Basu, 1992). In some cases the tenants gets one-fourth, one-sixth, or even 
one-eighth of output, depending on the terms of agreement and contribution made in 
inputs. Fixed-rent contracts are normally informal and tend to vary between one and 
three years, although they can extend for several years, depending upon the mutual 
understanding between the owner and tenant.  
 
1.3 Conceptual Model of Land Tenure Rights and Investment 
 
In the theoretical part of our study we initially analyse the link between tenure security 
and productivity enhancing investments. For this purpose, we formulate the farmer‟s 
decision problem within a dynamic framework. The solution of this problem enables us 
to explain the investment behaviour resulting from different land tenure arrangement 
and to determine the efficient investment behaviour for each tenure arrangement. We 
also extend the dynamic framework to a two stage optimal control approach to address 
potential endogeniety of land tenure that may arise. 
 
Specifically, we model soil capital as a renewable resource and analyse its 
interdependence with cotton production. It is assumed here that farmers combine 
investments in organic fertilizers (manure), )(tM , cultivation of leguminous crops16, 
)(tL , and mineral fertilizers, )(tF , such as NPK. Leguminous crops are cultivated in 
between the cotton growing periods. The variable t indicates calendar time. Farmers 
                                                 
16
 Leguminous crops are known for their ability to fix atmospheric nitrogen, because of a 
symbiotic relationship with certain bacteria known as rhizobia found in root nodules of these 
crops. This ability to form symbiosis reduces fertilizer costs for farmers, and allows legumes to 
be used to replenish soil that has been depleted of nitrogen. 
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are fixed-rent tenant, sharecropper or owner-cultivators of the land. We assume that 
the fixed-rent or sharecropping contract last k years. The parameter k can be 
interpreted as the commitment period of the landlord. As mentioned above k varies 
normally from 1 to 3 in the case of Pakistan. We define the cotton production function 
per hectare by ))(),(),(),(( tFtLtMtSY , where )(tS represents soil capital and the 
remaining variables are as defined above. Following the standard convention we 
assume that the function )(Y is strictly concave in its arguments. Moreover, since 
manure, the cultivation of leguminous crops and mineral fertilizers are close substitutes 
in the short run, we assume that )(Y is additive separable in M(t), L(t), and F(t). 
Consequently, the cross deviations with respect to these variables is zero. Yet, the 
application of manure or the cultivation of leguminous crops has a positive impact on 
the evolution of soil capital in the medium-term perspective, and leads to an increase in 
soil productivity. However, an increase in )(tS decreases the marginal productivity of 
M(t), L(t), and F(t). Therefore, we assume that the cross derivatives SMY , SLY  and SFY  
are negative. On the other hand, a decrease in )(tS results in the three cross 
derivatives being positive. 
 
Our focus is on investments in soil quality on a given piece of farmland17. Thus, the 
application of manure, the cultivation of leguminous crops, and the application of 
mineral fertilizer are assumed to affect soil capital by the factors M , L  and F  
respectively, with M , L , F >0. Hence, the evolution of the soil quality over time is 
described by 
 
)),(),(),(),(()()()(
.
tFtLtMtSYtFtLtMS YFLM    
 
where a dot over a variable denotes the operator dtd /  and Y  the decrease in soil 
quality in proportion to the output as a result of the extraction of nutrients with the 
harvest. Thus, while manure and leguminous crops have positive effects on soil quality, 
mineral fertilizer tends to decrease it over time. 
 
Since current investment decisions affect the evolution of soil capital over time, we 
analyse the farmer‟s decision problem within a dynamic context. We consider the fact 
that the planning horizon of the farmer depends on the land tenure arrangements. In 
                                                 
17
 The terms soil capital and soil quality are used synonymously. 
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the case of fixed-rent farmers or sharecroppers, user rights of the land are transferred 
for k years so that the length of their planning horizon corresponds to )0( k , where k 
indicates the final and 0 the initial year of the land-use contract. In the case of owner-
cultivators, we assume that the length of their planning horizon is given by ),0( T , 
where T indicates the end of the planning horizon of the owner. We further assume that 
the farmer maximises farm profits subject to agronomic and biophysical constraints. 
The present value of the soil capital for the owner-cultivator at the end of the planning 
horizon is given by 
TeTSW ))((0 , and by )())1(( kC etSW  for the fixed-rent tenant or 
sharecropper (land-use contract). If the existing land-use contract is not renewed at 
time k the function )(CW is zero. However, if the existing land-use contract is renewed, 
the present value of the soil capital is a function of the farm profits in the subsequent 
period of the land-use contract.  
 
The planning horizon of the subsequent land-use contract is given by kk 2 , or in 
more general terms for the i-th number (renewal) of the land-use contract by 
kiik )1()(  , i =1, 2,...T/k. We assume that the landlord communicates the extension 
or termination of the land-use contract with k-year notice, i.e., at time ki )1(  . To 
facilitate the comparison between the different tenure arrangements we postulate that 
the maximum number of the land-use contract is given by T/k. We also assume that in 
the case the contract is renewed, the farmer maintains the soil quality at the end of the 
planning horizon ik above the level ikS , i.e., ikSikS )( , so that the expected farm 
profits can be realised in the subsequent period. To simplify notation, we suppress the 
argument t of the control and stock variables unless it is required for an unambiguous 
notation. Given these assumptions, the fixed rent tenant‟s or sharecropper‟s decision 
problem for the i-th period, i= 1, 2,……..T/k can be stated as 
 
RF
ik
ki
LM
T
kiikki
C
FLM
pFpLpMpFLMSpYeSttJ )1(),,,([),,,(
)1(
)1()1(
,,
max 
  



  
)())(()],,,( ikC eikSWdtFLMSpY         (1) 
 
subject to 
 
YFLMS YFLM  
.
, with ,))1(( )1( kiSkiS   
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and 0)(),(),( tFtLtM  
 
The parameter   represents the share of the yields that accrues to the landlord in the 
case of sharecropping18. In this situation   takes the value of 1 and the cost of land is 
given by  pY . In case of a fixed rent tenant 0 , and the cost of the land is given 
by the constant Rp which denotes the annual land rent. 
 
All parameters, except i, k and kiS )1(   are grouped in a vector named  . The 
components of this vector are given by p = price of cotton, Mp price of manure, Lp  
“price” of cultivating a leguminous crop, Fp price of mineral fertiliser,  discount 
rate, and the previously introduced parameters  ,,,, YFLM and Rp . 
 
The current value Hamiltonian )(1 tH  associated with problem (1) yields 
 
),()1()( YFLMpYpFpLpMppYtH YFLM
C
RFLM
C    
 
and the first order conditions for an interior solution are given by 
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C
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C
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C
LLL
C
L YpYppYH       (3) 
 
0)(  FYF
C
FFF
C
F YpYppYH       (4) 
 
SY
C
s
C
C
YpY  
.
        (5) 
 
YFLMS YFLM  
.
,  kiSkiS )1()1((       (6) 
 
                                                 
18
 Since we focus on the issue of different tenure regimes we use expected crop yields and do 
not analyse their variation and the associated question of risk-sharing between the farmer and 
the landlord. 
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Finally, the transversality condition implies that dSeikSdWik kCC /))(()(      
 
 
Let the solution of the problem (1) is given by 
 
)),)1((,,)1(()),)1((,,)1();(),(),((
**** kiSikkiJkiSikkitFtLtMJ CC    
 
where the superscript * indicates the evaluation of the variable along its optimal 
trajectory given the parameter values of ))1((,,)1( kiSikki  and  . Hence, 
)))1((,,)1((
*
kiSikkiJ C  indicates the maximized discounted farm profits aggregated 
over the time horizon of k-years given the initial soil capital of kiSkiS )1())1((  for the 
i-th period of the land-use contract. Note that the terminal value of the soil quality for 
the i-th period of the land contract becomes the initial soil quality for the subsequent 
period. In case the farmers will be offered to renew the land-use contract the 
expression 
)())(( ikC eikSW  can be replaced by )),(,)1(,(
*
ikSkiikJ C   since it 
expresses the discount farm profits aggregated over the subsequent k-years. The link 
between the land-use contracts for different periods is given by the soil quality at the 
end of the period and the present value of the stream of farm profits of the subsequent 
periods. Hence, the overall farm profits of a sequence of land-use contracts over 
*i periods of k-years is given by 
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To analyse the decision problem of the owner of the land we consider the following 
formulation 
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subject to 
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YFLMS YFLM  
.
, with 0)0( SS  , 
 
and 0)(),(),( tFtLtM  
where Cp denotes the annual cost of land owned. This cost comprises of the forgone 
interest on own capital as well as the paid interest and capital service for borrowed 
capital. 
 
The current value Hamiltonian )(tH O associated with problem (7) yields 
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CFLM
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and the first-order conditions for an interior solution are given by 
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.
,  0)0( SS  .      (12) 
 
In addition, the terminal condition requires that ./))(()( dSeTSdWT TOO    The first 
order conditions (2)-(6) for the fixed-rent tenant or sharecropper and the conditions (8)-
(12) seem to differ at first glance only by the annual payment of the sharecropper for 
the use of the land MpY . However, a closer look reveals that the planning horizon 
for the fixed-rent tenant or sharecropper is only k-years, whereas it is T years for the 
owner-cultivator.  
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The solution of equations (5) and (11) yields  
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and determines the shadow value of the soil quality at time t. An increase in soil quality 
at time t benefits the fixed-rent farmer‟s or sharecropper‟s farm profits at the most for k-
years whereas the owner takes advantage of the same increase until T. This can be 
seen in equation (13) from the upper limit of the integrals which do not form part of an 
exponent. Hence, one can conclude that the shadow price of the fixed-rent tenant or 
sharecropper,
C , is less than the shadow price of the owner cultivator, O  for any 
identical soil quality S. Yet, this result cannot be extended over the entire trajectories of 
C  because the trajectories of the soil qualities will only coincide by chance. If the soil 
quality of the owner-cultivator is better than that of the fixed-renter or sharecropper, the 
term SY  will be lower for the owner-cultivator than for the fixed-rent tenant or 
sharecropper due to concavity of the production function. If the upper limits of the 
integral )( Tik  were identical one might expect in this case that O is lower 
than )(tC . However, since )(tO and )(tC are basically determined by the stream of 
the discounted farm profits with respect to a marginal improvement of soil quality from 
time t  until the end of the planning horizon, their values depend crucially on the length 
of the planning horizon. Since )(tO takes into account the next T-t years and 
))1( skiC  considers only the next k-s  years, it is expected that the longer time 
horizon of the owner guarantees that 
C  is lower than the shadow price of the owner, 
O ,  for any soil quality S and any remaining planning horizon. 
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Efficiency Investment Behaviour 
 
In this section, we analyse the effect of the land-tenure regime on the optimal choice of 
manure, cultivation of a leguminous crop, and mineral fertiliser. In order to determine 
the optimal short-run behaviour we assume that the initial soil capital 0)0( SS  is 
identical for all three different tenure arrangements. However, soil capital is likely to 
evolve differently for each tenure regime and therefore we need to consider the 
individual changes of S(t) in order to determine the optimal long-run behaviour of the 
different types of farmers. 
 
Since the cross derivatives of the function Y involving M, L or F are zero, we can 
analyse the first order conditions (2)-(4) for the fixed-rent tenant or sharecropper, and 
the first order conditions (8)-(10) for the owner-cultivator for each choice variable, 
independently of the values of other choice variables provided that 0)0( SS  . Given 
the relatively short time horizon of the land-use contracts, we assume that 
sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants practically do not place any value on the shadow 
price of the soil quality. Hence, for the graphical analysis of the first-order conditions we 
assume that 
C  is practically zero. 
 
Observation 1: If increased application of manure leads to an improvement in soil 
quality that is more (less) than the decline in soil quality resulting from the increase in 
quantity harvested, then the efficient amount of manure applied by sharecroppers 
(fixed-rent tenants) will be lower in the short-run than that applied by fixed-renters 
(sharecroppers), which in turn, will be lower (larger or less) than the amount applied by 
owner-cultivators. 
 
As shown in figure 1a (continuous lines) the solution of equation (2) demonstrate that it 
is efficient for sharecroppers to apply less manure 
SM  than for the fixed rent tenants, 
TM , for whom in turn it is efficient to apply less manure than owners, OM . This result 
is obtained under the assumption that the term )( MYM Y   is strictly positive, i.e. an 
additional unit of manure leads to an increase in soil capital that is larger than the 
decrease resulting from the increase in quantity harvested.  
 
It is significant to mention that the theoretical analysis presented above does not allow 
a unique ranking based on amounts of organic manure applied by owner-cultivators, 
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fixed-rent tenants and sharecroppers. In figure 1b, we have depicted the opposite case, 
i.e. )( MYM Y  <0, with the result that it is efficient for owners 
OM to apply less 
manure than sharecroppers, 
SM , for whom in turn it is efficient to apply less than 
fixed-rent tenants, .TM  Finally, it is also possible that the sign of )( MYM Y   
changes with the value .M  In this situation the rankings obtained previously depend on 
the values of MppM ,, and . One possible outcome is depicted in figure 2. Overall, 
the determination of the ranking requires the specification of the parameters. Once, 
these values are determined, the ranking can be obtained from the solution of the first 
order conditions (2) and (8).  
 
As pointed out by Jacoby and Mansuri (2008), whether fixed-renters or sharecroppers 
apply less manure than owner-cultivators depends on the extent to which landlords can 
commit to rewarding the tenant for his investment. Where landlords fully commit to 
reward tenants, a fixed-rent contract essentially provides user rights for the duration of 
the contract and also makes it possible for tenants to claim monetary compensation for 
improvements in the soil quality at the end of the contract. Hence, a residual claimant, 
the tenant is fully incentivized and moral hazard problems consequently disappear. 
However, in a world of no commitment, the tenant will apply manure only to the point 
where the marginal profits in the current period are equal to zero and does not take into 
account the shadow value of the soil. This dynamic inefficiency will be common to both 
sharecropper and fixed-renters. 
 
To analyse the effect of the land-tenure regime on the optimal short-run cultivated 
amount of leguminous crops we solve the first order conditions (3) and (9). Since the 
structures of these equations are identical to equations (2) and (8), the conclusions are 
identical. In the interest of brevity, the arguments are not repeated here. Finally, we 
analyse the effect of land-tenure regimes on the optimal choice of mineral fertiliser. 
 
Observation 2: The efficient amount of mineral fertilizer applied by owner-cultivators 
is in the short-run lower than the one applied by sharecroppers, which in turn is in the 
short-run lower than the level applied by fixed-rent tenants. 
 
By solving equations (4) and (10), figure 3 shows that in the short run, it is efficient for 
owners to apply less mineral fertiliser, 
OF , than for sharecropper, SF , for whom in 
turn it is efficient to apply less than fixed rent tenants, 
TF . In the case of mineral 
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fertiliser, it is possible to determine a unique ranking because the term FYF Y   is 
strictly positive. 
 
The previous analysis is valid for the case where 0)0( SS  is identical for all three 
tenure arrangements. While this assumption is plausible at the beginning of the 
planning horizon, it is not likely to hold over a longer time horizon since owner-
cultivators, sharecroppers, and fixed-rent tenants value soil capital differently. We 
assume that there exists a long-run equilibrium value for soil capital and this may be 
above or below its initial value. For this purpose, we analyse the optimal long-run 
investment behaviour of the different farmers for the case where 0)( StS  and where 
0)( StS  . In the former case, farmers have to build up soil capital over time and in the 
latter case it is optimal to decrease soil capital. Figures 1a and 1b show that in long-run 
it is optimal for the owner-cultivator to reduce the application of manure )(
O
M , while 
for sharecroppers )(
S
M and fixed-rent tenants )(
T
M it is optimal to increase the 
application of manure and mulch over time, provided that owner-cultivators build up soil 
capital )( 0SS  and sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants decrease soil capital 
)( 0SS  . 
 
For the sake of brevity we do not discuss the optimal long-run investment behaviour for 
the case where )( MYM Y  changes over time but it can be derived from figure 2 in 
the same way as it was done in figures 1a and 1b. Figure 3 demonstrates that it is 
optimal in the long-run for owner-cultivators to apply less mineral fertiliser )(
O
F and for 
sharecroppers )(
S
F and fixed-rent tenant )(
T
F to apply more fertiliser over time, 
provided that owner-cultivators build up soil capital )( 0SS  and sharecroppers and 
fixed-rent tenants decrease soil capital )( 0SS  . Although many other cases could be 
analysed with figures 1-3, we have focused on the most typical situations in the interest 
of brevity. Nevertheless, the change in the application rates of mineral and organic 
fertilizer of the owner-cultivator, sharecropper and fixed-rent tenant are subject to the 
magnitude of the shift of the graphs. Since it cannot be determined analytically, the 
theoretical analysis provides information about the changes in the long-run behaviour 
for each type of farmer but does not allow a comparison of these changes among 
them. 
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Endogeneity of Land Rights 
 
The analysis presented above considered land rights as exogenously given. However, 
as indicated earlier, farmers may engage in soil-improving investments to increase the 
security of property rights and thus in a way reduce the probability of losing property 
rights in the future. To account for this potential endogeneity of land rights, we 
formulate the decision problem as a two stage optimal control problem. In the first 
stage farmers are either fixed-rent tenants or sharecroppers but may become owner-
cultivators in the second stage. Thus, we examine the optimality of switching the land-
tenure regime, as well as its optimal point in time. We denote this intermediate point in 
time by 1t , with ],0[1 kt  . The decision problem can be generally formulated as 
dtpYpFpLpMppY RF
t
LM
tFLM
)()1((.)max
1
1
0
,,,
   
           (14) 
 
T
t
CFLM dtpFpLpMppY
1
)( , 
 
subject to 
 
YFLMS YFLM  
.
, with kttSS  10 0,)0(    (15) 
and 
YFLMS YFLM  
.
, with TttStS t  11 ,)( 1     (16) 
 
The first order conditions according to Tomiyana (1985) are given by 
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The following continuity conditions also have to hold at the optimal intermediate point in 
time 
*
1t . 
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where ),,,(max)(
1
*
1
,,
t
O
FLM
O STtJJ   is the value function of the second stage as 
defined in equation (7). The second equality sign in equation (21) and (22) follows if the 
function 
*OJ is twice continuously differentiable in 1t  and S. 
 
For ,0*1 t  the necessary conditions are given by (16), and (18) and equation (20) 
takes the form 
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On the other hand, for kt *1 , the necessary conditions are given by (15), (17) and (19) 
and (21) equation takes the form 
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
          (24) 
 
Tomiyama (1985) analysed the case where the intermediate point in time is an element 
of the set [0, T] whereas the intermediate point in our analysis is restricted to the set [0, 
k]. Hence, if the optimal intermediate point of time is not within this set, then there is the 
need to check the remaining sets given by ],[],....,2,[ TkTkk  . Failure of the optimal 
intermediate point in time to fall within any of these sets would imply non-optimality of 
land acquisition within the time span of T years. Thus, it would rather be optimal to 
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continue cultivating the land as a fixed-rent tenant or sharecropper over the entire time 
span. 
 
The optimal intermediate point in time can be determined by establishing the value 
function of the second stage ),(max)(
112,,
*
2 t
FLM
StJJ  . It is a function of the yet to be 
determined optimal intermediate point in time 1t  and the corresponding initial value of 
the soil quality
1t
S . With these provisions, the equation (14) can be reformulated to 
obtain. 
 
 
1
1
*
1
0
1
,,,
),()()1()(max
t
t
O
RFLM
tFLM
StJdtpYpFpLpMppY    (25) 
 
The solution to equation (25) is characterized by the necessary conditions defined 
above. For practical purposes, the analysis proceeds by finding the interior solution, 
).,0(*1 kt   However, if no interior solution exists, then there is the need to check for a 
boundary solution, i.e. 0*1 t , and kt 
*
1 . As mentioned above, this procedure needs 
to be repeated for the remaining sets of time of length, k, i.e. of the remaining land-use 
contracts. Once the optimal intermediate point of time is determined, it would be 
obvious whether and when it is optimal to acquire the previously cultivated land. 
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Figure 1a: The optimal amount of manure and mulch with 0M Y MY   . 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: The optimal amount of mulch and manure with 0M Y MY   . 
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Figure 2: The optimal amount of mulch and manure with 0M Y MY  ¦ . 
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Figure 3: The optimal amount of mineral fertiliser 
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2. Empirical Analysis: Econometric Issues  
 
The theoretical model provides general insights about the link between land tenure 
arrangements and the optimal investments behaviour. However, it does not account for 
socioeconomic factors and location specific information. Hence, we conduct an 
empirical cross-section analysis that accounts for this additional information and also 
allows us to contrast the results of our theoretical findings. The analysis focuses on the 
investment behaviour of farmers but does not consider the long-term perspective. 
 
2.1 Land Tenure and Investment 
 
The maximization problems for sharecroppers and fixed-renters outlined in equation (1) 
and that of owner-cultivators in equation (7) suggest that farmers invest in soil-
improving and yield enhancing measures, if the resulting changes in the discounted 
aggregated stream of future farm profits is positive, i. e. XJ  /1  is positive with 
COl , and FLMX ,, . However, the information about this change is private and 
therefore not observable. What is normally observed is the decision to invest or not to 
invest in soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures. The empirical specification and 
analysis focus on the underlying factors that determine farmers‟ decisions to engage in 
soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures. Let‟s define the underlying latent 
propensity variable for investment in the soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures 
by farmer i with Ni ,.......,1  as *iI . Given the censored nature of the investment 
decision variable, the tobit specification can be employed in the analysis. This is given 
by  
 
imimimimimim XZI  
//*
  Ni ,.......,1      (26) 
 
,
0
0
**


 

otherwise
IifI
I imimim  
 
where m indicates the three different investment options in soil improving and yield-
enhancing measures. While 
*
imI  represent the unobserved latent variable, imI  is 
observed, and im  and im  are parameters to be estimated. We assume that the 
errors im  are independently and identically distributed. The vector imX  includes 
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variables showing whether the land is owner-cultivated or cultivated under 
sharecropping or fixed-rent contract, while the vector imZ  includes household 
characteristics such as age, gender, and number of years of formal schooling of the 
farmer, as well as farm-specific characteristics such as farm size and geographic 
location.  
 
As stated earlier, land tenure arrangements and investment decisions may be jointly 
determined, resulting in endogeneity of the land tenure variables in equation (26)19.  
 
Thus, the determinants of land rights may also be specified as 
 
,
/
imimimimimim ZIX           (27) 
 
where im  and im  are parameters to be estimated and im  is an error term. Because 
of the censoring in the dependent variables, the empirical model used below is the form 
suggested by Smith and Blundell (1989). The authors develop both a test for 
endogeneity and an efficient method of estimation in the context of simultaneity and 
censoring. The test for endogeneity is developed by writing im  from (26) conditional 
on im  from (27) as imimimim   . Substituting im  into (26) then produces the 
conditional model 
 
imimimimimimimim XZI  
//*
       (28) 
 
A test of the null hypothesis 0im constitute a test for exogeneity of imX ; specifically, 
if the hypothesis that 0im  is not rejected, then the hypothesis that land rights are an 
exogenous determinant of investment in productivity enhancing  measures is not 
rejected. The test is implemented by first estimating (27) and then using the residuals 
from that estimation as estimates of im  (28). Specification (28) is then estimated via a 
standard censored regression. If the coefficient on the residual term is significant, then 
exogeneity is rejected. Given that the dependent variables in (27) are discrete, we 
employ a linear probability model to facilitate estimation and computation of standard 
                                                 
19
 Jacoby and Mansuri (2008) also pointed out that most models of agrarian contracts imply a 
correlation between contractual choice and unobserved cultivator characteristics, resulting in 
endogeneity of land tenure arrangements. 
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errors in the second stage estimation. To account for second stage heteroskedasticity, 
is first estimated by OLS to obtain predicted values for land tenure variables and then 
is re-estimated with weighted least squares using the inverse of these predicted values 
as weights (Maddala, 1983). 
 
Using the above method involves identifying a vector of excluded instruments. We 
employ a dummy variable indicating whether the landlord resides in the village where 
the farm is located or not and the distance of the farm from the landlord‟s residence as 
identifying instruments. The validity of the exclusion restriction can then be tested by 
the over- identification test statistic suggested by Lee (1992). This test statistics is 
distributed as 
2  with degree of freedom equal to the number of excluded instruments. 
 
2.2 Land Tenure and Farm Efficiency 
 
Besides, analysing the impact of tenure arrangements on soil improving and 
productivity enhancing investments, we also employ a stochastic profit frontier model to 
examine the relationship between tenure security and profit efficiency. As profit 
efficiency is the ability of the farm to achieve the highest possible profit given the prices 
and levels of fixed factors of that farm, profit inefficiency in this context can be defined 
as the loss of profit from not operating on the frontier (see, for example, Jondrow et al. 
(1982); Battese and Coelli, 1995; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
We employ a translog functional form to estimate the profit function. This is a flexible 
functional form that places no a priori restrictions on the elasticity of substitution and 
allows the economies of scale to vary with the output level (Ali and Flinn, 1989). The 
normalized translog stochastic profit function, which is assumed to be “well behaved”, 
is specified as20: 
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20
 Competitive input and output markets are assumed because all output and input prices are 
exogenous to the farm household. The Cobb-Douglas specification was tested versus the 
Translog and rejected at the 1% level of significance. 
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where i indicates a specific farmer in the sample, i  is the normalized profit computed 
as gross revenue less variable costs, iD is a vector of dummy variables representing 
districts fixed effects; while nip  is a vector of input prices with n representing the 
number of variable inputs. Inputs such as land and labor are captured by the vector qiz , 
with .2,1q  The svi ' are assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
random errors having ),0( 2vN  distribution, while the sui '  reflect profit inefficiency. 
The determinants of inefficiency are specified as iii XRu 210    where 
iR and iX  indicate a vector of household and farm-level characteristics, and a vector of 
tenure arrangement variables, respectively, as defined above. The si
/  are the 
parameter to be estimated. The parameters of the model are estimated in one stage 
with the approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). 
 
In estimating the translog function, we consider the specification as a second order 
approximation around the sample median, by normalizing all the variables by the 
corresponding sample medians21. The convexity of the estimated profit function implies 
that the profit function is a result of profit maximization. This assumption is reasonable 
in the present study because the sample only consists of cotton farmers, who produce 
for the market and therefore aim at maximizing their benefits from production. Hence, 
comparing profits among different farms can reveal the extent to which these farms 
achieve the objective of profit maximization. 
 
3. Data and Description of Variables 
 
The data employed in this study were collected with a survey of farmers from seven 
districts in the Punjab province in Pakistan. A stratified random sampling of 325 cotton 
farm households was selected from the Punjab province for the survey. The survey 
was conducted through questionnaire interviews by local enumerators who were 
trained prior to the exercise which took place between August and December 2007. 
The districts sampled include Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, Vehari, Khanewal, Multan, 
Lodhran and Rahim Yar Khan. The sample consisted of 210 owner-cultivated 
households, 88 households with sharecropping contracts and 27 household with fixed 
                                                 
21
 This stems from the fact that the translog functional form requires that the underlying profit 
function is approximated around a specific point. The median is chosen rather than the mean 
because it is less affected by outliers and as such more precise in the approximation of the 
translog. 
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rent contracts. The soil improving and productivity enhancing investments undertaken 
by farmers included organic (manure) and mineral fertiliser and planting of leguminous 
crops. 
 
The survey gathered information on household and farm-level characteristics. 
Household variables included the number of years of schooling and the age of farmer, 
implements owned by farmer, livestock value and access to credit. Improved natural 
resource management practices such as mulching and manure preparation and 
application are knowledge-intensive and require considerable management input 
(Barrett et al., 2002). In particular, formal schooling may enhance latent managerial 
ability and greater cognitive capacity. 
 
Differences across farms in term of quality and location also affect the suitability of the 
plots for various investments. Information on farm characteristics was therefore 
collected to address this issue. Farm-level variables included distance of the cultivated 
land (farm) from home for owner-cultivators, distance of farm from landlord‟s home for 
sharecroppers and fixed-renters, soil fertility, and slope of land. A farmer‟s decision to 
apply organic or mineral fertiliser or cultivate leguminous crops (green manure) will 
depend on whether the fertility of the soil needs to be replenished. The manpower 
availability is captured by the number of adults in the household while possible wealth 
effects are captured by including farm size, farm implements owned and livestock 
ownership. The age of the farmer is included to capture potential returns to experience. 
 
To examine the impact of land tenure on efficiency, detailed information was also 
collected on quantities and prices of inputs such as seeds, pesticides, farm labor as 
well as farm output. Detailed information was collected on the amount of mineral and 
organic fertiliser applied and the number of acres used in the cultivation of leguminous 
crops. The dependent variable in the investment specification is censored, since some 
of the observations are zero. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
analysis are provided in table 1. The statistics reveal that the mean value of output was 
highest for owner-cultivators, followed by fixed-renters and sharecroppers, respectively. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable  Description      Sample  Standard 
          Mean  Deviation 
Total cost   Per hectare cost of cotton production in Rupees  17559  5766.5 
Output value   Per hectare value of cotton output in Rupees  33937.7 1326.7 
Cotton Price  Price of 40 kg cotton in Rupees    1537.7  307.2 
Cotton area  Number of hectares under cotton cultivation  12.95  18.24 
Profit   Per hectare profit from cotton output   16378  8920.5 
Seed    Price of 1 kg seed in Rupees    92.13  23.57  
Pesticide   Price of 1 liter pesticide in Rupees   312.8  241.23 
Fertilizer   Price of 1 bag (50 kg fertilizer) in Rupees  724.4  254.62 
Manure   Price of 1 troley farm yard manure in Rupees  387.08  339.46 
Irrigation   Price of 1 irrigation in Rupees    377.10  255.84 
Labour    A unit cost of labour per man day   112.2  154.23  
Districts fixed effects 
Bahawalpur  1 if farmer belongs to Bahawalpur district, 0 otherwise  0.17  0.38  
Bahawalnagar  1 if farmer belongs to Bahawalnagar district, 0 otherwise0.10  0.29 
Khanewal  1 if farmer belongs to Khanewal district, 0 otherwise 0.14  0.34  
Vehari   1 if farmer belongs to Vehari district, 0 otherwise 0.16  0.36 
Multan   1 if farmer belongs to Multan district, 0 otherwise 0.06  0.24 
Lodhran  1 if farmer belongs to Lodhran district, 0 otherwise 0.18  0.39 
Age   Age of cotton farmer in number of years  42  12.14  
Education  Number of years of schooling    9.02  4.26  
Owner   1 if land is under owner-operated, 0 otherwise  0.63  0.26 
Sharecropper  1 if land is under sharecropping, 0 otherwise  0.27  0.24 
Fixed-rent  1 if land is under fixed-rent, 0 otherwise   0.10  0.15  
Soil fertility  1 if good soil fertility, 0 otherwise   0.46  0.49 
Family size  Number of total family members   9.53  5.3  
Road access  1 if household had road access, 0 otherwise  0.83  0.37  
Family type  1 if joint family, 0 otherwise    0.78  0.4  
Tubewell  1 if farmer owns a tube well, 0 otherwise  0.66  0.47  
Organic Manure  Amount applied per hectare in kg   297  171 
Mineral Fertilizer Amount applied per hectare in kg   155  87 
Leguminous crops Number of hectares under leguminous crops  0.91  0.79 
Pre-sowing irrigation 1 if farmer carried out double pre-sowing irrigation,  
0 otherwise      0.46  0.49 
Non-farm work  1 if farmer engaged in non-farm work, 0 otherwise 0.20  0.40  
Extension contact 1 if farmer have contact with extension agent, 0 otherwise0.81  0.40  
Farmer field school 1 if farmer is member of farmer field school, 0 otherwise 0.16  0.36  
Credit access  1 if farmer have access to credit facility, 0 otherwise 0.62  0.48 
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4. Empirical Results  
 
4.1 Results of Land-Related Investments   
 
The results of the (first-stage) regression of land rights on household and farm-level 
variables as well as the instruments used in the (second stage) investment regression 
are presented in table 2. The omitted category is the owner-cultivator variable and the 
specifications were estimated with a linear probability model. Household and farm 
characteristics appear to be related to the rights that household enjoy. The village 
effects reveal that two districts namely Bahawalpur and Rahim Yar Khan tend to favour 
owner-operated tenure arrangements. The F-test on the joint significance of the 
instruments (distance and location) in the land rights regression is reported in the table. 
The hypothesis that they are jointly zero is rejected at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 2: Linear probability estimates of determinants of land tenure arrangements 
Variable Fixed-rent arrangement Share-cropping arrangement 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Farm size -0.036** 2.08 -0.017 0.89 
Soil fertility 0.286 1.63 0.024* 1.71 
Slope 0.108* 1.98 0.262* 1.84 
Tube well 0.013 1.18 0.049 0.83 
Extension 0.076* 1.86 0.008* 1.97 
Household size -0.009 0.54 -0.082** 2.03 
Female -0.039 0.50 -0.061 0.71 
Age -0.009* 1.86 -0.017* 1.96 
Education 0.022 0.73 0.031 0.96 
Livestock 0.088*** 2.72 0.045** 2.09 
Implements -0.049 1.52 -0.036 1.39 
Years under cultivation 0.007* 1.92 0.058** 2.26 
Distance from landlord 0.021*** 2.38 0.015** 2.17 
Location of farm 0.062*** 2.51 0.138** 2.25 
Bahawalpur -0.452*** 2.69 -0.081*** 2.37 
Bahawalnagar 0.038* 1.92 0.076* 1.84 
Khanewal 0.006 0.57 0.022 0.68 
Multan -0.011 1.25 0.006 0.38 
Lodhran 0.019 0.77 0.284 1.13 
Rahim Yar Khan -0.032*** 2.56 -0.047* 1.92 
F-Statistics 
[p-value] 
21.82 
[0.00] 
 27.69 
[0.00] 
 
Note: The t-values are significantly different from zero at ***1%, **5% and *10% levels 
respectively. 
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The empirical results for the investment equation (28) are presented in table 3. It is 
clear from the results that the variables representing the residuals (RESSHARE and 
RESFIXED) derived from the first stage regression for fixed rent and sharecropping are 
not statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting no simultaneously bias 
and that the coefficients have been consistently estimated (Wooldridge, 2002). Also 
shown in the table are the 
2 - statistics for the joint Wald tests on the vector of these 
residuals. These values reveal that for each investment equation, the null hypothesis 
that the residuals are jointly equal to zero could not be rejected, again confirming the 
results of the individual t-statistics. These results are not surprising because in the 
study area, property rights to land are normally acquired either through purchase of 
land, inheritance or gifts. Contrary to other regions and countries individuals have few 
options to engage in activities that increase tenure security. 
 
The coefficient of primary interest in table 3 are those on sharecropping and fixed-rent 
tenants. The specifications for organic fertiliser and leguminous crop show that the 
coefficient on sharecropping is negative and significantly different from zero, while 
positive and insignificant in the specification of mineral fertiliser. The computed 
marginal effects from the coefficients indicate that sharecroppers apply about 41% less 
organic fertiliser than owner-cultivators and devote 33% less land to the cultivation of 
leguminous crops22. The estimates of the coefficients on fixed-renters are also negative 
and significantly different from zero, while positive and significant in the specification for 
mineral fertiliser. The marginal effects indicate that fixed-renters apply almost 21% less 
organic fertiliser and devote 12% less land to the cultivation of leguminous crops, as 
compared to owner-cultivators. On the other hand, they apply almost 31% more 
mineral fertiliser than owner-cultivators, a finding that is consistent with the notion that 
fixed-renters normally attempt to maximise net benefits from their rented land within a 
very short time, which normally include applying relatively high levels of yield 
enhancing inputs such as mineral fertiliser. 
 
It is significant to note that these empirical results are consistent with our theoretical 
findings, where we showed that owner-cultivators apply more organic fertiliser in the 
form of manure and cultivate more leguminous crops than fixed-rent tenants who in 
turn apply more organic fertiliser than sharecroppers, if the soil improvement effect is 
greater than the soil degradation effect of organic fertilizer. Hold-up problems in the 
                                                 
22
 To obtain the marginal effects within a Tobit model, the Maximum Likelihood Estimates must 
be multiplied by the proportion of non-censored observations in the sample (Greene, 2003), 
which is 57.7% within the data. 
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sense of lack of full commitment on the part of landlords could be influencing the 
findings for fixed-rent tenants and sharecroppers, since supervision, which is quite 
expensive in the study area, is not undertaken to ensure that tenants put in maximum 
effort in terms of investment in soil-improving measures and yield enhancing inputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87 
Table 3: Tobit estimates of extent of investment in land improving measures 
Variable Manure Fertilizer Leguminous crops 
Sharecropping -0.718** 
(2.34) 
0.414 
(1.58) 
-0.581** 
(2.04) 
Fixed-rent -0.359*** 
(3.19) 
0.534*** 
(2.73) 
-0.213** 
(2.25) 
Farm size -0.017* 
(1.68) 
0.182** 
(2.69) 
-0.105* 
(1.76) 
Soil fertility 0.759* 
(1.72) 
0.531* 
(1.84) 
-0.194 
(1.14) 
Slope 0.246 
(1.43) 
-0.092* 
(1.85) 
0.057 
(1.39) 
Tube well 0.102* 
(1.96) 
0.118 
(1.22) 
0.286 
(0.08) 
Extension 0.503* 
(1.87) 
0.216 
(1.57) 
0.034** 
(2.03) 
Household size -0.085 
(0.79) 
-0.116* 
(1.77) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
Female 0.079 
(0.82) 
-0.061 
(0.22) 
-0.064 
(0.86) 
Age 0.014** 
(2.16) 
0.036 
(1.33) 
0.032* 
(1.69) 
Education 0.266* 
(1.78) 
0.042* 
(2.14) 
0.062* 
(1.87) 
Livestock 0.864*** 
(3.12) 
-0.041 
(0.72) 
0.263** 
(2.41) 
Implements 0.266* 
(1.78) 
0.238* 
(1.83) 
0.316** 
(2.39) 
Plot years 0.151*** 
(3.74) 
0.329*** 
(4.02) 
0.77** 
(2.16) 
Bahawalpur 0.318** 
(2.01) 
0.577** 
(2.26) 
0.674*** 
(2.56) 
Bahawalnagar 0.548* 
(1.69) 
0.708 
(1.57) 
0.619** 
(2.01) 
Khanewal -0.205 
(0.34) 
0.204 
(1.22) 
0.374 
(1.35) 
Multan 0.322 
(1.38) 
-0.847* 
(1.79) 
0.306 
(0.76) 
Lodhran 0.159 
(0.96) 
-0.206 
(0.33) 
0.212 
(1.14) 
Rahim Yar Khan 0.235** 
(2.36) 
-0.172 
(0.64) 
0.148* 
(1.87) 
RESSHARE 0.043 
(1.08) 
0.038 
(1.26) 
0.19 
(0.62) 
RESFIXED 0.278 
(0.96) 
0.154 
(1.02) 
0.138 
(1.17) 
2 -statistics for 
overidentification 
0.69 
[0.43] 
0.55 
[0.49] 
0.82 
[0.51] 
2 -statistics for 
joint significance of 
residues 
0.962 
[0.32] 
0.782 
[0.56] 
1.06 
(0.53) 
Number of 
Observations 
325 325 325 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses and p-values in squared brackets. 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
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The observed positive effect of tenure security on investment in soil-improving 
measures is consonant with the notion that in the absence of security of tenure, 
farmers tend to be unsure about capturing future returns to investments that yield 
medium to long term net benefits and as such tend to invest less in such activities. In 
particular, the positive impact of ownership on the application of manure is consistent 
with the findings of other studies such as Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) for Niger and 
Jacoby and Mansuri (2008) for rural Pakistan. Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) point out 
that in the presence of perfect markets for manure, individuals unsure about capturing 
future returns to manuring would be better off selling the manure to secure households 
than applying on rented land. 
 
The variable representing farm size is positive and significantly different from zero for 
mineral fertiliser but negative and significant for organic fertiliser and leguminous crops. 
Thus, as farm size increases, it may become less feasible for the farmer to meet the 
farm yard manure requirement of the land under cultivation, a finding that is consistent 
with Deininger et al. (2009) for Ethiopia. Livestock ownership is shown to exert a 
positive and significant effect on manure and leguminous crops but no significant 
influence on the application of mineral fertiliser. The positive and significant influence of 
livestock ownership is in agreement with the idea that farmers have manure resources 
that are largely determined by their possession of animals. Investment in organic 
manure and fertiliser are higher on fertile land, where the returns to such investments 
are likely to be much higher. 
 
Access to extension services is found to have a positive and significant effect on 
investments in organic fertiliser and leguminous crops. The coefficient for age is 
positive for all three types of investments, although statistically significant only for 
organic fertilizer and leguminous crops, suggesting that older farmers invest more in 
soil improving and yield enhancing measures. The results also appear to suggest the 
presence of wealth effects as the farm implements turned out to be positive and 
significantly different from zero for all three investment options. In particular, 
investments in mineral fertiliser and cultivation and ploughing of leguminous crops into 
the soil require significant cash outlays. Higher levels of education also increase the 
propensity to invest in both soil improving and yield-enhancing measures. Farm land 
that has been under cultivation for long periods receives higher levels of manure and 
fertiliser as well as acreage used for leguminous crops. 
 
 89 
A number of the district dummies are significantly different from zero. Moreover, the 
joint test of the null hypothesis that all district effects are equal using a likelihood ratio 
test given a sample
2 value of 67.26 against a critical value 16.7 at the 1% level of 
significance. This suggests the presence of significant cluster effects, and probably 
reveals agro climatic variation and access to infrastructure. The finding could also  
differences in district level land tenure arrangements (Besely, 1995). 
 
4.2 Land Tenure and Farm Efficiency 
 
The maximum-likelihood (ML) estimates of the normalized profit frontier subject to the 
restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry are given in table 4. The equation was 
estimated by Frontier 4.1, an econometric package developed by Coelli (1996). A 
glance at the results in table 4 indicates that land has the expected positive sign; while 
the coefficient for the prices of seed and labour has the expected negative signs. The 
estimates of sources of inefficiency are also presented in table 4. The results show that 
tenancy arrangements do influence efficiency. Specifically, coefficients for the variables 
sharecroppers and fixed-renters are positive and significantly different from zero, 
indicating that owner-cultivators are more efficient compared to sharecroppers and 
fixed-renters.  
 
The level of education (human capital) of the farmer tends to have a positive and 
significant impact on profit efficiency. Household size, which reflects the household 
manpower resources, has a significantly positive influence on efficiency, a finding that 
is in contradiction with allocative efficiency. Thus, labor transactions may be failing to 
make up for differences in land endowments. Quite a number of studies have 
demonstrated that household manpower resources and other characteristics tend to 
influence returns to farming in different institutional settings, suggesting that factors are 
not efficiently allocated across farms (e.g.  Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996; Ali and Flinn, 
1989; Parikh et al., 1995). Other variables such as access to irrigation, contacts to 
extension services and access to credit all tend to have statistically positive influences 
on efficiency. The positive impact of access to credit indicates that farmers who face 
financial constraints on purchased inputs experience profit inefficiency.  
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of translog profit frontier 
Parameter Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
0  Constant 1.552*** 13.538 
1  ln (land) 1.176*** 2.472 
2  ln (seed) -0.106** -1.984 
3  ln (pesticide) 0.472 0.819 
4  ln (fertilizer) 0.535 0.948 
5  ln (manure)  -0.436 -0.812 
6  ln (labour) -0.726*** -2.554 
7  ln (land) x ln (land)  0.903* 1.785 
8  ln (seed) x ln (seed)  0.616 0.719 
9  ln (pesticide) x ln (pesticide)  0.417 1.276 
10  ln (fertilizer) x ln (fertilizer)  0.332* 1.909 
11  ln (manure) x ln (manure)  -0.155 -0.181 
12  ln (labour) x ln (labour)  0.264** 2.139 
13  ln (land) x ln (seed) 0.023** 2.166 
14  ln (land) x ln (pesticide)  -0.049 -0.791 
15  ln (land) x ln (fertilizer)  0.102 0.792 
16  ln (land) x ln (manure) 0.057 1.044 
17  ln (land) x ln (labour) -0.169*** -2.472 
18  ln (seed) x ln (pesticide) 0.211* 1.714 
19  ln (seed) x ln (fertilizer) 0.257* 1.669 
20  ln (seed) x ln (manure)  -0.212*** -3.161 
21  ln (seed) x ln (labour)  -0.323*** -2.734 
22  ln (pesticide) x ln (fertilizer)  -0.089 -0.305 
23  ln (pesticide) x ln (manure)   0.104* 1.782 
24  ln (fertilizer) x ln (labour)  0.590** 2.109 
25  ln (fertilizer) x ln (manure)  0.189* 1.687 
26  ln (fertilizer) x ln (labour) 0.121 0.454 
27  ln (manure) x ln (labour)   -0.057 -0.594 
Variance parameters 
2  )( 222 vu    2.458*** 3.744 
  ))/( 222 vuu    0.995*** 246.895 
Inefficiency effects 
0  Constant -0.728 -0.407 
1  Age 0.025 1.587 
2  Education -0.071** -2.334 
3  Family size -0.088** -2.065 
4  Tube well -0.057* -1.934 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Parameter Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
5  Road access -0.149*** -2.411 
6  Family type -1.143* 1.826 
7  Soil fertility -0.710*** -2.644 
8  Credit access -0.231* 1.810 
9  Off-farm work -0.561 -0.903 
10  Pre-sowing irrigation 0.540 1.217 
11  Extension contact -1.224* -1.723 
12  Sharecropper 2.117* 1.827 
13  Fixed renter 3.451** 2.124 
Note: District dummies included in the model but not reported. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. A positive sign of a parameter of 
the inefficiency model means that the associated variable has a negative impact on 
technical efficiency, and a negative sign indicates the reverse is true. 
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Although, the results of the determinants of inefficiency show that owner-cultivated 
lands are more efficient than fixed-rent and sharecroppers, they do not show the 
differences between fixed-rent and sharecropping in terms of efficiency. Table 5 
therefore presents estimates of technical, allocative and economic efficiency for the 
various tenancy arrangements23. The estimates reveal that owner-cultivated lands 
exhibit the highest levels of technical, allocative and economic efficiency followed by 
fixed-renters and sharecropper showing the lowest level of efficiency. On average, the 
allocative efficiencies for owner-cultivators fixed-renters and sharecroppers are 92, 85 
and 82 while the corresponding figures for technical efficiency are 86, 80 and 77, 
respectively. The findings indicate that on average, the efficiency of owner-cultivators 
differs little from that of fixed-renters and sharecroppers. However, the minimum and 
maximum efficiency levels reveal that the average conceals considerable heterogeneity 
across tenure regimes. For example, while the minimum and maximum levels of 
allocative efficiency for owner-cultivators are 58% and 99%, respectively, the 
corresponding figures for fixed-renters are 36% and 91%, and for sharecroppers,  
27% and 89%, respectively. These results suggest that redistribution of land in favour 
of both sharecroppers and fixed-renters could have considerable efficiency effects. 
 
 
Table 5: Efficiency levels among owner-cultivators, sharecroppers and fixed-renters 
Efficiency 
Category 
Owner-cultivator Sharecropper Fixed renter 
Average Max Min Average Max Min Average Max Min 
Technical 
Efficiency 
0.86 0.94 0.45 0.77 0.84 0.26 0.80 0.88 0.32 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
0.92 0.99 0.58 0.82 0.89 0.27 0.85 0.91 0.36 
Economic  
Efficiency 
0.78 0.98 0.27 0.62 0.77 0.13 0.68 0.84 0.21 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Technical efficiency was estimated with a translog stochastic frontier production function. 
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Although our results show that investment in soil improving measures is affected by 
tenure security, it is also significant to examine the relationship between investments 
and efficiency before we can conclude that efficiency is reduced by tenure concerns. 
We therefore employed a propensity score matching approach to examine the direct 
effects of investments in organic and mineral fertiliser and leguminous crops on farm 
productivity and efficiency. Table 6 presents the average treatment effects (ATT) 
estimated by nearest neighbour matching (NNM) and kernel-based matching methods 
(KBM). The matching results from both approaches generally indicate that investment 
in organic and mineral fertiliser and leguminous crops exert a positive impact on farm 
productivity and efficiency, indicating that this may partly account for the productivity 
and efficiency impacts of tenure security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 
Table 6: Average treatment effect for organic manure, fertilizer and leguminous crops 
 Organic Manure Fertilizer Leguminous crops 
NNM KBM NNM KBM NNM KBM 
Yield 
(kg/ha) 
80* 
(1.71) 
88* 
(1.74) 
73* 
(1.84) 
76* 
(1.69) 
101*** 
(3.28) 
112*** 
(3.05) 
Technical  
efficiency 
0.127*** 
(2.49) 
0.109* 
(1.94) 
0.139*** 
(3.78) 
0.158*** 
(4.15) 
0.15* 
(1.73) 
0.17** 
(2.02) 
Allocative  
efficiency 
0.128** 
(2.18) 
0.087 
(1.22) 
0.108** 
(2.27) 
0.090* 
(1.85) 
0.09* 
(1.82) 
0.11** 
(2.25) 
Number of 
treated 
208 206 144 144 249 249 
Number of 
control 
113 113 176 177 25 25 
Common 
support 
imposed 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Balancing 
property 
satisfied 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Number in parentheses are t-values. Values are significantly different from zero 
at ***1%, **5% and *10% levels. ATT is the average treatment effect for the treated. 
NNM stands for Nearest Neighbour Matching and KBM stands for Kernel Based 
Matching. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper addresses the impact of land tenure arrangements on farmers‟ investment 
decisions in soil improving and yield enhancing measures as well as economic 
efficiency using a sample of 325 cotton farmers from the Punjab province in Pakistan. 
We observed wide variations in land tenure arrangements across the sampled farmers, 
as well as their investments in soil-improving and yield enhancing measures. Given 
that most models of agrarian contracts imply a correlation between contractual choice 
and unobserved cultivator characteristics, we employ a framework that accounts for 
potential land tenure endogeneity in our investment specification. We also employ a 
stochastic frontier model to examine the relationship between tenure security and farm 
efficiency. 
 
We find robust evidence that secured land rights do matter when farmers make 
investment decisions about soil improving measures such as organic manure and 
cultivation of leguminous crops. Specifically, farmers with secured land rights are found 
to be more likely to invest in soil improving measures, compared to those on leased 
contracts. However, tenure security does not matter for investments in short-term yield 
enhancing inputs such as mineral fertiliser, since fixed-rent tenants are found to apply 
higher levels than owner-cultivators. 
 
While both moral hazard and hold-up problems may explain the lower levels of 
investment by sharecroppers, the finding for fixed-renters may be attributed whereby 
landlords do not fully commit to their contracts with fixed-renters. Under such 
conditions, fixed-renters do not find it attractive to invest in long-term soil improving 
measures; since the landlord could decline to extend the contract once it expires, 
preventing the tenant from reaping the benefits of the investments. 
 
 We also find empirical support for the hypothesis that farmers with secured land rights 
are more efficient than those with leased contracts. Specifically, the average allocative 
efficiencies for owner-cultivators, sharecroppers and fixed-renters are 92%, 82% and 
85%, respectively. Although these average efficiency differences between owner-
cultivators and those of tenants do not appear to be large, the averages actually 
concede great heterogeneity across tenure arrangement types. The higher levels of 
efficiency on owner-cultivator farms stem from their higher incentive to invest in soil 
improving and productivity enhancing measures, and to exert great effort in production. 
Given the high cost of supervision in Pakistan, landlords rarely supervise their share-
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tenants, resulting in tenants exerting less effort and therefore achieving lower 
productivity levels. These findings generally suggest that a land redistribution exercise 
in favour of sharecroppers and fixed-renters could have considerable efficiency effects. 
We also employed a propensity score matching model to assess the impacts of 
investments in soil improving and productivity-enhancing measures on farm 
productivity and efficiency. The findings revealed that investment in organic fertiliser, 
mineral fertiliser and leguminous crops exert positive impacts on farm productivity and 
efficiency, suggesting that investment in these soil-improving and yield-enhancing 
measures may partially account for the productivity and efficiency impacts of tenure 
security. Overall, our results indicate that redistribution of land that strengthens tenure 
security can have substantial investment and efficiency effects in agricultural 
production.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Farmers Access to Markets: The Case of Cotton in Pakistan  
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines cotton farmers‟ market participation and determinants of market 
participation by employing a cross-sectional data set from a survey of farmers in the 
Punjab province of Pakistan. A number of different econometric models were employed 
to carry out the analysis. The Probit model was employed for farmers‟ cotton selling 
decision making (market or farm gate) and the Heckman selection estimator was 
employed to correct for sample selection bias for the quantity of cotton sold at the 
market. For the distance travelled to sell cotton both Tobit and censored least absolute 
deviation (CLAD) models were employed. The CLAD model along with the Tobit model 
was employed because the CLAD model is flexible and takes the heteroscedasticity 
and non normality assumptions into account. Generally, the findings reveal that 
households owning more human and capital resources like having more education, 
wealth and transport facility have easy access to markets. In contrast, as the distance 
to market increases the household prefers to sell at the farm gate. Besides village 
infrastructure and socioeconomic characteristics of the household, an important role is 
played by the informal credit source, i.e. local traders (commission agent) in 
determining cotton farmers‟ market participation. The propensity score matching 
approach was employed to estimate cotton net returns. The results indicate that net 
returns are higher for farmers selling at the market compared to farmers selling at the 
farm gate in all the matching algorithms. Regarding policy implications, the study 
findings highlight the need for more investment in human capital development and 
infrastructure improvement so that cotton farmers have easy access to markets since 
currently, only large and resourceful farmers have easy access to markets and vice 
versa. 
 
Key words: Cotton, Farm gate, Market, Transaction costs, Punjab, Propensity score 
matching 
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1. Introduction 
 
Efficient marketing plays a crucial role in the process of economic development (Barrett 
and Emelly, 2005; Gideon et al., 2007; Kleih, 1999). In developing countries, the 
marketing system is mainly confronted with multiple problems like high transaction 
costs, poor physical and institutional infrastructure, lack of market information and 
inadequate markets (Jones, 1996). In Pakistan, first steps towards liberalising the 
export trade were taken in 1987 when exporting was opened to the private sector for 
the first time since 1973. Between 1973 and 1987, external trade was monopolised by 
the Cotton Export Corporation (CEC), a government controlled parastatal, which in 
addition to its role as the sole exporter was also responsible for maintaining a minimum 
support price for suppliers of seed cotton (growers) and suppliers of cotton lint 
(ginners). However, the CEC never played a significant part in the procurement of seed 
cotton as the support price tended to lie beneath the market price. Private traders have 
always dominated this part of marketing chain, acting as the main link between growers 
and the ginning factories. By 1993-94, the CEC was in serious financial difficulty and it 
has not purchased cotton since then. Since 1994, all exports have been in the hands of 
the private sector and in February 1995, the government removed all remaining duties 
and restrictions on the export of cotton (Lohano et al., 1998). 
 
Regarding cotton marketing in Pakistan, the household financial condition plays a 
crucial role in deciding the place of cotton sale, i.e. the market or the farm gate. If the 
farmer is financially well-off, credit is not needed from informal sources and he does not 
have to buy inputs on credit. But the majority of cotton producers need credit during 
cotton season to meet the high input demand of the cotton crop or to buy inputs on 
credit from a local trader (commission agent), interlocking to sell cotton to local trader/ 
commission agent24. However, there exists the formal credit programme in the cotton 
growing areas of Pakistan but unfortunately, the formal credit programme is not very  
effective as the procedure is lengthy, the mark up rate is extremely high and also not in 
favour of small farmers25. Landless farmers are deprived of the credit facility from the 
formal sources due to no land ownership26. Because of these procedural and 
institutional problems, the farmers turn to informal credit source i.e. local traders 
                                                 
24
 The interlocking of input supply, credit and crop marketing is a common feature of marketing 
in many developing countries in Asia (Smith et al. 1999). 
25
 In most cases only the wealthy and influential farmers are able to gain access to loans from 
formal sources. 
26
 Because land is used as a medium of guarantee, the sharecropping or landless households 
gain even less access to formal sector credit (Smith et al. 1999). 
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(commission agent) since they provide ready credit27. These traders usually operate 
year round, buying cotton in winter season and wheat in summer season28. Many also 
supply credit and farm inputs, usually interlocking the supply of credit with a 
commitment on the part of the grower to sell his output to the trader29 (commission 
agent). Commission agents and other traders are the major source of informal credit for 
small farmers in Pakistan30 (Lahano et al., 1998). Availability of credit is a key issue in 
marketing in Pakistan, as the formal sector has generally failed to meet the farmers 
demand and it is the informal sector which meets the 70-80% of credit demands 
(Lohano et al., 1998). The majority of the farmers in Pakistan have no access to 
interlinked markets and have to deal with middlemen rather than direct sources31 
(Kamdar, 1990).   
 
In Pakistan, the private sector has always played a significant role in credit provision, 
input distribution, and output marketing in rural areas. The lack of market information 
often deprives the farmers from their genuine right and causes them financial loss, so 
the cotton farmers have no other option except to sell on the rates offered by the local 
middleman/ commission agents (Khan, 2003). In addition to price, there are also other 
factors which affect farmers‟ decision regarding the selling place, Vakis et al. (2003) 
pointed out that farmers‟ decision where to sell a particular crop depends not only on 
the price they receive in each market but also on additional costs related to transacting 
in these markets. Similarly, Mcleay and Zwart (1988) have indicated that the farmer‟s 
sale transaction choice is influenced by marketing competencies and strategy, farm 
and farm manager‟s characteristics. 
 
In the past, most of the literature on agricultural marketing has focused on the 
transaction costs and their affect on crop production (Allene et al., 2008; Buduru and 
Brem, 2007; Dyer et al., 2006; Renkow et al., 2004; Obare et al., 2003; Nigel et al., 
2000; Smith et al., 1999; Fuentes, 1998).  Fohad and Dina (2007) pointed out that 
focus on transaction costs was mainly on the transportation costs, but in the current 
                                                 
27
 Traders frequently act as moneylenders and input suppliers as well as providing crop 
marketing services (Smith et al., 1999). 
28
 The contracts between farmer and trader are informal and verbal in nature (Smith et al. 
1999). 
29
 Another school of thought, drawing particularly evidence from South Asia, see interlocking of 
transaction as providing traders with a powerful means of extracting surplus from poor and 
vulnerable peasants (Smith et al. 1999). 
30
 The observed interest rates are quite high and vary in the range of 40-80 % per year. 
31
 Since sharecroppers are not greatly involved in crop marketing or the purchase of farm 
inputs, this is generally left to the owner. As a consequence, cotton is always marketed by the 
owner (Smith et al. 1999). 
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market participation scenario there are many other important factors which contribute 
to market participation besides transaction costs32. Chowdhury (2005) has observed 
that market participation was 14% higher in the case of the Bangladeshi farmers who 
have access to telephone compared to non users of phone. This indicates that overall 
improvement in the infrastructure index leads to greater market participation besides 
the financial condition of the farmer. Similarly, Holloway and Lapar (2003) have 
investigated the positive neighbourhood impact in market participation among Filipino 
smallholders. 
 
According to Smith et al. (1999), the transaction costs normally include the following 
costs. 
 
-Search costs: the costs of searching out suppliers or buyers in a particular  
market (for input, output or credit). 
-Screening costs: the costs of establishing the reliability and trustworthiness of  
potential parties to a transaction particularly the creditworthiness of borrowers. 
-Negotiation costs: the costs of measuring attributes such as quality and  
quantity of goods or services being bought or exchanged. 
-Transfer costs: including transport, processing, packaging and securing title. 
-Monitoring costs: the costs of monitoring whether the terms and conditions  
agreed on are fulfilled. 
-Enforcement costs: the costs of enforcing agreement, of seeking compensation  
when an agreement is broken, or the cost incurred when a contract is broken. 
 
The importance of farmers associations and cooperatives can not be ignored, but 
mostly these exist in small numbers and are handicapped by low quality of 
inexperienced management, thus not contributing to farmers in a benefiting way (IFAD, 
2007). 
 
                                                 
32
Transaction costs can be classified as the information, negotiation, and monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Information costs (ex-ante) relates to the costs incurred in obtaining 
information relative to the undertaking of the transaction (price information, market location 
etc.). Negotiation costs represent the costs incurred while the transaction is being carried out 
(negotiation terms of exchange, drawing up the contract, etc.). Monitoring and enforcement 
costs (ex-post) are the costs incurred once the transaction is completed and in order to ensure 
that the terms agreed upon ex-ante are kept to (payment arrangement). 
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Recent studies have focused on the factors influencing farmers‟ decision regarding 
marketing33 (Jacoby, 2000; Fafchamp and Shilpi, 2003; Fafchamp and Hill, 2005; 
Fohad and Dina, 2007; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006). These studies‟ findings indicate 
that farmers lack access to markets, capital, inputs, new technology and extension 
services but farmers can be linked to markets through cooperatives, growers 
association and contract farming to reduce marketing and transaction costs (Pratap et 
al., 2007). A household‟s ability to access commodity markets has a significant impact 
on the crop share and the farm income since market participation can help to reduce 
poverty to a considerable extent (Zeller et al. 1998). In the present study effort has 
been made to investigate the factors influencing cotton farmers‟ market participation. 
 
1.2 Cotton Marketing Chain in Pakistan 
 
The cotton marketing chain in Pakistan is presented in figure 1. There are three 
principal actors in the marketing chain of seed cotton in Pakistan; farmers, local 
traders, and cotton ginners. The majority of seed cotton is sold by farmers to local 
traders (commission agent) who then sell it to cotton ginners, while some farmers travel 
to the market or directly sell to the ginning factories. Cotton ginning factories34, located 
throughout the main production areas, process seed cotton into lint and cotton seed. 
The lint is sold via broker either to spinners located in large urban centres or to 
exporters. The seed is sold, again via brokers, to oilseed factories that produce cotton 
seed oil and seed cake. The main function of the ginners is processing, but they also 
provide credit services to local traders and farmers35. This is usually on interest free 
basis. The main purpose of lending from the ginners point of view is to have a mean of 
securing supplies. 
 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the conceptual framework. 
Section 3 provides a description of the data and definition of the variables. The 
empirical results are presented in section 4 and in the final section 5 concluding 
remarks are presented.  
                                                 
33
 Farmers‟ decision whether to sell at the farm gate or to transport their produce to the market 
has received little attention in the literature (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005). 
34
 The cotton price agreement between the trader and the factory either takes place over the 
phone, especially in the case of more distant factories, or is made at the factory itself. The 
agreement is normally made within a few days of purchasing agreements between the local 
traders and farmers. It states the volume of seed cotton to be delivered and the price per maund 
(1maund=40 kg). The agreement is an informal one, but once agreed, it is morally binding. 
Neither party is expected to seek a re-negotiation of the price. 
35
 This facility from ginning factories is provided to a very limited number of traders and cotton 
farmers. 
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Figure 1: Cotton marketing chain in Pakistan. 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework presented in this study is inspired by two studies, i.e. 
Fafchamps and Hill (2005) entitled “Selling at farm gate or travelling to market” and 
Abdulai and Birachi (2008) entitled “Choice of coordination mechanism in the Kenyan 
fresh milk supply chain.”  
 
The starting point can be a simple model where a farmer can either sell at the farm 
gate or take the produce to the market. The price the farmer receives at the farm gate 
can be represented as
fp , whereas the price the farmer receives at the market can be 
represented as
mp . It is assumed that the price the farmer receives at the farm gate36 
)( fp is lower than the price the farmer receives at the market37 ( mp ), but in the market 
the farmer has to face higher transaction costs X. Assuming a perfectly competitive 
market, a price-taker farmer i thus chooses to sell at the farm-gate if: 
 
i
mf Xpp           (1) 
 
Note that the transaction cost38 X is assumed to be farmer-specific as has been 
emphasized in large literature on farm household‟s choices [de Janvry et al., 1991) and 
Key et al. (2000)]. Let the difference between the payoffs from selling at the market and 
selling at the farm gate be 
 
f
i
m
i pXpD           (2) 
 
Factors that raise iD will increase the sale at the market as opposed to the farm gate 
and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
36
 Selling at the farm gate often is less remunerative but it may be the only alternative for the 
farmers who cannot afford carrying their crop to the market, usually located many miles away 
(Fafchamps and Hill, 2005). 
37
 Since cotton is a cash crop,  we can ignore the situation in which farmers wish to keep more 
cotton for home use and 
mf pp  . 
38
 The problem with the explicit introduction of transaction costs into economic analysis is that 
transaction costs are difficult to measure in the real world. Little empirical estimation of 
transaction costs can be found in current literature, even more so in developing countries. 
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The villages are also served by itinerant traders (local traders/commission agents) who 
face transaction costs T to transport and sell the produce at the market. Free entry into 
itinerant trading implies that in equilibrium: 
 
Tpp mf            (3) 
 
The difference between the payoffs from selling at the market and at the farm-gate can 
be re-defined as: 
 
ii XTD            (4) 
 
A farmer would choose to sell at the market, if 0iD and vice versa. 
It is assumed that farmers maximize their expected utility by choosing the place of sale 
with the highest perceived net returns, while facing the fixed )( fiX and proportional 
transaction costs )( piX . Fixed transaction costs are independent of the quantities 
transacted. These costs include searching for potential buyers and obtaining 
information about prices and markets etc. On the other hand, proportional transaction 
costs vary according to the quantity transacted and include price premiums obtained 
from bargaining capacity as well as per unit transport costs to the market. 
 
Travelling to the market is associated with fixed and proportional transaction costs. The 
proportional transaction costs )( piX are a function of distance and time to reach the 
markets. The proportional transaction costs can be denoted as )( pi
pp
i ZXX  , where 
p
iZ denotes a vector of factors such as distance, time and effort it takes to reach the 
market for cotton selling. For example, the transaction costs faced by the farmer will 
increase with the distance from the market. However, the individual transactions that 
occur in the market are associated with fixed transaction costs 
f
iX that are invariant to 
the quantity transacted. This can be expressed as )( fi
ff ZXX  , where fiZ is the 
vector of characteristics that influence fixed transaction costs. 
 
Let im  be the net returns defined as total returns less fixed and proportional 
transaction costs, and iP  is the price realized from transaction i at a given place of 
sale, i.e. the farm gate or the market. 
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)}()(max{arg fi
f
i
p
iiiii ZXXPQy      (5) 
 
Equation (5) shows that forces that affect 
p
iX and 
f
iX certainly influence the level of 
i  and therefore the profit maximizing behaviour of cotton farmers. The equation can 
therefore be used to explore the role of transaction costs on the choice of place of sale, 
i.e. the farm gate or the market. Given that farmers are assumed to choose a given 
place of sale, either the market )(y or the farm gate )(k , it is implied that: 
 
kyikiy  ,         (6) 
 
However, the net returns associated with each place of sale can be represented by 
their latent net returns,
*
i , such that the observed place of cotton sale represents the 
maximum possible latent net revenues available to the cotton farmer. Assuming that 
the place of sale can be represented by one and zero otherwise, the threshold 
measurement model for the place of sale can be formulated as: 
 











*
*
*
*
0
1
ik
ik
iy
iy
im
if
if
      for all ky   (7) 
 
where y and k represent the place of sale at the market and the farm gate, respectively. 
Equations (5) and (7) can then be utilized to specify the market participation model as 
follows. 
 
)max( /* iiiii mWRy           (8) 
 
where 
*
im  are the latent net returns from transaction i at a given place of sale, iR  is  a 
vector of transaction costs‟ characteristics that influence the choice of the cotton selling 
place, iW are socioeconomic and firm-related attributes that also influence the choice of 
the selling place, 
/  and m are parameters to be estimated and i  are i.i.d. error 
terms. 
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2.1 Cotton Marketing Analysis 
 
2.1.1 Cotton Farmers Market Participation 
 
Consider a process with two possible outcomes, indicated by a dependent variable „y‟, 
labelled for convenience y=1 and y=0. We assume as well that there is a set of 
measurable covariates, x, which will be used to help for explaining the occurrence of 
one outcome or the other. Most models of binary choice set up in this fashion will be 
based upon an index function, x/ , where   is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The modelling of discrete binary choice in these terms is typically done in 
one of the following frameworks.  
 
Thus, the probit model which forms the basis of most of the results in econometrics is 
based on a latent regression model in which the disturbances are assumed to have a 
normal distribution.  
 
Based on normal distribution the probit model can be written as 
 
     
ix
ixdt
t/ /
2
2
2/exp


      (9) 
 
2.1.2 Instrumental Variable Approach 
 
The instrumental variable method is possible when a variable can be identified to be 
related to participation but not to outcomes. This variable is known as the „instrument‟ 
and it introduces an element of randomness into the assignment which approximates 
the effect of an experiment. Where variation in the impact of treatment across people is 
not correlated with the instrument, the IV approach recovers an estimate of impact of 
treatment on the treated (TT). The main drawback of the IV approach is that it is often 
is difficult to find a suitable instrument because, to identify the treatment effect, one 
needs at least one regressor which determines the programme participation but is not 
itself determined by the factors which affect outcome.  
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2.1.3 Censored Regression Model (Tobit Model) 
 
The Tobit model is employed to capture the intensity of the density to the market. The 
censored regression or tobit model is appropriate when the dependent variable is 
censored at some upper or lower bound as an artifact of how the data are collected 
(Tobin 1958; Maddala 1983). For censoring at a lower bound, the model is  
 
iili XY  * , with        (10) 
 
lili YY *  if 0* liY         (11) 
 
0liY  if ,0* liY          (12) 
 
where, for the ith observation, liY *  is an unobserved continuous latent variable, liY is 
the observed variable, iX  is a vector of values on the independent variables, i  is the 
error and   is a vector of coefficients. We assume that i  is uncorrelated with iX  and 
is independently and identically distributed. The censoring point may also vary across 
observations, leading to a model that is formally equivalent to models for survival 
analysis (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980; Lancaster, 1990).  
 
Unlike the standard estimators of the censored regression model such as Tobit or other 
maximum likelihood approaches, the CLAD estimator is robust to heteroscedasticity 
and is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed for a wide class of error 
distributions. 
 
 
2.1.4 Heckman Selection Estimator 
 
This approach has been extensively used in evaluations. It allows for selection into the 
treatment group on the basis of variables that are unobservable to the analyst. It 
operates by assuming a particular form for the distribution of the unobservable 
characteristics that jointly influence participation and outcome. By explicitly modelling 
the participation decision, it is possible to derive a variable that can be used to control 
for that part of unobserved variation in the outcome equation that is correlated with the 
unobserved variation in the participation decision. Including this new variable alongside 
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the observable variables in the outcome equation can result in unbiased estimates of 
the treatment effects. While not strictly necessary from a mathematical viewpoint, 
credible implementation includes an instrument; that is, a variable included in the 
estimation of the participation equation that is excluded from the outcome equation. 
 
This approach appears to offer an elegant means of obtaining an estimate of TT in the 
presence of selection. However, there are two main drawbacks. First, as with the 
instrumental variable approach, the identification of a suitable instrument is often a 
significant practical obstacle to successful implementation. Second, the resulting 
estimates are entirely contingent on the underlying distributional assumption relating to 
the unobserved variables. 
 
2.1.5 Propensity Score Matching Model 
 
More recently, the method of matching has achieved popularity as a tool of evaluation. 
It assumes that selection can be explained purely in terms of observable 
characteristics. Propensity score matching can be implemented with both cross- 
sectional and longitudinal datasets. Matching deals with the selection process by 
constructing a comparison group of individuals with observable characteristics similar 
to those treated. The main purpose of the matching is to re-establish the conditions of 
an experiment when no such data are available. 
 
3. Cotton Marketing Results 
 
3.1 Description of Variables  
 
The data employed in the analysis were collected through a survey of 325 farmers from 
the seven highest cotton producing districts of the Punjab province39. The Punjab 
province was chosen for the survey because almost 80% of the cotton production in 
the country takes place in this province. A stratified random sampling technique was 
employed to select the farmers in the districts of Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, Vehari, 
Khanewal, Multan, Lodhran and Rahim Yar Khan. The districts were further divided into 
sub-districts and villages respectively for homogenous selection of data40. The sample 
ensured representation of farmers selling at the farm gate and travelling to the market. 
The survey was conducted through questionnaire interviews by local enumerators who 
                                                 
39
 In total, the Punjab province consists of 36 districts. 
40
 Data was collected from 24 sub-districts and 115 villages. 
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were trained prior to the exercise, which took place between August and December 
2007. The data collected included information on village infrastructure, households‟ 
background, socioeconomic characteristics of the farmer, land holding, cotton 
production, post harvest activities, sales, formal and informal credit sources and 
assets. 
 
Table 1 presents definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. The survey indicated that 31% of the farmers sold cotton at the 
market and the rest sold at the farm gate. The most popular mode of transport used for 
cotton marketing was a tractor trolley (nearly 64% surveyed farmers have an own 
tractor) followed by mini trucks and animal carts, respectively. The majority of the 
farmers have access to road link in the village. The average distance to the market was 
6.34 kilometres. The average age of farmers was almost 42 years, whereas the mean 
level of schooling was about 9 years. The farming experience was 23 years. About 
65% of the farmers were working as owner of their land and the rest as tenants (both 
fixed renters and share croppers). The average land owned by the household was 31.3 
acres and the cotton area per household was 31.76 acres. The average family size 
was 10 persons per household, whereas nearly 80% of the households were living in 
joint family systems and the rest 20% were living in nuclear family systems. Per acre 
cotton yield was about 905 kg per hectare. In comparison to the previous year‟s (2006-
07) less cotton production, the cotton rate was high during the survey year (2007-08). 
About   43% of the farmers purchased inputs on credit from local traders (commission 
agent) due to high costs involved in cotton production. Most of the time these local 
traders (commission agent) interlock the supply of credit with the purchase of the 
cotton crop. Due to the intensive labour requirement, 83% of the farmers had hired 
labour (causal/ permanent) during the cotton season. The farm household‟s wealth was 
accounted as income earned by all the family members from farming and engagement 
in off-farm work plus the value of the current assets of the farmer like livestock 
ownership, etc. The district dummies are also included. All farm household heads 
interviewed were males41. The farmers were getting information about markets from 
personal visit, telephone, fellow farmers and the commission agent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 So the gender role in marketing was not studied, as Cunningham et al. (2008) have focused. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable   Description       Sample Standard 
           Mean    Deviation 
Village Infrastructure 
 
Road access  1 if village has road access, 0 otherwise   0.83 0.37 
Market distance Distance to the nearest market in kilometres   6.34 6.75 
Agri. extension   Distance to the Agri. extension office in kilometres  7.40 6.79 
 
Characteristics of the farmer 
 
Age   Age of cotton farmer in number of years   42 12  
Education  Number of years of schooling     9 4.3  
Farming experience Experience of farmer in number of years   22.6 13.5  
Tenancy status  1 if farmer is owner of household, 0 otherwise   0.65 0.02  
Land owned  Number of acres owned by the farmer    31.3 56.2  
Operational land Number of acres currently under cultivation   44.7 61.5  
Cotton area  Number of acres under cotton cultivation   31.8 49.7  
Male child  Number of male children in the household (< 16 years)   2.4 2.3  
Female child  Number of female children in the household (< 16 years)  2.4 2.2  
Adult male  Number of adult males in the household (16-60 years)   2.0 1.3  
Adult female  Number of adult females in the household (16-60 years)  1.9 1.3  
Old age male  Number of old age male in the household   0.4 0.5  
Old age female  Number of old age female in the household   0.4 0.5  
Household size  Number of people residing in the household   9.5 5.4  
Family farm workers Number of family members working at farm   1.9 0.9  
Family type  1 if Joint family, 0 otherwise     0.8 0.4 
Tractor   1 if household owns a tractor, 0 otherwise   0.6 0.5 
Motorcycle  1 if household owns a motorcycle, 0 otherwise   0.8 0.4  
Bicycle   1 if  household owns a bicycle, 0 otherwise   0.7 0.5 
Cotton yields  Cotton yield in kg/ha      905 0.2  
Cotton rate  Cotton rate in Pakistani Rupees     1,532 88 
Buy inputs on credit 1 if farmer buys inputs on credit, 0 otherwise   0.4 0.5 
Membership   1 if farmer holds any organization membership, 0 otherwise 0.2 0.4 
Extension contact 1 if farmer has contact with extension agent, 0 otherwise 0.8 0.4 
Labour availability 1 if labour is available during cotton season, 0 otherwise 0.8 0.4 
Market sale  1 if farmer sales at the market, 0 otherwise   0.3 0.5 
Cotton Marketed Amount of cotton sold at market in maunds   93.7 64.6  
Non-farm work  1 if farmer is involved in non farm work, 0 otherwise  0.2 0.4 
Household wealth Total income from farm and non farm work in Rupees  46,415 3,037 
Credit   1 if farmer has access to credit, 0 otherwise   0.34 0.02 
 
Locations and Districts Dummies 
 
Bahawalpur  1 if the farmer is located in Bahawalpur district, 0 otherwise 0.17 0.4  
Bahawalnagar  1 if the farmer is located in Bahawalnagar district,0 otherwise 0.10 0.29 
Khanewal  1 if the farmer is located in Khanewal district, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.34 
Vehari   1 if the farmer is located in Vehari district, 0 otherwise  0.16 0.36 
Multan   1 if the farmer is located in Multan district, 0 otherwise  0.06 0.24 
Lodhran   1 if the farmer is located in Lodhran district, 0 otherwise  0.18 0.39 
Rahim Yar Khan 1 if the farmer is located in Rahim Y. K. district, 0 otherwise 0.19 0.39 
Source: Survey data. 
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3.2 Empirical Results 
 
3.2.1 Probit Results of Decision to Sell Cotton 
 
The empirical analysis was conducted using the STATA statistical package. Due to the 
binary nature of the dependent variable, i.e. the market or the farm gate the Probit 
model (i.e. 1 for market selling and 0 for farm gate selling) was employed, and the 
results are presented in table 2. The model is expanded step by step by including more 
variables.  
 
The McFadden 
2R  as an indicator of the goodness of fit is 0.1683 and the likelihood 
ratio is 226.79 and significant at the 1%-level against a critical value of 
2 (19) = 38.6. 
This suggests that the 0H that all exogenous variables are 0 can be rejected and 
therefore the model implemented is reasonable and the results are robust. 
 
The model started by including the market distance, tractor and district dummies. The 
result indicates that as the distance to the market increases the chances of selling 
cotton at the market decrease and vice versa. This result implies that mostly household 
situated close to the market sell at the market due to easy access and less transaction 
costs. With the increase in distance to the market, the proportionate transaction costs 
also increases and household prefer to sell cotton at the farm gate. 
 
The household owning a tractor is more likely to sell at the market, as the coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 1% level of significance. This result indicates that 
household owning a tractor will prefer to sell at market and the household having no 
own transportation will most probably sell at farm gate, since a tractor is a significant 
mode of cotton transportation.  The results of the asset ownership and the probability of 
selling at the market are in line with the findings of Boughton et al. (2007).  
 
The model has been expanded by including the log of the quantity sold, the log of the 
household wealth, the log of the household size and the dependency ratio coefficients. 
The quantity sold results are positive and significant meaning that the larger the cotton 
quantity to be sold the higher chances of selling at the market. A large quantity of 
cotton is an indicator of wealthier household or large land holder farmers. This result 
implies that large farm having higher quantities of cotton mostly sell at market. The 
results of quantity sold at the market are in line with the findings of                 
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Fafchamps and Hill (2005) in their study on coffee producers in Uganda. Similarly, the 
household‟s wealth coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that wealthier 
households have easy access to the markets compared to resource poor households. 
The household size and dependency ratio coefficient have a negative impact on selling 
at the market, although the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. 
 
The model has been further expanded by including the interaction terms like log of 
distance and log of wealth interaction. The distance and wealth interaction coefficient 
has a positive impact on the household‟s decision of travelling to the market. This result 
implies that of two households with the same distance to the market, the one having 
more wealth is, more probable to market to sell cotton. Thus reconfirming the earlier 
results that wealthier households have easy access to the market. Similarly, the 
quantity and wealth interaction coefficient has a positive impact on selling at the 
market, meaning that of two households having the same quantity of cotton to sell the 
wealthier one is more likely to sell at the market and vice versa.  
 
The credit taken from the local trader coefficient is negative and significant, implying 
that farmers who take credit from the local trader or commission agent mostly do not 
travel to the market for cotton selling but sell at the farm gate. The predicted values 
from the first stage estimates are also included in the model and the results are 
significant thus confirming the presence of endogeneity. 
 
The model has been completed by including road access, household head‟s education 
and land tenure. The road access coefficient has a positive impact on the possibility of 
travelling to the market. This result focuses on the importance of improved 
infrastructure, although the coefficient is not significant, but it can be concluded that 
household having easy road access mostly sell cotton at the market and vice versa. 
 
The household head‟s education coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level of 
significance. In the model the household head education is included because the 
decision making mainly rests with the household head. The results clearly indicate that 
mostly the educated farmers sell cotton at the market and we can conclude from the 
results that farmers having lower levels of education sell at the farm gate. Regarding 
the districts fixed effects, most of the districts have a negative sign indicating that 
farmers mostly prefer to sell at the farm gate due to non availability of the market or 
having the market at a far off place. 
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Table 2: Probit results of decision to sell at the market 
Variable    First  Second Third  Fourth 
Market distance   -0.325  -0.334  -0.257  -0.334  
   (-1.36)  (-1.39)  (-0.88)  (-1.13) 
Tractor (dummy)  0.474*** 0.422** 0.427** 0.405** 
   (2.85)  (2.22)  (2.10)  (1.98) 
Log (quantity sold)    0.219*  0.277** 0.245** 
     (1.69)  (2.28)  (2.16) 
Log (household wealth)   0.469*** 0.452*  0.404* 
     (2.51)  (1.94)  (1.72) 
Log (household size)    -0.579  -0.633* -0.545 
     (-1.54)  (-1.67)  (-1.39) 
Dependency ratio42    -0.230  -0.284  -0.240 
     (-1.34)  (-1.61)  (-1.35) 
Log (distance)*log (wealth)     0.263*** 0.287*** 
       (2.39)  (2.45) 
Log (distance)*log (quantity)     0.693*** 0.721*** 
       (2.65)  (2.69) 
Log (quantity)*log (wealth)     0.007  0.002 
       (0.16)  (0.05) 
Credit taken from local trader      -0.326* 
         (-1.71)  
Rescredit         -0.028* 
         (-1.89) 
Road access (dummy)       0.293 
         (1.26) 
Household head education       0.034** 
         (1.99) 
Tenancy status (dummy)       0.166 
         (0.83) 
Bahawalpur   -0.512** -0.539** -0.579** -0.530** 
   (-2.05)  (-2.12)  (-2.22)  (-2.00) 
Khanewal   -0.348  -0.493* -0.566* -0.540* 
   (-1.27)  (-1.72)  (-1.94)  (-1.81) 
Vehari   -0.612** -0.618** -0.699*** -0.637** 
   (-2.34)  (-2.34)  (-2.60)  (-2.31) 
Multan   -0.237* -0.641* -0.342* -0.417* 
   (-1.81)  (-1.77)  (-1.95)  (-1.68) 
Lodhran   -1.509*** -1.649*** -1.780*** -1.655*** 
   (-4.80)  (-5.00)  (5.17)  (-4.74) 
Rahim Yar Khan  -0.119  -0.140  -0.192  -0.143 
   (-0.50)  (-0.57)  (-0.77)  (-0.56) 
Constant   -0.285  -1.356  -0.681  -0.893 
   (-1.41)  (-1.63)  (-0.68)  (-0.84) 
Number of observation 325  325  325  325 
McFadden 
2R     0.1089  0.1336  0.1534  0.1683 
Log Likelihood ratio  121.27  155.46  184.31  226.79 
 
Note: The t-values are given in parentheses. The results are significantly different from 
zero at ***1%, **5% and *10% respectively.  
                                                 
42 A household‟s dependency ratio is calculated by dividing the number of individuals under 16 
years of age plus the number of individuals over 60 years of age by the total number of 
individuals in the household. 
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3.2.2 Instrumental Regression Results (Amount of Credit taken from Local 
Trader) 
 
As discussed earlier, cotton is a high input demanding crop and especially pesticide, 
fertilizer and irrigation requirements are quite high. In order to meet the expensive input 
requirements, farmers mostly take credit (advance) from local traders or the 
commission agents. In return, the commission agents interlock the supply of credit with 
the purchase of cotton. Due to this endogeneity problem, the regression results have 
been instrumented for the amount of credit (advance) taken from the commission 
agent. As the amount of credit taken from the commission agent increases, the 
chances of selling at farm gate also increase. The total number of local traders 
(commission agents) visiting the farmers is used as an instrument. The instrument is 
strongly significant with F-statistics of 132.11. The 
2R of the instrumenting regression is 
0.48, suggesting that it is unlikely to suffer from overfitting. The results are presented in 
table 3.   
 
The results are positive for the distance to the market coefficient. The results indicate 
that households that are situated away from markets mostly take credit from the local 
trader and in return sell cotton to that particular person from whom they have taken the 
credit. From this finding it can be concluded that farmers living in far off villages having 
no market access mostly take higher amounts of credit as compared to farmers living 
close to the market.  
  
The results are positive and significant for vehicle ownership, i.e. motorcycle in the 
study area. The vehicle ownership depicts the wealth status of the households. The 
result indicates that even to obtain credit from the informal source, the vehicle 
ownership play a positive and significant role as it can serve as a medium of 
guarantee.   
  
The model has been expanded by including the log of household wealth, the results for 
which are positive and significant. The result implies that wealthy households obtain 
higher amounts of credit even from the informal sources in comparison with poor 
households.  
 
The model has been further expanded by including road access, age and education 
coefficients. The results for road access are positive and significant, indicating that 
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households having road access obtain a higher amount of credit from the local trader. 
The coefficient for the age of the farmer is positive and significant, indicating that older 
farmers are obtaining a higher amount of credit from the local trader compared to 
younger farmers. The result also implies that older farmers due to having more dealing, 
may have build the confidence with the local trader and in return are obtaining higher 
amounts of credit from the local trader. The result also implies that younger farmers 
mostly obtain less amount of credit from the local trader and hence prefer to sell at the 
market, while older farmers prefer to sell at the farm gate. The education coefficient is 
negative and significant, indicating that more educated farmers get a lower amount of 
credit from the local trader and hence prefer to sell at the market, while the less 
educated farmers get a higher amount of credit and in return sell to the local trader at 
the farm gate from whom they have taken the credit. 
 
The model has been completed by including the household size and the dependency 
ratio. The household size coefficient is negative and significant, while the coefficient of 
the dependency ratio is positive and significant, thus indicating that household having 
more dependents in the household obtain a higher amount of credit from the local 
trader and in return prefer to sell at the farm gate instead of travelling to the market. 
Although the district dummies are not significant individually, districts fixed effects have 
been estimated as Abdulai and Hoffman (2005) have estimated and district fixed 
effects are different from zero though not significant. 
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Table 3: Instrumenting regression results for amount of credit taken from local trader 
Variable   First  Second Third  Fourth 
Log (market distance) 0.111*  0.052  0.044  0.038  
   (1.73)  (1.00)  (0.85)  (0.74)  
Vehicle   0.552*** 0.250*** 0.220*** 0.219*** 
   (6.93)  (3.67)  (3.20)  (3.19) 
Log (wealth)     0.643*** 0.640*** 0.637*** 
     (13.19) (13.06) (12.87) 
Road access       0.124*  0.110 
       (1.78)  (1.58) 
Age       0.005*** 0.004** 
       (2.38)  (2.13) 
Education       -0.012* -0.012* 
       (-1.91)  (-1.93) 
Household size         -0.014* 
         (-1.63) 
Dependency ratio        0.190** 
         (2.31) 
Bahawalpur   0.034  -0.050  -0.017  -0.018 
   (0.30)  (-0.55)  (-0.20)  (-0.21) 
Khanewal   0.280** -0.031  -0.022  -0.025 
   (2.33)  (-0.32)  (-0.23)  (-0.25) 
Vehari   0.193*  0.121  0.175*  0.150 
   (1.70)  (1.32)  (1.91)  (1.63) 
Multan   0.033  0.045  0.012  0.055 
   (1.21)  (1.27)  (1.45)  (1.61) 
Lodhran   0.515*** 0.117  0.166*  0.159* 
   (4.57)  (1.24)  (1.75)  (1.68) 
Rahim Yar Khan  0.061  -0.025  -0.001  -0.010 
   (0.57)  (-0.29)  (-0.01)  (-0.11) 
Constant   2.152*** -1.368*** -1.793*** -1.684*** 
   (19.36) (-4.86)  (-5.76)  (-5.36) 
 
Number of observations 325  325  325  325 
Adjusted 
2R      0.1732  0.4658  0.4805  0.4849 
F-test on significance of  
Instruments   132.11*** 109.75*** 94.68*** 63.27*** 
 
Note: The t-values are given in parentheses. The results are significantly different from 
zero at ***1%, **5% and *10%, respectively. 
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3.2.3 Heckman Selection Estimator for Quantity of Cotton Sold 
 
The results of the Heckman selection estimator for the quantity sold at the market are 
presented in table 4. The Heckman model is employed for the quantity of cotton sold at 
the market to account for selectivity bias. The value of lambda )(  is positive and 
highly significant, indicating that selection effects are significant. The Wald test 
statistics is 135.86 and is significant at the 1% -level of significance against a critical 
value of 
2  (16) = 34.3, indicating that model results are robust. 
 
The result for the road access coefficient is positive, though not significant. This 
indicates that households having road access sell higher quantities of cotton at the 
market. This emphasises the importance of infrastructure not only for having easy 
access to the markets but also the volume transacted at the markets.  
 
The tractor ownership coefficient is positive and highly significant at the 1% level of 
significance, indicating that households owning a tractor sell higher quantities of cotton 
at the market. In contrast the farmers having no own tractor prefer to sell at the farm 
gate. As tractor ownership is also an indicator of household wealth, it can be concluded 
that wealthy households sell higher quantities of cotton at the market. 
 
The age coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that young farmers sell higher 
quantities of cotton at the market, while the old age farmers sell lower quantities of 
cotton in the market. The education coefficient is positive and highly significant, 
indicating that educated farmers sell higher quantities of cotton at the market, while the 
farmers having less levels of education sell less quantities of cotton at the market. The 
results for the tenancy status are positive, though not significant, indicating that owners 
mostly sell larger volumes of cotton in the market, while the tenants sell less quantities 
of cotton in the market. 
 
The log of the household wealth coefficient is positive and highly significant, indicating 
that wealthy households sell higher quantities of cotton at the market. Since wealthier 
households have easy access to the markets due to having own transport they sell 
large volumes of cotton in the market, while poorer households sell less volumes of 
cotton in the market. The log of the distance to the market coefficient is negative, 
indicating that as the distance to the market increases, farmers prefer to sell less 
amount of cotton in the market due to higher proportional transaction costs and more 
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labour requirement. As a consequence, the farmers located in the far off areas mostly 
prefer to sell at the farm gate instead of travelling to the market. The log of wealth and 
the log of distance coefficients are negative meaning that comparing two households 
with the same wealth the one who has to travel a longer distance will probably sell less 
quantities of cotton at the market.  
 
The land ownership coefficient is positive and highly significant. As land ownership is 
also an indicator of household wealth, the result indicates that farmers having higher 
land ownership or the wealthy households sell higher quantities of cotton at the market, 
while the small farmers having less or no land holding sell less quantities of cotton at 
the market. The coefficient of labour availability is also positive and highly significant, 
indicating that households having more labour availability sell higher quantities of 
cotton at the market, since during cotton marketing the labour is needed for loading, 
unloading and transportation of cotton at the market. 
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Table 4: OLS regression (Heckman) results for quantity of cotton sold at market 
Variable Coefficient z-value 
Road access 0.320 1.32 
Tractor (dummy) 0.592*** 2.50 
Age  -0.020** -2.16 
Education  0.067*** 3.01 
Tenancy status 0.487 1.23 
Log (household wealth) 0.750*** 2.38 
Log (wealth)*log(distance) -0.298 -0.57 
Household size (number) 0.058** 2.05 
Land owned 0.057*** 3.70 
Labour availability 0.983*** 3.72 
Bahawalpur 0.082 0.19 
Bahawalnagar 0.653* 1.66 
Khanewal 0.115 0.24 
Vehari 0.03 0.06 
Lodhran 0.109 0.24 
Rahim Yar Khan 0.526 1.21 
Constant  2.59* 1.69 
  0.446*** 2.60 
Rho 0.735 
Number of observations 325 
Censored Observations 45 
Uncensored Observations 280 
Wald 
2  135.86 
Prob>
2  0.000 
Note: The results are significantly different from zero at ***1%, **5% and *10%, 
respectively. 
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3.2.4 Tobit and CLAD Model Results for Distance Travelled to Sell Cotton 
 
Both CLAD and Tobit models are employed to estimate the distance travelled to sell 
cotton. The censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) model has been estimated43. 
Since in the face of heteroskedaticity or non-normality, the Tobit model produces 
biased estimates. In contrast, since the censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) 
estimator does not depend on distributional or homoskedasticity assumptions of the 
errors and is robust to censoring, it produces consistent estimates even in the face of 
heteroskedasticity, non-normality and censoring. As the CLAD estimator imposes the 
weakest stochastic restrictions on the error terms, it results in the most precise 
estimates of the policy effects44. 
 
The results of the CLAD and Tobit models for distance travelled to sell cotton are 
presented in table 5. The result for the road access coefficient is positive and 
significant, indicating that household having road access can travel longer distances to 
sell cotton or in other words having a road access is the pre-requisite for market 
participation. In the study area, few villages have no road access at all and hence the 
farmers prefer to sell at the farm gate to the local trader instead of travelling to the 
market. Hence, good infrastructure can enhance farmers‟ chances of selling at the 
market.   
 
The tractor ownership coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that households 
owning a tractor can travel longer distances to sell cotton at the far off markets. The 
age coefficient is negative though not significant, indicating that young farmers can 
travel long distance to sell cotton at the market. The land ownership coefficient is 
positive and significant, indicating that households having more land ownership can 
travel longer distances to sell cotton. As land ownership is also an indicator of 
household‟s wealth since the results indicate that wealthy households can access the 
far off markets for cotton selling. 
                                                 
43
 The CLAD estimator is a generalization of the least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. Unlike 
the standard estimators of the censored regression model such as Tobit or other maximum 
likelihood approaches, the CLAD estimator is robust to heteroskedasticity and is consistent and 
asymptotically normal for a wide class of error distribution. 
 
44
 The censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) estimator for the censored regression model 
has been regarded as a desirable alternative to maximum likelihood estimation methods due to 
its robustness to conditional heteroscadesticity and distributional misspecification of the error 
term. However, the CLAD procedure has failed in certain empirical applications due to the 
restrictive nature of the “full rank” condition it requires. This condition can be especially 
problematic when the data are heavily censored. 
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The tenancy status results are positive, indicating that owners travel longer distances 
to sell cotton while the tenants mostly sell at the farm gate. Since the owners have 
higher land holding and more assets compared to tenants, they can travel longer 
distance to access cotton markets at the far off place. The tenants with fewer resources 
need credit from the local trader to meet the expensive input requirements and in return 
prefer to sell at the farm gate. 
 
The results of the residuals of the quantity are not significant (the first stage estimates 
of quantity sold are presented in Appendix A-1). The result of the household size 
coefficient is also not significant. The log of quantity and log of wealth interaction is 
positive and significant, indicating that for the same quantity wealthier households can 
travel longer distances to sell cotton. The districts dummies are also included in the 
model. 
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Table 5: Tobit and CLAD results for distance travelled to sell cotton 
Variable CLAD  Tobit 
Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Road access 0.957** 2.09 0.878* 1.93 
Tractor (dummy) 1.818* 1.95 1.565* 1.72 
Age -0.033 -1.43 -0.564 -1.16 
Education 0.033 0.97 0.732 1.56 
Land owned 0.007* 1.75 0.031*** 2.50 
Tenancy status 1.817* 1.66 0.986* 1.82 
Log (wealth) 0.401 1.48 0.001* 1.66 
Residuals of quantity sold 0.002 1.14 0.005 1.33 
Household size 0.024 0.89 0.03 0.57 
Log (quantity)* Log (wealth) 0.296** 2.19 0.405*** 2.83 
Bahawalpur 2.413* 1.83 1.180 1.20 
Bahawalnagar 4.330*** 2.45 0.194 0.16 
Khanewal -0.216*** 2.88 -0.348 -0.31 
Multan 0.173*** 2.306 2.01 1.42 
Lodhran -1.201 0.51 -0.185* -1.82 
Rahim Yar Khan 2.698* 1.92 2.101** 2.00 
Constant 3.386*** 2.864 3.452** 2.06 
Sigma ( )   5.051  
LR 
2    277.51  
Prob >
2    0.000  
Initial sample size 325  325  
Final sample size 223  325  
Pseudo 
2R  0.4105  0.1825  
Note: In CLAD bootstrap replications are 100. The results are significantly different 
from zero at ***1%, **5% and *10%, respectively. 
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3.2.5 Propensity Score Matching Results for Net Returns 
 
Propensity score matching estimates for cotton net returns are presented in table 6. 
Different matching algorithms like nearest neighbour matching (NNM), kernel based 
matching (KBM), radius matching and mahalnobis metric matching (MMM) with 
different calipers and bandwidths are employed to carry out the analysis of cotton net 
returns to selling at the market or the farm gate. The farmers selling at the market get 
higher net returns in the range of Rupees 1,875-5,434, thus indicating that cotton 
farmers who have access to markets get higher net returns compared to farmers 
selling at the farm gate. Similar results were obtained by Smith et al. (1999). Since they 
found that farmers who interlock the credit from informal sources to the supply of output 
received lower cotton prices compared to the farmers who had not interlocked the 
cotton output with the provision of credit from the local traders. In other words, farmers 
having independent choice regarding the place of sale, get higher prices compared to 
farmers who do not have independent choice regarding the place of sale. The results of 
higher returns from cotton when the farmers sell at the market are also in line with 
Boughton et al. (2007), since they observe higher returns for cotton selling at the 
market in Mozambique. 
 
Critical levels of hidden bias are presented in the third column of table 6. The critical 
level of hidden bias of e.g. 1.20-1.25 indicates that farmers selling at the market and 
selling at the farm gate differ  due to unobservable factors by 20-25%. The results are 
sensitive to very low as well as to very high values of the hidden bias. In the present 
analysis the value of hidden bias varies between 1.10-1.95. It can therefore be 
concluded that results are robust and not sensitive to hidden bias. This unobserved 
heterogeneity indicates that there are some unobserved variables simultaneously 
influencing the participation decision and the outcome. However, it has to be stressed 
that the Rosenbaum bounds are a worst-case scenario since they do not question the 
significance of the causal effects, but they show the required extent of a confounding 
variable on the market participation probability to undermine the significance of the 
average treatment effects.  
 
Since the main purpose of the propensity score matching is to balance the covariates 
among participants and control groups, table 7 presents the indicators of covariates 
balancing after propensity score matching. A number of different balancing tests have 
been performed. The results indicate that after matching, the median absolute bias has 
been reduced considerably and is low after matching in all the matching algorithms. 
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Before matching the median absolute bias lies in the range of 17% and 21%, and after 
matching the median absolute bias lies in the range of 5% to 11%. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1985) suggested that a remaining standardised bias of 20% is quite acceptable. 
In all the matching algorithms, the bias has considerably decreased after matching, e.g. 
in the range of 45% - 72%. The results indicate that after matching, the bias has been 
decreased by a considerable amount and the covariates have been balanced and 
hence, the results are robust. 
  
Similarly, the value of the pseudo-
2R  is really low after matching depicting that there 
are no systematic differences between adopters and non adopters after matching. The 
last two columns in table 7 indicate the joint significance of covariates. Before 
matching, the null hypothesis of equal covariate means for both groups of households 
should be rejected and after matching, the p-value of the likelihood ratio test should be 
quite high so that the hypothesis of statistically similar samples cannot be rejected 
anymore.  
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Table 6: Average treatment effects and results of sensitivity analysis for net returns 
Matching Algorithm Caliper/Bandwidth ATT Critical level  
of hidden Bias 
Number  
of Treated 
Number  
of Control 
Nearest Neighbour Matching(1) 0.01 2264.98* (1.77) 1.20-1.25 96 192 
Nearest Neighbour Matching(2) 0.05 3919.47*(1.86) 1.55-1.60 96 192 
Nearest Neighbour Matching(5) 0.9 4345.19**(2.18) 1.45-1.50 96 192 
Nearest Neighbour Matching(10) 0.05 2945.76*(1.71) 1.75-1.80 96 192 
Kernel Based Matching 0.5 3242.20*(1.66) 1.55-1.60 96 192 
Kernel Based Matching 0.9 4550.02***(2.54) 1.40-1.45 96 192 
Kernel Based Matching 0.01 1875.13**(2.19) 1.35-1.40 96 192 
Kernel Based Matching 0.05 3748.44*(1.80) 1.90-1.95 96 192 
Radius Matching 0.5 4556.68**(1.98) 1.25-1.30 96 192 
Radius Matching 0.9 4665.38***(2.65) 1.35-1.40 96 192 
Radius Matching 0.05 3957.74*(1.83) 1.55-1.60 96 192 
Radius Matching 0.01 4555.86* (1.77) 1.45-1.50 96 192 
Mahalanobis Metric Matching 0.01 3483.21**(2.11) 1.10-1.15 82 61 
Mahalanobis Metric Matching 0.02 4163.21*(1.90) 1.25-1.30 40 37 
Mahalanobis Metric Matching 0.03 5011.63*(1.88) 1.45-1.50 49 45 
Mahalanobis Metric Matching 0.05 5434.61 (1.59) - 55 49 
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses and the values are significantly different from zero at the ***1, **5 and *10% level, respectively. 
For Kernel based matching, the bandwidths are reported and for nearest neighbour matching, radius matching and mahalanobis metric 
matching, the calipers are reported. 
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Table 7: Indicators of covariate balancing before and after matching  
Matching Algorithm Caliper Median 
absolute 
bias 
(before 
matching)
% 
Median 
absolute 
bias (after 
matching) 
% 
(Total)% 
bias 
reduction 
Pseudo 
2R   
(unmatched) 
Pseudo 
2R   
(matched) 
2P  
(unmatched) 
2P  
(matched) 
Nearest Neighbour Matching(1) 0.01 21.51 6.00 72.10 0.244 0.034 0.000 0.764 
Nearest Neighbour Matching(2) 0.05 20.22 7.26 64.09 0.259 0.014 0.000 0.587 
Nearest Neighbour Matching(5) 0.9 20.79 7.70 62.96 0.261 0.006 0.000 0.945 
Nearest Neighbour Matching(10) 0.05 20.51 6.57 67.96 0.282 0.002 0.000 0.987 
Kernel Based Matching 0.5 19.75 9.49 51.94 0.266 0.001 0.000 0.632 
Kernel Based Matching 0.9 18.65 9.21 50.62 0.258 0.002 0.000 0.534 
Kernel Based Matching 0.01 18.44 7.26 60.63 0.295 0.012 0.000 0.997 
Kernel Based Matching 0.05 17.67 6.33 64.17 0.334 0.022 0.000 0.841 
Radius Matching 0.5 20.51 11.16 45.59 0.281 0.026 0.000 0.999 
Radius Matching 0.9 20.27 8.41 58.51 0.279 0.058 0.000 0.961 
Radius Matching 0.05 20.57 7.93 61.49 0.284 0.049 0.000 0.925 
Radius Matching 0.01 20.11 6.69 66.73 0.277 0.099 0.000 0.475 
Mahalanobis Metric Matching 0.01 20.66 7.35 64.42 0.268 0.074 0.000 0.273 
Mahalanobis Metric Matching 0.02 19.63 5.68 71.06 0.279 0.001 0.000 0.808 
Mahalanobis Metric Matching 0.03 19.64 11.52 58.66 0.241 0.022 0.000 0.780 
Mahalanobis Metric Matching 0.05 20.33 6.79 66.60 0.246 0.033 0.000 0.509 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The results indicate that cotton farmers‟ market participation is not driven by the self 
control motive but there are a number of factors influencing the farmers‟ market 
participation. The empirical results from the analysis show that road access, transport 
availability, the household‟s wealth and the household head‟s education contribute 
positively and significantly to the sale of cotton at the market. 
 
The most important finding is the positive and significant difference in net returns 
farmers receive at the market or at the farm gate. The difference in net returns 
indicates that farmers selling at the market are gaining higher net returns compared to 
farmers selling at the farm gate. But it can be clearly concluded from the results that 
wealthy households have easy access to markets. On the contrary, small and resource 
poor farmers are getting less returns by selling at the farm gate to local traders 
(commission agent). The results also indicate that wealthy households can travel 
longer distances and can sell higher quantities of cotton in the market. Small farmers 
have fewer resources and need to take credit from the informal source, i.e. local trader 
(commission agent). Hence, they are bound to sell to the local commission agent. In 
this situation, the formal credit programme needs to be transparent, quick and easy for 
landless and small farmers. However, the formal credit programme is currently not 
small farmers friendly, since the procedure is long, not transparent and mark up rates 
are quite high. The landless farmers have no access to the formal credit programme at 
all and as a consequence, the small and landless farmers turn to informal credit 
sources and in return sell cotton to them on the offered rates. The results emphasise 
the improvement in infrastructure and the establishment of markets at districts level. 
The government should invest in human capital development and information about 
market prices should be provided to farmers through print and electronic media. 
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Appendix 
Table A-1 First stage estimates of determinants of quantity sold 
Variable Coefficient t-values 
Road Access 341.83* 1.94 
Age -0.268 -0.05 
Education 22.372 1.31 
Tenancy 266.43 1.13 
Land owned 15.55*** 10.98 
Tractor 146.98 0.86 
Labour 140.88 0.72 
Log (wealth) 301.97* 1.86 
Bahawalpur 486.27 1.59 
Bahawalnagar 319.89* 1.84 
Khanewal 473.36 1.51 
Vehari 509.21* 1.66 
Lodhran 795.01*** 2.58 
Rahim Yar Kahn 141.72 0.47 
Constant 10798.06*** 3.95 
Number of Observation 325 
F(22, 302) 28.84 
Prob>F 0.000 
2R  0.6775 
Adjusted
2R  0.6541 
Note: The results are significantly different from zero at ***1%, **5% and *10%, 
respectively. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
The analysis conducted in this dissertation is focusing on three important aspects of 
production and marketing of cotton in Pakistan. First, the adoption and impact of Bt  
cotton technology on cotton yield, household income, poverty status of the household 
and pesticide demand; second, the land rights‟ influence on farmers decision to invest 
in land improvement measures and impact on technical, allocative and economic 
efficiency levels of cotton farmers; third, the impact of transaction costs and liquidity 
constraints on cotton farmers‟ market participation. The major motivation for the study 
was that genetically modified cotton varieties are recently introduced in Pakistan and 
this is the first study which has estimated the adoption and impact of Bt cotton by 
employing the propensity score matching approach. The main advantage of the new 
technology are the higher yields and incomes and less pesticide demand besides 
poverty reduction as well as socioeconomic benefits to the household. 
 
1. Study Focus and Review of Methods 
 
The present study is the first Bt cotton adoption and impact assessment study in 
Pakistan. The study employed the propensity score matching (PSM) approach to 
reduce potential issues of non random sample selection. This approach is quite new in 
the growing literature on the impact of genetically modified crops. In the past, Bt cotton 
studies in developing countries has mainly focused on cotton yields and pesticide use, 
but the household poverty aspect was mostly missing in the past literature. In the 
present study Bt cotton impacts on cotton yields, household income, pesticide demand 
and poverty status are estimated. The second important focus of this dissertation is on 
land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement measures and 
efficiency level. The third important focus is on the role of transaction costs and liquidity 
constraint on cotton farmers‟ market participation. Only a couple of studies in Pakistan 
have studied the land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land 
improvement measures, but no study has related this to farmer‟s technical, allocative 
and economic efficiency levels. A multivariate Tobit model is employed to estimate 
farmers‟ investment in land improvement measures and translog profit and cost frontier 
models are employed to estimate the technical, allocative and economic efficiency 
levels. The propensity score matching approach was also employed to assess the 
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impact of investment in soil improving and fertility enhancing measures. The study also 
focused on cotton farmers‟ market participation. So far, only little literature exists on 
farmers‟ market participation and determinants of participation. In the present study, a 
number of different models are employed to estimate the farmer‟s market participation. 
A Probit model is employed for farmers‟ market participation and results are 
instrumented for the amount of advance taken from the commission agent and the 
Heckman selection estimator is employed for the quantity of cotton sold. Both CLAD 
and Tobit models are employed for the distance travelled to sell cotton and the 
propensity score matching approach is employed for cotton net returns. 
 
2. Summary of Results and Implications for Policy 
 
2.1 Genetically Modified Cotton Impact on Household Welfare 
 
The adoption of genetically modified cotton is helpful in increasing cotton yields and 
household income. These benefits usually manifest themselves in the form of poverty 
reduction. The empirical results from the analysis show that the adoption of the Bt 
cotton has a positive and significant impact on cotton yields, household income and 
poverty reduction, and a negative impact on pesticides demand. For example, the 
estimates reveal that cotton yields are by 50-62 kg per acre higher for farmers who 
adopted Bt cotton technology. This can be considered as the opportunity cost of not 
adopting the Bt cotton varieties. Similarly, the household incomes are higher by 
Rupees 16,500-17,000 pesticide demand was less by 0.62-0.68 liters per acre and Bt 
cotton is helpful in reducing the household poverty by 13.5-14.3%. The positive and 
significant impact of the technology on cotton yields and household income reaffirms 
the potential role of new agricultural technology in directly reducing the rural poverty 
through increased farm household incomes. The negative and significant impact of the 
technology on the demand for pesticide shows that as an inbuilt pest resistance 
mechanism, Bt cotton could result in substantial ecological benefits. The reduced 
demand for pesticide is encouraging not only for ecological reasons, but also for health 
reasons, as they are potentially harmful for human health, particularly under the 
conditions of usage in several developing countries. 
 
The estimates differentiated by land ownership indicate that the productivity gains from 
Bt cotton are higher for small scale farmers compared to medium and large scale 
farmers. The income effect of technology appears to be higher for large farmers. 
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However, adoption tends to help small farmers out of poverty but exerts no statistically 
significant impact on medium and large farmers‟ poverty status. The policy implications 
of this finding is that targeting small-scale farmers with new agricultural technology can 
help in improving their farm productivity, income and reduce poverty among these 
households. Policies in this direction include increasing their access to information to 
reduce uncertainty about new technologies and to formal credit to overcome liquidity 
constraints. In addition, efforts to improve their human capital in the form of education 
and providing them with better infrastructure as well as advanced extension services 
would go long way to help facilitating the adoption of new technologies. 
 
2.2 Land Rights Influence on Farmers’ Decision to Invest in Land 
Improvement Measures and Efficiency Levels 
 
Robust evidence was found that secured land rights do matter when farmers make 
investment decisions about soil improving measures such as organic manure and 
cultivation of leguminous crops and mineral fertilizers. Specifically, farmers with 
secured land rights were found to be more likely to invest in soil improving measures 
compared to tenants. However, tenure security did not matter for investments in short-
term yield enhancing inputs such as mineral fertiliser, since fixed-rent tenants were 
found to apply higher levels than owner-cultivators. While both moral hazard and hold-
up problems may explain the lower levels of investment by sharecroppers, the finding 
for fixed-renters may be attributed to landlords who do not fully commit to their 
contracts with fixed-renters. Under such conditions, fixed-renters do not find it attractive 
to invest in long-term soil improving measures since the landlord could deny to extend 
the contract once it expires, preventing the tenant from reaping the benefits of the 
investment. 
 
We also find empirical support for the hypothesis that farmers with secured land rights 
are more efficient than those with leased contracts. Specifically, the average alloctaive 
efficiencies for owner-cultivators, sharecroppers, and fixed-renters are 92%, 82%, and 
85% respectively. Although these average efficiency differences between owner-
cultivators and those of tenants do not appear to be large, the averages actually 
concede great heterogeneity across tenure arrangement types. The higher levels of 
efficiency on owner-cultivator farms stem from the higher incentives to invest in soil-
improving and productivity enhancing measures, and to exert great effort in production. 
Given the high cost of supervision in Pakistan, landlords rarely supervise their share-
tenants, resulting in tenants exerting less effort and therefore achieving lower 
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productivity levels. These findings generally suggest that a land redistribution exercise 
in favour of sharecroppers and fixed-renters could have considerable efficiency effects. 
 
A propensity score matching model was also employed to assess the impacts of 
investments in soil improving and productivity-enhancing measures on farm 
productivity and efficiency. The findings revealed that investment in organic manure, 
fertilizer and leguminous crops exert positive impacts on farm productivity and 
efficiency, suggesting that investment in these soil improving and yield enhancing 
measures may partially account for the productivity and efficiency impacts of tenure 
security. Overall, our results indicate that redistribution of land that strengthens tenure 
security can have substantial investment and efficiency effects in agricultural 
production.  
  
2.3  Determinants of Cotton Marketing 
 
The results depict that the cotton farmers‟ market participation decision is influenced by 
a number of factors. The empirical results shows that road access, transport 
availability, the household‟s wealth and the household head‟s education have a positive 
and significant influence on the cotton farmers‟ market participation.   
 
There is a positive and significant difference in cotton net returns farmers receive at the 
market and at the farm gate. Propensity score matching results indicate that farmers 
having access to the market are getting more net returns compared to the farmers 
selling at the farm gate. This can be clearly concluded from the results that wealthy 
household have easy access to markets. Small farmers have fewer resources and they 
take credit from the informal source, i.e. local trader (commission agent), hence they 
are bound to sell to the local trader (commission agent) at the farm gate. The formal 
credit programme needs to be transparent, quick and easy for small scale farmers and 
tenants. But currently, the formal credit programme is not small farmers friendly since 
the procedure is long, non-transparent and mark up rates are quite high. The landless 
farmers have no access to formal credit programme at all. So the small and landless 
farmers turn to informal credit sources and in return interlock output supply to them. 
The results emphasise the improvement in infrastructure, the establishment of markets 
at district levels and the investment in human capital development. 
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3. Policy Implications  
 
The present study has a number of important policy implications. As far as the 
household‟s welfare is concerned, the Bt cotton has a positive and significant impact on 
cotton farmers in Pakistan. Policy makers should ensure the supply of healthy Bt cotton 
seed to farmers. The land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land 
improvement measures indicate that farmers having secure land rights invest more in 
land improvement measures and vice versa. As owners are technically, allocativelly 
and economically more efficient, tenants should be provided with land rights through 
land reforms since this will be added incentive for the landless and resource poor 
farmers to invest in land improvement measures and hence higher levels of technical, 
allocative and economic efficiency levels can be achieved. The gap between highest 
and lowest efficiency levels indicates the scope for improvement.  
The policy implications for farmers‟ market participation are that the formal credit 
programme needs to be made more transparent, easy and quick for the small scale 
farmers. Besides this, the improvement in village infrastructure and the investment in 
human capital is also needed. 
 
4. Directions for Future Research 
 
Since the current study was the first study regarding the adoption and impact of Bt 
cotton, more studies regarding Bt cotton adoption and impact evaluation should be 
carried out in the future to have a clear understanding how the new technology has 
performed over the years regarding household welfare. Future researchers can also 
focus on other areas of Bt cotton adoption and impact evaluation like impact on the 
farmers‟ health status.  
 
Due to time and resource constraints, only cross-sectional data were collected for the 
present study, so future researchers can possibly employ panel data to estimate the 
land rights‟ influence on farmers‟ decision to invest in land improvement measures and 
efficiency level. Especially for efficiency estimation, cross sectional data provide only a 
snapshot for efficiency estimation, while panel data provide a comprehensive overview. 
Therefore, future researchers in Pakistan should focus on this issue. 
 
Regarding cotton farmers‟ access to the markets, the main focus was on the farmers‟ 
decision to sell at the market and determinants of the farmers‟ market participation and 
household net returns. Hence, future studies can be expanded to other market 
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stakeholders involved in the cotton marketing chain. Last but not least similar studies 
for cotton and other crops in the developing countries can be helpful regarding policy 
formulations and rural household welfare.   
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Appendix A  
OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS IN PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF 
COTTON IN PAKISTAN 
Questionnaire Nr_________________ 
 
Name of Enumerator _________________________________ 
 
Date of Interview [  ____ /____ /_____](DD/MM/YY) 
 
Time started ________________ Time ended_________________ 
 
Signature_______________________________ 
 
      
 
Reviewed by _________________________________ 
 
 
Date [  ____ /____ /_____](DD/MM/YY) 
 
 
Signature of Reviewer _________________________________________ 
 
 
Instructions 
 
 Please explain to the farmers the purpose of getting information. 
 
 Please interview only 1 farmer from one household (e.g., if father and son are 
also involved in farming for the same piece of land then interview only one 
person). 
 
 Please try to complete as accurately as possible. 
 
 Please use codes where provided. 
 
 Please specify units clearly whenever you write quantity and prices. 
 
 About sensitive questions like income and family please ask these questions at 
the end. 
 
 Please make sure that no important column is missing, so after completing and 
before saying good bye to farmer check once again. 
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A / Village Information 
 
Please write down the name of district, tehsil and village of the respondent. 
 
A / 1 District [  _________________________________________ ] 
 
A / 2 Tehsil   [  __________________________________________ ] 
 
A / 3 Village/ Place [  _____________________________________ ] 
 
A / 4 Infrastructure in the village 
 
Please make a cross [x] in the relevant box if the facility is available then in front of yes 
and if not then in front of no. If the facility is not available then please mention the 
approximate distance at which the facility is available. 
 
Facility Yes No Distance 
(Kms) 
Facility Yes   No Distance 
(Kms) 
Mettle Road [ __ ] 
 
[ ___ ] 
 
[  ___ ] 
 
Primary 
School girls 
[  ____ ] [  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
Brick Road / 
Soling 
[ ___ ] 
 
[ ___ ] 
 
[  ___ ] 
 
Hospital [  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
Transport [ ___ ] 
 
[ ___ ] 
 
[  ___ ] 
 
Veterinary 
Centre 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
Electricity [ ___ ] 
 
[ ___ ] 
 
///////////// 
 
Agriculture 
NGO,s 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
Inputs Dealer [ ___ ] 
 
[ ___ ] 
 
[  ___ ] 
 
Agri. 
Extension 
office 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
Crops Output 
Market  
[ ___ ] 
 
[ ___ ] 
 
[  ___ ] 
 
Agri. 
Research 
Institute 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
 
Primary 
School boys  
[ ___ ] 
 
[ ___ ] 
 
[  ___ ] 
 
Agri. Bank 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
 
[  ____ ] 
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B/ Personal Information 
 
B/1 Name of Farmer [  _________________________________________________] 
 
B/2 Age (Years) [  _________________ ]  B/3 Education (Years) [ ______________ ]  
 
B/4 Farming Experience (Years) [  ___ ] B/5 Cotton Growing Experience (Years) [  __ ] 
 
B/6 Gender of Household Head [  ________________________ ]  1. Male 2. Female 
 
B/7 Relationship of the farmer with household head [  _________________________ ] 
 
B/8 Status of the Farmer [  ___________ ] 1. Owner 2. Tenant 3.Owner cum Tenant 
 
B/9 Land owned by the farmer (acres) [  _____________________ ] 
 
B / 10 Land owned by the father (acres) [  _____________________ ]  
 
B/11  Farm Land Resources (Number of acres) 
Total Own Land Area 
Rented In 
Area 
Rented Out 
Area 
Shared 
In 
Area 
Shared 
Out 
Operational 
holding Cultivated Un-
Cultivated 
[  _____ ] [  _____  ] [  _______ ] [  _______ ] [  ___ ] [  __ ] [  ______ ] 
 
Land rent if rented in or rented out (6months / cotton season) [ __________________ ] 
Owner share percentage if shared in or shared out (6months / cotton season) [ _____ ] 
 
B/12  Crops and Area Information (Acres) 
Please provide information about different crops sown during summer and winter 
season 
 Crops 
(Kharif)  
Area 
(acres
) 
Vegetables 
(Kharif) 
Area 
(acres
) 
Crops 
(Rabi) 
Area 
(acres
) 
Vegetables 
(Rabi) 
Area 
(acres
) 
[ Cotton ] 
[ _______ ] 
[ _______ ] 
[ ___ ] 
[ ___ ] 
[ ___ ] 
[ _______ ] 
[ _______ ] 
[ _______ ] 
[___ ] 
[___ ] 
[___ ] 
[  ____ ] 
[  ____ ] 
[  ____ ] 
[ ___ ] 
[ ___ ] 
[ ___ ] 
[  _______ ] 
[  _______ ] 
[  _______ ] 
[ ___ ] 
[ ___ ] 
[ ___ ] 
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B/13 Total area of cotton planted during the last season (number of acres) [ ________] 
 
B/14 Have you kept some part of your land fallow [  _______________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
B/15 If yes then please give number of acres left fallow [  __________________ ] 
 
B/16 What is the over all type of your soil? Please choose from the below choices. [ _ ]  
1. Clay 2. Loam  3. Clay Loam   4.Sandy Loam 5. Silt loam 6. Others [ ___________ ] 
 
B/17 Main soil type at which cotton is planted [  ________ ]1. Good 2. Medium 3. Poor  
 
B/18 Have you ever carried out soil test?  [  ____________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
B/19 Do you have idea / information about micro nutrients?[  _________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
B/ 20 Has over the years soil fertility decreased? [  _________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
B/21 Is the fertility levels same in all the plots? [  _________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
B/22 Have you planted fertility enhancing crops like legumes [_________] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
B/23 Number of cotton plots [  _____ ] 1. One  2. Two 3. Three 4.Four 5.Other [  ____ ] 
 
B/24 If fragmented then distance between two farthest cotton plots in kms [ ________ ] 
Or distance of the farthest plot from farmer‟s home in kms [______________] 
 
B/25 Family Information 
Household Size and Education level 
Please fill the following information regarding size of family members. 
Children (Less 
than 16 years) 
Adult  (16-60) Old age (above 
60) 
Male Family 
Farm 
Workers 
Female family 
farm workers 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
[  __ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _______ ] [ ________ ] 
 
 
B-26 Highest Education in the family (years of education) [ _____________________ ] 
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B-27 Education level of Family household head [ ____________________________ ] 
 
B-28 Family Type [ __________________________ ]1. Joint Family 2.Nuclear Family 
 
B-29 Assets of Farmers 
Please Cross[x] in front of the relevant column, if the farmers have that particular 
assets or not. Please also mention the total number if the answer is yes. 
Assets  Yes  No Number Assets Yes   No Number 
Tube wells [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Fodder Cutter [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Wells [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Manual Spray 
Machine 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Plough [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Tractor driven 
spray machine 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
MB Plough [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Laser Leveler [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Chisel plough [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Radio [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Tractor [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Television [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Trolley [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Car / Vehicle [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Thresher [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Motorcycle/Scoot
er 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Rotavator [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Bicycle [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Rabi drill [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Milk Animals cow 
/ Buffalo 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Zero-till drill [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Bullock [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Hand cotton 
drill 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Sheep & Goats [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Tractor driven 
cotton drill 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Camel / Horses / 
Donkeys 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
Electric Motor [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [  ____ ] Hens [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ____ ] 
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Cotton Production Practices 
C/ Land Preparation; Mode of preparation 
 
C/1 Which tools do you use for land preparation; please enter code from the choices  
 [  ________ ] or cross[ x ]  in front of choice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
C/2 Is the tractor for land preparation easily available [ _____ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
C/3 Total land prepared / ploughed in acres for cotton during 2006-07 season [ ___ ]  
 
C/4 Total Number of Ploughing / acre [ ________ ], Cost in Rupees [ _____________  ] 
 
C/5 Total Number of Planking / acre [ ________ ], Cost in Rupees [ _____________  ] 
 
C/6 What do you pay for total land preparation in Rupees [ ______________________] 
 
C/7 Cost of per acre land preparation [ _____________________________________] 
 
C/8 Month / Date of cotton sowing (exact date / month) [ ______________________ ] 
 
C/9   Seed Sources 
 
What is your source of cotton seed, please fill from the given choices [  ___ ] [  ___ ] 
Or cross[x] in front of choice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
C/10 Quantity of cotton seed used per acre in Kilograms [ ____], Price per kilogram[ _ ] 
 
1. Own Bullock   
2.Own Tractor   
3. Hired Bullock   
4. Hired Tractor   
5. Both Bullock and Tractor  
1.Own  
2.Fellow Farmers  
2. Market Dealer / Seed Agency   
3. Govt. Offices   
4. Others  
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C/11 Price of seed, if own seed used then total approximate market value in Rupees   
 [ __________ ] 
 
 
C/12 Seed Treatment 
 
Please provide information about seed treatment from the below choices [ _____ ] or 
cross in front of choice 
1. Already Treated  
2. Treated by himself  
3. Not Treated  
 
C/13 If himself carried out seed treatment then name of chemical used [ ___________] 
 
C/14Quantity of chemical used for treating 40kg of seed in liters [ _______________ ] 
 
C/15 What is total cost of chemical [ _________________________________ ] 
 
C/16 What is per acre cost of chemical [ _////////////////_______________ ] 
 
C/17 Pre sowing irrigation (rauni) [ ___________________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
C/18 If yes then number of irrigation (Raunis) [ _________ ] 1. Single 2. Double  
 
C/19 Approximate cost of raunis [ _____________________________________ ] 
 
 
C/20 Sowing Method 
 
What sowing method did you used for cotton crop land preparation, please enter from 
the following choices [  _______________ ] 
1. Ridge / Furrow Sowing 2. Broadcast 3. Line sowing 4.Others, pl. specify [ _______ ] 
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C/21 Varieties Sown 
Name of Variety Acres sown Seed / Acre 
(Kgs) 
Total Cost Cost / acre 
[ ___________ ] [ ___________ ] [ _________ ] [ _________ ] [ _//______ ] 
[ ___________ ] [ ___________ ] [ _________ ] [ _________ ] [ _//______ ] 
[ ___________ ] [ ___________ ] [ _________ ] [ _________ ] [ _//______ ] 
 
C/22 Please give reasons for planting these varieties from the below choices [ ______ ] 
 
1. High yielding   
2. Insect pest resistant   
3. High value in market  
4. Recommended by Agri. Department   
5. Only this variety available  
6. Others specify [ _________________ ]  
  
 
C/23 How do you decide about the seed rate? Please choose from the choices  
below [ ________________ ] 
1. Past Experience   
2. Advice from the Agri. Department  
3. Advice from input dealer   
4. Any other [ _________________ ]  
 
C/24 Have the germination been tested prior to sowing [  ________ ] 1. Yes 2.  No 
 
C/25 What is the approximate germination percentage (%)  [ ____________________ ] 
 
C/26 Do you carry out the thinning operation [  _______ ] 1. Yes 2.  No 
 
C/27 What is the approximate plant to plant distance in feet [  ___________________ ] 
 
C/28 What is the approximate row to row distance in feet [  ____________________ ] 
 
C/29 Total plant population in an acre [ __________________________________ ]  
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D/ Irrigation Sources & Methods 
 
D/1What are your sources of irrigation, please choose from the choices below [ _ ]  [ _ ] 
1. Canals   
2. Tube wells   
3. Electric Pumps   
4. Wells  
5.Any Other  
 
D/2 If own Tube well then monthly electricity bill in Rupees [  ______ ] Pumps [ _____] 
 
D/3 Approximate number of hours a tube well is run every day [ ___________] 
 
D/5 Total number of acres managed by one Tube wells [  ______________________ ] 
 
D/6 If purchase water then Total cost in Rupees during season [ ________________ ] 
 
D/7 If water is purchased then per hour cost of water [///////////___________ ] 
 
D/8 If you sell water then approximate monthly income from water selling [ _______ ] 
 
D/9 During the season is there scarcity of water [_____] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
D/10 If yes then how do you manage water scarcity [ ___ ]+ [  ___ ]+ [  __ ] 
 1. Band making 2. Deep ploughing 3. Line Sowing 4. Others [ _________________ ] 
 
D/11 How much yield is affected due to water scarcity in percentage [ ____________ ] 
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D/12 Time of Irrigation 
Please provide information about stage of cotton and the costs of irrigation. 
Irrigation 
Number 
Stage of Crop Month Name  / 
Irrigation interval 
Cost / Irrigation Total cost Cost per 
acre 
Rouni [  __________ ] [  __________ ] [  __________ ]  ////////////// 
/////////////// 1st [  __________ ] [  __________ ] [  __________ ] 
2nd [  __________ ] [  __________ ] [  __________ ] 
3rd [  __________ ] [  __________ ] [  __________ ] 
4th [  __________ ] [  __________ ] [  __________ ] 
5th [  __________ ] [  __________ ] [  __________ ] 
6th [  __________ ] [  __________ ] [  __________ ] 
 
E- Fertilizer Use Information 
 
E/1 What is the source of fertilizer? 
 Please choose from the choices [  ________ ]  
 
  
 
 
E/2 Are you using the recommended doses of fertilizer [  ________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
E/3 Do you apply Farm yard manure at the land preparation time [  ____ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
E/4 If Yes what is the source of Farm Yard Manure [  _______ ] 1. Own 2.  Purchased 
 
E/5 If purchased what are total cost of Farm yard manure in Rupees [  ____________ ] 
 
E/6 Total number of acres in which Farm yard manure was applied [  _____________ ] 
 
E/7 Quantity of Farm yard manure applied [ ______________ ] 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Own   
2. Village Market   
3. Tehsil Market   
4. District Market  
 5. Public / Private Agency  
6. Others [ ____________ ]  
 153 
E/8 Fertilizer Application 
Name of 
Fertilizer 
Stage of 
crop 
Acreage Quantity Applied 
(Bags) 
Price 
/Bag 
Total 
Cost 
Per acre 
Cost 
[  _______ ] [  _______ ] [  ____ ] [  ___________ ] [ ___ ]  /////////////////
//////////// [  _______ ] [  _______ ] [  ____ ] [  ___________ ] [ ___ ] 
[  _______ ] [  _______ ] [  ____ ] [  ___________ ] [ ___ ] 
[  _______ ] [  _______ ] [  ____ ] [  ___________ ] [ ___ ] 
 
E/9 How do you decide about the application of 
fertilizer?  Please choose from the given  
Choices [ _______________________ ] 
 
F/10 Have you used potash fertilizer?  
[ ______ ] 1. Yes 2. No  
 
 
F - Insect / Pest and Diseases Attack 
F/1 Please provide information about the name of insect, pest and diseases  
Name of Insect / 
Pest / Diseases 
Stage of Crop Name of 
Pesticide 
Sprayed 
Unit 
(liter) 
Price 
per 
liter 
Total 
Cost 
Per Acre 
Cost 
Insects /Pests 
1. [__________ ] [ _________ ] [ ___________ ] [ ___] [ __ ] [ ___ ] [ _/__ ] 
2. [__________ ] [ _________ ] [ ___________ ] [ ___] [ __ ] [ ___ ] [ _/__ ] 
3. [__________ ] [ _________ ] [ ___________ ] [ ___] [ __ ] [ ___ ] [ _/__ ] 
4. [__________ ] [ _________ ] [ ___________ ] [ ___] [ __ ] [ ___ ] [ _/__ ] 
5. [__________ ] [ _________ ] [ ___________ ] [ ___] [ __ ] [ ___ ] [ _/__ ] 
Diseases 
1. [__________ ] [ _________ ] [ ___________ ] [ ___] [ __ ] [ ___ ] [ _/__ ] 
2. [__________ ] [ _________ ] [ ___________ ] [ ___] [ __ ] [ ___ ] [ _/__ ] 
3. [__________ ] [ _________ ] [ ___________ ] [ ___] [ __ ] [ ___ ] [ _/__ ] 
 
 
F/2 What percentage of cotton was damaged by insect, pest 
/diseases during the current season.  [  ________________ ] 
 
F/3 How much area was damaged by cotton leaf curl virus [ ___ ] 
 1. Result of Soil Test 
 2. Fertilizer dealer recommendations 
 3. Extension service recommendation 
 4. Routine Practice (Past Experience) 
 5. Price of Fertilizer 
 6. Any Other [ _________________ ] 
1-      >50 % 
2-      25-50  % 
3-       10-15 % 
4-        0-10  % 
5. Others[ _____] 
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F/4 Do you carry out the pest scouting manually? [ _ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
F/5 If yes then frequency of pest scouting [ ______ ]  
 
 
 
 
 
F/6 Source of pesticide Purchase 
From where do you purchase 
pesticide? Please choose from the 
given choices [ ___ ] 
 
 
F/7 How do you purchase pesticides [  _____________ ] 1. On Cash 2. On Credit  
 
F/8 Please provide the price difference when purchased on credit, how much do you 
have to pay additionally in Rupees / acre  
[ _______________________________________________________] 
 
F/9 Pesticide Spray 
 Machine used for spray operation [  ______ ] 1=Manual hand machine 2. Tractor 
driven machine 3. Other [ _______________________________________________ ]   
 
F/10 Can you differentiate between harmful and beneficial pests [ ___ ] 1=Yes2= No  
 
F/11 Recommended doses of pesticide & Timing of application [ _____ ] 1=Yes2= No 
 
F/12 Precautions taken during pesticide spray [ __________________ ] 1=Yes2= No  
 
F/13 Number of human illness due to pesticide sprays [ ____________ ] 1=Yes2= No  
 
F/14 If human beings and animals are affected by the pesticide spray then please 
provide the approximate cost of treatment in Rupees [ ______________________ ] 
 
F/15 Total number of insect / pests attacking on cotton crop [ ___________________ ] 
 
1. Daily  
2. Weekly   
3. Monthly   
4. Once in season 
5. Others [ _____ ] 
1. Village dealer   
2. Tehsil dealer / District dealer  
3. Pesticide company man visited in the village   
4. Fellow farmers in the village do this business   
5. Any Other[ ___________________________]  
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G-/ Weeding / Hoeing Operation 
G/1 
Names of weeds Controlling Method 
1. With hand 2. Spray 3. 
With Tractor 4. Any 
Other 
Total Cost  Cost /Acre 
1. [  _________________ ] [  _________________ ] [  ________ ] [  _/_____ ] 
2. [  _________________ ] [  _________________ ] [  ________ ] [  _/_____ ] 
3. [  _________________ ] [  _________________ ] [  ________ ] [  _/_____ ] 
Total Cost [  ________ ] [  __/____ ] 
 
Do you carry out the rogging/ Hoeing operation [ __________ ] 1=Yes2= No 
 
If yes total number of Hoeing / rogging operation during cotton season [  __________ ] 
 
Total cost of rogging / Hoeing operation [  __________________________________ ] 
 
H- Cotton Picking 
 
H/1 When do you start picking (What percentage of bolls are open) [ _____________ ] 
 
H/2 Please provide name of month in which you start 1st picking [_______________ ] 
1. September 2. October 3. November 4. Others 
[______________________________________________ ] 
 
H/3 Please gives information about wage rate of cotton picking per day [_________]  
 and per mound [_________________________] 
 
H/4 Do you provide instructions to cotton pickers about clean picking [ ___ ]1. Yes 2. 
No 
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I- Variety-wise yield / production of Cotton   
Picking 
Number 
Variety-Wise Yield in maunds Yield per acre 
(Maunds) 
Total Yield 
(Maunds) Variety 1 
________ 
Variety 2 
________ 
Variety 3 
________ 
1st [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ___________ ] [  __________ ] 
2nd [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ___________ ] [  __________ ] 
3rd [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ___________ ] [  __________ ] 
4th [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ___________ ] [  __________ ] 
Total [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ______ ] [ ___________ ] [  __________ ] 
 
Total cotton yield during the last season in maunds [ __________________________ ] 
Value of yield in Rupees [ ______________________________________________ ] 
 
J- Credit Facilities / Extension Services and Membership of Farmers Group 
 
J/1 Is credit facility available for purchase of inputs / Farming [_______ ]1. Yes 2. No 
 
J/2 Have you ever received credit facility [_______ ] 1.Yes 2. No 
 
J/3 If yes then please fill in the following table regarding credit information 
Source of 
Credit * 
Year Amount 
(Rs) 
Interest 
Rate 
Purpose Duration Installments 
Number 
Installments 
amount 
 [ _____] [ ____ ] [ ____ ] [ ____ ] [ ____ ] [ _______ ]  [ _______ ] 
*1. Formal (Banks / Govt. Institutions/ NGO‟s/ One window credit scheme) 2. Informal 
(Friends / Relatives / Commission agent) 
 
J/ 4 Have you information about all available credit sources [  _________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
J/5 Have any of your family member ever availed credit facility [  _____ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
J/6 Ever this happened that your application for loan was rejected [ ____ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
J/7 Reason of not taking credit [ _________________________________________ ] 
1. High interest rate 2. No Guarantee 3. Difficult procedure 4. Other [ _____________ ]   
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Inputs Availability on Credit 
 
J/8 Do you buy inputs on credit [______________________________] 1. Yes 2.  No 
 
J/9 If yes then names of inputs taken on credit  
1. [ __________] 2. [ __________] 3. [ __________] 4. [ __________] 
 
J/10 Prices at which offered in Rupees  
1. [ __________] 2. [ __________] 3. [ __________] 4. [ __________] 
 
J/11 Market Price of the Inputs in Rupees 
1. [ __________] 2. [ __________] 3. [ __________] 4. [ __________] 
 
J/12 Difference in Price  
1. [ __________] 2. [ __________] 3. [ __________] 4. [ __________] 
 
Farmer’s Membership 
J/13 Are you a member of any organization   [ __________________ ] 1. Yes 2.  No 
 
J/14 If yes then please provide the following information 
Organization Name Membership Year Meeting Frequency / month 
[ ________________ ] [ ________________ ] [ ______________________ ] 
 
J/15 Benefits from the organization [ ______ ] [ ________ ], Please use codes 
1. Information 2. Marketing help  3. Credit  4. Extension advice  5. Others [ ______ ] 
 
Farmer’s Source of Information 
 
J/16 Do agriculture extension department visit you [  ________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
J/17 If yes then Frequency of visit [  ____________ ] 1. Weekly   2. Monthly  3. Once / 
season 4. Never 
 
J/18 Have you ever visited extension office for information? [  ______ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
J/19 Do you know about the location of the extension office [  ______ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
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J/20 Most popular source of information, Please fill below by choosing from the 
following choices ( 1. TV 2. Radio 3. Newspaper 4. Extension agents 5. Fellow Farmers 
6. Any Other [ ________] 
1. [ __________] 2. [ __________] 3. [ __________] 4. [ __________] 
 
J/21 Ranking of Problems / Constraints or Lack of Information 
Lack of Information/Constraints/ 
Problems  
 Please cross [ x ] the Constraints by 
severity 
Very High   High     Medium    Low    Very Low 
No 
[ x ] 
Lack of Production Technology 
Information 
[ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
High Price of Inputs [ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Poor Quality of inputs [ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Lack of guidance from extension 
department 
[ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Severe attack of insect, pest and 
disease 
[ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Lack of information about Support 
Price 
[ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Non availability of credit facility [ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Less market prices of cotton [ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
No crop Insurance system [ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
No Government Purchasing points  [ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Non availability of Transport [ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Lack of information about IPM 
Programme 
[ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Bad weather during cotton season [ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
Non availability of Official Bt cotton 
seed 
[ ___ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] [ _ ] [ __ ] [ _ ] 
 
J/22 Percentage of crop destroyed due to bad weather [ _____________________ ] 
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K- Labour Availability and Wage Rates  
 
K/1 Do you hire labour for your farm activities? [ ______________ ] 1 =Yes, 2 = No 
 
K/2 What is your source of labour for farm activities and how much do you pay for hired 
labour 
Activity  Sourc
e of 
labour 
No. of 
days per 
season 
Hours 
per 
day 
No. Of 
hired 
labourers 
Wage rate 
(Rupees) 
Unit 
1=day 
2=month 
3= acre 
4= other 
Land preparation [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Seed Sowing [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Weeding [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Hoeing [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Irrigation [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Fertilizer [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Pesticide Spray [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Cotton picking [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Marketing 
 
[ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
Others ______ [ ___ ] [ ____ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] 
 
K/2 Source of labour 
1= Male Family member           2= Female Family member  3=Male hired labour  
4=Female hired labour  5. Others [ ___________________________ ] 
 
K/3 What is the wage rate per day during the cotton season in Rupees [ __________ ] 
 
K/4 Wage rate during the off-season in Rupees [ ________ ] 
 
K/5 Are female labourers for cotton picking are easily available [ ______ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
K/6 Is the wage rate same for male and female [ ____________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
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Disposal of sticks 
 
K/7 How do you dispose-off sticks [___] 1.Burn 2. For home use 3. Others [ ______] 
 
K/8 What is the approximate value of the Sticks in Rupees [____________________] 
 
IPM Questions 
K/9 Deep ploughing of soil [ ___________________________________ ] 1. Yes 2. No  
 
K/10 Planting of Okra [ _______________________________________ ] 1. Yes 2. No  
 
K/11 Planted only recommended varieties [ _______________________ ] 1. Yes 2. No  
 
K/12 Before cutting of stubbles goats has the goats been grazed [ ____ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
K/13 Has the cotton sticks been put under sun for drying [ ________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
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Marketing System 
 
L/1 Cotton Selling Decision Making 
Please choose from below where you sold cotton crop during 2006-07 
 [ __________ ] [ ___________ ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L/2 Where did you sell during the last year [ ________________] [ _______________] 
 
L/3 Cotton Production and Sale for year 2006-07 
Selling Agency Total Quantity Sold Price per mound Total Price 
received  
A- Farm Gate [ _____________ ] [ ____________ ] [ _____________ ] 
B- Market [ _____________ ] [ ____________ ] [ _____________ ] 
  
L/4 Is there variety-wise difference in Prices?  [ ___________________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
L/5 If yes What is the difference in prices between highest and lowest varieties [ ____ ] 
 
L/6 Which variety have more market value [ ________________________________ ] 
 
L/7 Time of Selling 
After 1st 
Picking 
1=Yes 2= No 
After 2nd 
Picking 
1=Yes 2= No 
After 3rd 
Picking 1=Yes 
2= No 
After 4th 
Picking 1=Yes 
2= No 
After all Picking 
1=Yes 2= No 
[ __________ ] [ __________ ] [ __________ ] [ __________ ] [ __________ ] 
L/8 Sell when the prices are highest [ ____________________________  ]1. Yes 2. No 
 
    A 1. To Commission agent at farm gate 
2. To pesticide company at farm gate 
    B 3. To tehsil / district Market  (Town Market) 
4. To government purchasing point 
 5. Any other (specify) [ _________________ ] 
 162 
L/9  
Normally when do you make decision about  
the marketing of cotton [ _________________ ] 
 
 
Quality  
 
L/10 Does the cotton price vary with quality [ _____________________  ]1. Yes 2. No 
 
L/11 How do you take care of quality, please choose from the choices [ __]+ [ __ ]+ [ _] 
1. Care while handling 2. Give instructions to pickers for clean picking 3. Manual 
cleaning 
 
L/12 Relationship between Quality and Price 
Quality * 
[ ______ ] 
Price  received for 1 
maund 
Maximum Price 
offered (excellent 
quality) 
Difference in Price b/w 
price offered and received 
[ ______ ] [ _____________ ] [ ____________ ] [ _///////___________ ] 
* 1= Excellent clean from dust, leaves and other materials etc.    2= Very Good there is 
one part that is very little affected, over all looks good     3=Medium, almost one third is 
filled with small leaves and dust   4= Poor a lot of mixing of dust and leaves  
 
L/13 Price Fluctuations during the Season 
Price (Tick) Early 
Season 
Middle 
Season 
Late 
Season 
Variation in Rates 
 1= Daily 2=Weekly 3=Monthly 
4=No variation 
Farm gate [ ____ ]  [ ____ ]  [ ____ ]  [ __________________________ ]  
Market [ ____ ]  [ ____ ]  [ ____ ]  [ __________________________ ]  
 
Weights / Balances Used & Packing Material  
 
L/14What are the sources of weight / balance [ ___ ] 1. Own 2. Commission agent  3. 
Market agent 
 
L/15 Are you satisfied with the weight / balance [ _______________ ] 1= Yes 2= No 
 
L/16 Do you pack cotton in bags / packing material [ ______________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
1. Before Sowing 
2. During season before harvesting 
3. After harvesting 
4. Other please specify [ __________ ] 
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L/17 If yes then total cost of packing material [___________________________ ]  
 
M- Credit / Advance/ Token money Taken from Commission Agent   
(Please fill the following information only if the farmer sells to the commission agent / 
farm gate if the farmer sells at the market switch to part N) 
 
M-1 Have you obtained credit / Advance /Token money from commission agent?  
[ _______________________________________________ ] 1. Yes 2. No   
 
M-2 Amount of credit / Advance /Token money in Rupees [ ____________________]  
 
M-3 Total number of commission agents / factory person visiting during the season [ _]  
 
M-4 Do you sell cotton to the same commission agent each season [ ____ ] 1. Yes 2. 
No   
 
M-5 Timing of agreement with the commission agent [ __ ] 1. Before harvesting 2. After 
harvesting  
 
M-6 Agreement with commission agent [ _________________ ] 1. Verbal 2. Written   
 
M/7 Do you receive all the payment at the selling time [ ____________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
M-8 If not then total number of instalments in which the payment received [ ______ ] 
 
Selection of Commission Agent 
 
M-9 Please inform that which things you mostly consider while selecting the 
commission agent, Please fill from the below choices [ ____________________ ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Reputation of the Commission agent 
2. Previous Years Experience 
3. Rate Offered by the commission agent 
4. Friends / Relatives Relation with the commission agent 
5. Any other, pl. specify[ ________________________ ] 
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M-10 Have ever commission agent defaulted [ ______________ ] 1. Yes 2. No  
 
N/1 Reasons of selling at the farm gate (complete only if farmer sell at farm gate) 
Reasons of Selling at the Farm Gate Please evaluate the reason  
Very High    High      Medium      Low       Very  
                                                                     Low 
Not  a 
reason 
Less Production [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Transportation costs are high [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Non availability of Transport [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Market is at far off place [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
There is not much difference in Price [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Taken credit from commission agent [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Purchased inputs on credit [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Shortage of labour at marketing time [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Sometimes while marketed less rates 
are offered 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
No information about market prices [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
No storing place available [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Immediate need of money [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
Quality is not good [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ _ ] [ __] [ ___ ] 
 
Transport Availability for Marketing 
(Please fill the following information only if the farmer has sold the cotton in the market)  
 
O-1 Mode of Transport 
Mode* Fare 1 
Round 
Trip 
Weight 
Carried in 
1 Trip 
(maunds) 
Own 
Transport 
1= Yes  
2=No 
If hired then source from 
where transport was 
hired  
1= Friends and relatives 
2= Same village farmers 
3= Other village farmers 
Non 
Availability 
1. Yes 
2. No 
[ ___ ] [ ___ ] [ ______ ] [ _______ 
] 
[ ___________________ 
] 
[ _______ ] 
Mode* 1. Tractor Trolley 2. Truck 3. Animal Cart 4. Any Other (Pl. Specify) [ ________ ] 
 
O-2 Total transport visit to the market for cotton marketing [ ___________________ ]  
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O-3 Difference in fare during cotton season and off-season in Rupees [ ____________]  
 
Taxes paid while selling at Market / Factory 
 
O-4 Do you have to pay Chungi / Zila tax while travelling to market [ __ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
O-5 If yes then amount of tax paid in Rupees [ _____ ] weight for which tax paid [ _ ] 
 
O-6 Do you have to pay Thara tax / place tax in the market [ ________ ] 1. Yes 2. No  
 
O-7 If yes then amount of tax paid in Rupees [ ___ ] Quantity of Cotton for which tax 
paid[ _____________________________________________ ] 
 
O-8 Please mention name and amount of any other tax paid [ ______ ] [ ______ ] 
 
O-9 Distance of nearest market 
Please provide information about the distance of nearest market in kms [ __________ ]  
 
P- Sources of Income 
 
P/1 Please provide information about your primary source / main source of income, 
choose from the below choices [ _______________ ] 
1. Agriculture, 2. Business, 3. Employment, 4. Labour 5. Others [ __________ ] 
 
P/2 Are you also doing off-farm work [ _____________ ] 1. Yes 2. No 
 
P/3 Approximate per day time spent on off-farm work [ _____________________ ] 
 
 Agriculture Employment Business Others 
# of Family members 
engaged 
[ _______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] [ ______ ] 
Income per month [ _______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] [ ______ ] 
Income per season [ _______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] [ ______ ] 
Income Year [ _______ ] [ _________ ] [ ______ ] [ _______ ] 
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Q-1 Problems in Cotton Production and marketing 
 
1.____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q-2 Suggestions to improve Cotton Production and Marketing System 
(Suggestions at village level, institutional level and national level etc.) 
1.____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
(Please say Thanks to dear farmer for his time and useful information). 
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